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It is safe to say that in the historiography of the “golden age of economic growth in Western 
Europe” (Crafts 1995), international capital flows and foreign investment are the poor relation of 
international trade. Emblematically for this state of affairs, Christoph Buchheim (1990) devotes 
only a few pages to the liberalisation of cross-border capital flows in his comprehensive study of 
“the reintegration of West Germany into the World economy, 1945-1958”. This imbalance is not 
a coincidence. Instead, it mirrors the differential development of international trade as opposed to 
international capital flows during the early post-war period. European reconstruction was 
accompanied by a rapid expansion of cross-border trade. Contemporaries were especially stunned 
with the export performance of the new Federal Republic of Germany. In January 1954, the 
Financial Times of London reflected on the “commonly held view” that apparently “nothing could 
arrest the long series of German successes”. Among the country’s greatest successes was “the 
meteoric rise in German exports since 19501”. Historians of the period have accordingly 
characterised the German post-war ‘miracle’ as a prime example of export-led growth (Giersch et. 
al 1992, 71). Even though this verdict is not shared universally (Crafts & Toniolo 1996, 12), it has 
been confirmed recently by Vonyó (2018, 171), at least for the period until the mid-1950s. 
In contrast, the growth of international capital flows was much lower during the 1940s and most 
of the 1950s, especially as far as continental Europe is concerned2. Large private, cross-border 
capital movements, notably from the United States towards the European market, only picked up 
during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. The resulting time lag of approximately one decade 
between international trade and investment is not a coincidence either. Post-war reconstruction 
was deliberately shielded through pervasive exchange controls from disturbances by movements 
of international capital (Obstfeld & Taylor 1997, 27). Organized international capital markets re-
emerged only during the second half of the 1950s for the first time after the War with the growth 
of offshore Eurodollar markets (Schenk 1998). Previously, foreign investment had typically been 
limited to reinvesting asset returns in the countries in which they had arisen (Wilkins 1974, 308). 
As a consequence, there are very few contributions to the literature that are devoted to foreign 
investment or international capital flows specifically during the first post-war decade. Notable 
exceptions embrace a business history perspective.  
                                                 
1 The Financial Times of Saturday, January 16, 1954, p. 4: “How well has Germany done?”. 
2 Great Britain serves as an outlier in this respect, experiencing large inflows of Foreign Direct Investment by 
corporations from the United States already during the late 1940s and early 1950 (Schenk 1996). 
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For the example of West Germany, Wubs (2012) studies the fate of Dutch multinationals on the 
German market, and Eck (2003) performs a similar exercise for French companies. The extensive 
literature on the European Recovery Program also relates to capital flows in as much as American 
taxpayer funds disbursed across Western Europe during the late 1940s and early 1950s represent 
publicly mandated transfers of investment capital (Eichengreen & Uzan 1992). However, to my 
knowledge, there are as yet no systematic studies of how private foreign investment resumed in 
one particular country during an early period after the end of the Second World War. 
 
The papers assembled in this dissertation attempt to fill this gap in the literature for the important 
case of West Germany. It is important, on the one hand, because it had been a frequent destination 
of foreign investment since the 19th century, notably in manufacturing (Blaich 1984). On the other 
hand, West Germany during the early post-war period represented an investment destination with 
a unique recent history. It had been isolated from international capital markets for almost two 
decades after the financial crisis of 1931. It had notoriously defaulted on its foreign indebtedness 
during the 1930s. And it had caused an entire World War under an extremely aggressive, dictatorial 
regime. How did inward foreign investment recover from such upheavals? Who were the first 
movers who chose to commit new capital to that country, earlier than anybody else? How 
important were past misdeeds, such as external default, for investment decisions after the War?  
 
To paraphrase the Financial Times, one crucial empirical impediment to answering these questions 
is “the long series of German successes” over the course of the 1950s. By the end of the decade, 
the Federal Republic had become a ‘miracle’ country boasting extraordinary economic prosperity 
and political, as well as monetary stability, even in comparison to its similarly prosperous Western 
European neighbours (Carlin 1996, 457). To all intents and purposes, it had become a regular host 
country for foreign investment, as indeed manifest in the steady increase of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) during the following decade (see Table 6 below). Thus, when FDI finally picked 
up at an elevated pace, the potential relevance of past crises for that FDI had likely been obscured 
by the successful recovery in the meantime. As a consequence, those questions need to be 
answered through a careful analysis of the earliest instances of foreign investment after the War, 
occurring during the first half of the 1950s. This extensive margin of FDI unfolded within an 
environment of contemporary exchange controls that largely referred potential investors to a 
peculiar form of investment finance in the form of blocked non-resident accounts with German 
banks, so-called Sperrmark. By way of introduction, therefore, Chapter One traces the history of 
Sperrmark and the concomitant regulation of investment projects.  
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Due to their transferability among non-residents since early 1951, Sperrmark became an 
international medium of exchange that allowed arbitrage operations between national securities 
markets. They established indirect Deutschmark convertibility for non-residents several years 
before direct convertibility at the official exchange rate would be introduced. Moreover, the 
regulatory environment for foreign investment was effectively liberal due to a peculiar political 
compromise among Allied occupying powers. This opened up a broad range of serious investment 
opportunities relatively early after the end of the War. At the same time, it gave rise to many illegal 
conversion opportunities. In this way, the historical episode shows that foreign investment was 
possible even in the absence of full convertibility, while the effectiveness of convertibility 
restrictions that were in place after the Second World War was questionable. The difference to 
subsequent full convertibility was thus one of degree, rather than kind.  
 
On this basis, Chapter Two proceeds to analysing the extensive margin itself, in the form of the 
universe of direct investment projects during approximately the first five years following the lifting 
of the Allied investment embargo in June 1950. It turns out that foreign investors who had already 
been active in Germany during the interwar era played an important role in resuming FDI into 
West Germany after the Second World War. They tended to invest earlier and more frequently 
than other groups of investors after the War. Moreover, their historically established presence 
plays a significant role in the investment decision of new, post-war entrants. The latter tended to 
locate in districts with high concentration of companies historically under foreign ownership. This 
effect is present even after controlling for a range of other factors, notably also country-specific 
agglomeration. The Chapter thus reveals the strong persistence of investment patterns across a 
quarter century of War and economic crisis. It also contributes to a recent literature on the 
importance of ethnic ties in FDI decisions (Burchardi et al. 2018). In early post-war Germany, the 
reason why foreigners identifiable as being of German origin invested significantly earlier than 
other groups was because they already had liquid capital inside the country at their disposal. Their 
effect vanishes once the sample is restricted to the investment of new foreign capital.  
 
Following these general findings, the final chapter explores one specific issue in the context of 
post-war foreign investment. The settlement of Germany’s default through the London Debt 
Agreement of 1953 has been credited invariably with restoring the country’s creditworthiness on 
international capital markets, and has therefore received a considerable degree of attention in 
public debate on present-day debt crises. However, empirical evidence supporting the beneficial 
effect of the Agreement is scarce and prone to problems of post hoc ergo propter hoc.  
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To overcome these problems, Chapter Three offers two perspectives on the contemporaneous 
rather than the lagged impact of the Agreement. On the one hand, the market for Sperrmark, 
representing the means of investing in Germany at the time of the Agreement, provides an 
instantaneous measure for the Agreement’s impact on German creditworthiness. Testing for 
structural breaks in the Sperrmark price series reveals that the Agreement certainly did have an 
impact, but through its role in restoring direct convertibility of asset returns rather than through 
the debt settlement itself. On the other hand, the data introduced in Chapter Two makes it possible 
to estimate the effect which outstanding pre-war debt had on post-war investment in the first place. 
Results based on two different debt measures for contemporary German districts show that 
outstanding debt did not represent a solvency risk for German debtors. Debt settlement in the 
London Agreement did not have a differential impact on investment on the local level according 
to whether the particular district owed any outstanding debt. 
 
The empirical results derived in this dissertation rest on an extensive archival data set that was 
collected from textual records held at the German Federal Archives. They are complemented by 
two more archival data sets, collected from records held at the Archives of the German Bundesbank 
and the United States National Archives respectively. All these records have, to my knowledge, 
never been digitized before. These particular circumstances create a number of complications for 
data processing and interpretation. On the one hand, post-war data collected from the German 
Federal Archives essentially represent a register of foreign willingness to invest during a particular 
period of time, and therefore suffer from right truncation. As a consequence, simple statistical 
inference based on individual investors as units of observation risks lacking external validity, a 
problem discussed at length in Chapter Two. On the other hand, the process of digitisation required 
making a range of judgement calls that are necessarily open to criticism. The consistency of the 
final data set, for example, necessitates excluding a variety of investment projects on a 
discretionary basis. Such decisions are frequently based on third sources outside of the original 
records. However, for each instance concerned, I justify my decision in detail in the extensive 
appendix. In general, it is important to note that key measures like the indicator variables for 
German emigrants or pre-war investors represent lower bounds: They indicate those investors for 
whom I was able to verify their national origins or their pre-war investment activity in Germany. 
Nevertheless, studied with due care the data allow for answering relevant research questions which 
the existing literature has not been able to answer. Combined with a detailed account of the 
historical circumstances and supporting statistical evidence, they contribute to our understanding 
of a previously neglected dimension of the early post-war international economy. 
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CHAPTER I: Sperrmark and currency convertibility during the early 1950s 
 
 
The economic history of exchange controls has been written largely from a macroeconomic 
perspective, exemplified by the growing body of research on the functioning of the Bretton Woods 
system after the Second World War. This paper complements the existing literature by providing 
a micro study of exchange controls in the Federal Republic of Germany during the first half of the 
1950s. The legal trade outside of Germany in inconvertible non-resident accounts with German 
banks, commonly known as Sperrmark, from early 1951 onwards opened up foreign investment 
opportunities in German assets at a time when the German capital account remained virtually 
closed. It established indirect non-resident convertibility of Deutschmark and thus provided an 
effective early means for arbitrage between otherwise still segmented markets. Moreover, 
relatively liberal regulations prevented stringent policing of exchange controls on the level of 
private companies. Resulting conversion opportunities show that effective enforcement of 
convertibility restrictions was incompatible with a policy of encouraging foreign investment. 
Overall, the German example reveals that the difference between Bretton-Woods convertibility 
after 1958 and the prior period of inconvertible currencies was one of degree, not of kind. 
 
Introduction 
“One of the strangest features of the international monetary scene during the past few months has 
been the emergence of the blocked German mark as a kind of international medium of exchange”3. 
In October 1951, the Financial Times was astonished that German currency should have developed 
into an “international medium of exchange”, in particular inconvertible, non-resident Deutschmark 
accounts held with German private banks4. Blocked German mark, commonly known as 
Sperrmark, had been an essential feature of German exchange controls since the early 1930s. 
                                                 
3 The Financial Times of Thursday, October 25, 1951, p. 4: “D-Marks as International Currency”. 
4 In this paper, the terms “non-resident” and “foreign” refer to any individual or entity legally residing outside the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, a German national living in France would be a foreigner, while a French national 
living in West Germany would be German. This categorization reflects German exchange control legislation, which 
had been primarily designed as an instrument to prevent capital flight, rather than to control assets in Germany owned 
by nationals of other countries. Equally, I will use the terms “Germany” and “West Germany” interchangeably. 
Eastern Germany, represented by the German Democratic Republic (GDR), is irrelevant for the purpose of this paper, 
as GDR residents had been barred from financial transactions with Western Europe since the end of the War. Nor does 
(Western) Germany include the Saar area on the border with France and Luxembourg. This territory had been 
integrated with France at the end of the War and only acceded to the Federal Republic in January 1957, i.e. after the 
period under consideration in this paper. 
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In fact, blocked non-resident balances of some form were a common feature of exchange control 
systems all across Europe at the time (Obstfeld & Taylor 1998, 374). However, they have so far 
received relatively little attention themselves in the literature. Most historical research that deals 
with capital and exchange controls has been focused on the institutions of international economic 
cooperation, or on macroeconomic aspects of international capital flows. The “inconsistent trinity” 
(Obstfeld & Taylor 2004, 30) of free cross-border capital flows, fixed exchange rates and 
independent monetary policy has been studied extensively, as has the link between capital controls 
and economic growth (Eichengreen & Leblang 2003, 4ff.), or the macroeconomic impact of capital 
account liberalization across countries (Eichengreen 2001). Specifically for the post-war period, 
contributions range from comprehensive surveys of the Bretton-Woods system (Bordo & 
Eichengreen 1993) and large histories of international monetary cooperation (James 1996) to more 
detailed accounts of the origins of “Bretton-Woods” (James 2012), as well as country studies 
(Monnet 2017, Bordo 2014). Equally, the history of the European Payments Union, a multilateral, 
current-account clearing system directly dependent on the existence of exchange controls in 
member states, has been written either from an institutional perspective (Kaplan & Schleiminger 
1989) or has been embedded into a wider narrative about the post-war reconstruction of Western 
Europe (Eichengreen 1993). The effects of exchange controls, of their reform or altogether of their 
removal constitute a central part of these studies. Yet the precise functioning of these controls 
themselves are hardly ever discussed in any detail, but rather taken for granted. There are a number 
of notable exceptions with respect to the United Kingdom: Catherine Schenk has written 
extensively on the international history of Pound Sterling during the 1950s (Schenk 1994a), 
covering British exchange restrictions, as well as the different types of inconvertible Sterling 
similar to German Sperrmark (Schenk 2010, 101). When studying official interventions in the 
Pound Sterling exchange markets at the time, Schenk (1994b), Klug and Smith (1999) and recently 
Naef (2017) devote considerable attention to the regulatory regime under which these markets 
worked in the first place. One key finding emerges from the British experience: Interventions met 
with limited success, not the least because there were many opportunities to evade existing capital 
controls (Klug & Smith 1999, 185).  
Their ineffectiveness in the face of rampant evasion had been a central criticism already during 
the 1930s. The well-known British journalist Paul Einzig observed that “exchange restrictions tend 
to become a penalty on loyalty and a premium on disloyalty”, the more distortive they would be 
(Einzig 1977, 111). In characteristically stark terms, he called them “utterly inefficient and 
impossible to enforce” (ibid., 107).  
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At about the same time, however, he conceded that they were in fact “practically watertight” in 
National Socialist Germany (Einzig 1935, 184), because they were applied with “draconian rigour” 
(Einzig 1977, 120). In the same vein, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004, 135) claim that controls had 
become fairly effective by the time Einzig raised his criticism during the mid-1930s.  
For the case of Germany, renunciation to apply such draconian rigour represented the key 
difference between the 1930s and the early 1950s, despite a high degree of legal contitinuity. 
Sperrmark accounts remained officially inconvertible from 1931 to 1954, as did asset returns on 
foreign property located in Germany. Foreign exchange proceeds had to be surrendered to the 
Central Bank, and price controls on foreign trade were maintained in order to ensure the steady 
growth of currency reserves. At the same time, however, the political dynamic had changed from 
the National Socialist autarky drive of the 1930s towards the integration of Germany into the post-
war Western world economy. Moreover, with Allied occupation, the governments of Germany’s 
interwar creditor countries directly took over administration of the debtor country. The particular 
compromise reached between differing interests among Allied powers resulted in fairly liberal 
regulation of non-resident investment after the lifting of the investment embargo in June 1950. 
Importantly, the early introduction of Sperrmark tradability in March 1951 meant that 
Deutschmark became indirectly convertible in outward direction for non-residents. Stock market 
arbitrage between Germany and important financial centres abroad picked up in due course. In 
addition, private German companies, encouraged to increase their international activities, were 
soon authorized to resume certain financial transactions with their foreign counterparts, such as 
the payment of royalties or management fees, which in turn were hard to police. Finally, the 
discount on Sperrmark prevalent on foreign markets until early 1954 encouraged evasion of 
existing exchange controls by providing strong incentives towards illegal conversion of nominally 
frozen assets. All in all, taking a micro view on the implementation of exchange controls at the 
time shows that they were in reality rather patchy. This is not to say that exchange controls did not 
matter. As will be seen in Chapter Three, for example, the restoration of official convertibility of 
investment returns at the official Deutschmark parity was an important precondition for restoring 
investor confidence into the German economy. However, the present paper emphasizes the gradual 
nature of the “return to convertibility of the European currencies” (Carli 1988), which in the case 
of Germany began in earnest by 1950. While this has been established already by previous research 
for trade payments under the European Payments Union, it holds equally true for capital 
transactions such as the ones carried out using Sperrmark. The remainder of the paper is organized 
into three broad sections, respectively tracing the different dimensions of this gradual process 
towards convertibility. The first section introduces the financial history of Sperrmark.  
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The second section turns to the regulation of foreign investment into German private companies 
and resulting contradictions between liberal regulation and effective enforcement of exchange 
controls. The final section then provides evidence for the smooth functioning of investment and 
stock market arbitrage through Sperrmark transactions, in particular for the example of stocks of 
Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG).  
 
A short history of Sperrmark 
Blocked non-resident accounts were a central feature of German capital controls for more than a 
quarter century, between July 1931 and June 1958. On July 13, 1931, the failure of the Danatbank 
triggered a run on the German banking system. The Reich government reacted by declaring two 
bank holidays and took advantage of the respite to enact a host of emergency measures, suspending 
convertibility of the Reichsmark and thus taking Germany off the interwar gold-exchange standard 
(Schnabel 2004, 853). In order to stop rampant capital flight, all foreign exchange transactions 
were centralized with the Reichsbank and commissioned private banks, respectively. Payments 
abroad became subject to government approval (Banken 2006, 125). Accordingly, bank accounts 
owned by non-residents remained blocked when banks gradually reopened during the following 
two weeks. Current payments to foreigners, such as debt interest and dividends, however, 
remained fully convertible in practice, even though capital controls became ever more pervasive. 
Moreover, the original intention of controls was clearly to prevent capital flight, and not to 
manipulate foreign trade flows (Banken 2006, 144). The situation changed with the advent of the 
National Socialist regime. In June 1933 Germany defaulted on all its foreign obligations, with only 
a few temporary exceptions. From then on, German private individuals or companies had to make 
any payments due to non-residents to the newly founded Konversionskasse für deutsche 
Auslandsschulden, thus opening a blocked account on the foreigner’s behalf (Lückefahr 1958, 37). 
Under German law, the German payer was discharged from her debt through this Reichsmark 
payment, irrespective of the contractual currency. Subsequent conversion into the payee’s 
currency was subject to bilateral negotiations among national governments. Concessions with 
respect to German exports typically resulted in higher conversion quota (Frech 2001, 68), yet as a 
rule, these quotas steadily shrank as the regime’s balance of payments and thus its currency 
reserves continued to deteriorate over the course of the 1930s (Boelcke 1994, 35). The Second 
World War naturally ended all transactions with belligerent nations, while investors from neutral 
countries could convert some of their German earnings as late as 1945 (Frech 2001, 244). As a 
result of growing restrictions the quantity of blocked funds and the complexity of the system grew.  
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Ten broad categories of Sperrmark existed at the outbreak of the War (Dernburg 1955, 20), not 
including certain trade-related types, which played an important role in German clearing 
agreements with South-Eastern Europe for a few years after 1934 (Neal 1979). The purposes for 
which non-resident users were authorized to spend their blocked funds inside Germany varied 
among the different Sperrmark categories. They generally included personal travel expenses and 
payment of taxes, as well as long-term investment in stocks and bonds. Some types could also be 
used for direct investment into German companies, and even for the purchase and export of 
German goods (Lückefahr 1958, 63ff). As most types were transferable among non-residents, they 
simultaneously traded in foreign financial centres at varying discounts, according to the varying 
breadth of disbursement opportunities (Dernburg 1955, 20). This plethora of German “funny 
money” (Neal 1979, 393) was heavily criticised in creditor countries, contributing to the “immense 
amount of ill-feeling abroad” (Einzig 1934, 42). Repaying parts of the country’s foreign-currency 
obligations in blocked Reichsmark represented a method of default that was considered dishonest 
(Einzig 1977, 126) and which was particularly disadvantageous for foreign creditors (Obstfeld & 
Taylor 1998, 374). For a while German authorities repurchased these blocked funds for export 
promotion purposes at prevailing discounts, with foreign exchange that could otherwise have 
served to honour contractual debt obligations (Ebi 2004, 40ff.). Importantly, the exchange controls 
system was also employed as an expropriation tool against emigrant Jews and other refugees 
(Banken 2006, 188). Emigrants were authorized to convert only a tiny fraction of their German 
capital into foreign exchange, paying the rest into special blocked accounts (Köhler 2005, 436).  
At the end of the War, Allied authorities retained the essence of existing controls. The different 
types of Sperrmark were unified and remained blocked for the time being. Retaining existing rules 
also implied that there was still no legal convertibility. Controls were actually tightened in some 
respects: Foreign assets were summarily sequestered and a moratorium on new foreign investment 
was declared (Buchheim 1990, 161). Non-residents could not be party to any financial transactions 
within Germany before July 1948, which barred them from disposing of their Sperrmark among 
other things (Kühne 1984, 8). Sequestration was lifted only gradually between July 1948 and 
August 1950, when new regulations allowed Sperrmark owners to invest their funds into virtually 
all kinds of German assets. Any investment returns or sale proceeds once again became blocked5. 
                                                 
5 Lückefahr (1948, 144). Since May 1949 non-resident owners could already sell their assets. They could also raise 
loans within Germany in order to cover operating costs or restore their assets to their pre-war state. This was strictly 
regulated, however, and the proceeds from selling assets became Sperrmark (Kühne 1984, 87). Other limited 
investments and types of expenditures could already be made in 1949, too: Sperrmark could be used for own travelling 
expenses inside Germany, the taxes payments and private support payments. These disbursements were subject to 
official approval and tight monthly limits, cf. Kühne (1984, 130ff). 
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A crucial regulatory change occurred on March 3, 1951, when Sperrmark became legally 
negotiable among non-residents. The reform allowed for the emergence of official currency 
markets for so-called ‘acquired’ Sperrmark outside the Federal Republic, as opposed to ‘original’ 
Sperrmark of historic investors (Dernburg 1955, 23). From now on, a prospective investor who 
had never before owned any assets in Germany was able to newly commit her foreign capital to 
the German economy, for the first time since the end of the War. On the level of Germany’s balance 
of payments, she would buy an existing claim against the country from another non-resident, not 
giving rise to any additional capital inflow. On the individual level, however, she would have 
exchanged capital in her home country against capital in Germany. Subsequently disbursing the 
acquired Sperrmark balance for a German asset of her choice would create genuinely additional 
foreign investment on the individual, if not on the macro level. Analogously, the new rules 
provided legal, indirect conversion opportunities for non-residents at the Sperrmark exchange rate. 
The first step towards direct convertibility at the official Deutschmark parity was taken on 
September 30, 1953, when current returns on pre-1931 investments were made convertible with 
respect to countries that had signed the London Debt Agreement on February 27. Further 
relaxations occurred on December 19, 1953, and finally on February 1, 1954, when current returns 
on all non-resident assets were made directly convertible with respect to all countries. Sperrmark 
balances themselves followed soon. The introduction of so-called limited convertible non-resident 
DM accounts (Beko-Mark) in April 1954 established their direct convertibility for the benefit of  
residents of soft-currency countries, that is, fellow member states of the European Payments Union 
and Latin American countries. Beyond their role in facilitating convertibility Beko-Mark notably 
represented the first variety of German blocked accounts after the War that could also be used for 
financing German exports, just as it had been the case for Sperrmark during the 1930s (Dernburg 
1955, 28). The resulting discrimination against residents of hard-currency countries was abolished 
with the substitution of Sperrmark by liberalized capital accounts (Libka-Mark) in September 1954 
(Dickhaus 1996, 191). For the purpose of foreign investment, Sperrmark and Libka-Mark can be 
treated identically. The former was the means of investing in Germany between July 1950 and 
September 1954. The latter inherited this role until complete liberalization of the capital account 
in July 19586.  
Regarding the sources of these means of investing, additional Sperrmark could arise in four main 
ways during the first half of the 1950s: Foreign investment returns and sale proceeds of non-
resident assets together constituted the largest part, amounting to about 70% during 1952 and 1953.  
                                                 
6 The preceding chronology can be verified in Kühne (1984), p. 50, 86, 311, 407, 410 and 641. 
18 
 
An approximately further 15% came from settlement in Deutschmark of pre-war foreign debt 
denominated in foreign currency. Such settlement had been authorized since June 1950, if all 
foreign creditors of the German debtor consented (Rombeck-Jaschinski 2005, 94). The remainder 
consisted of restitution payments to non-resident victims of the National Socialist regime7. At first 
Allied, and later German legislation provided for the physical restitution of looted property to 
persecuted individual or their heirs (Goschler 2005). In case this was no longer feasible or an out-
of-court settlement was reached, current owners had to make compensation payments accordingly 
(Schwarz 1974, 175). Such payments were made to Sperrmark accounts as survivors had typically 
become non-residents by the early 1950s and no exception was made for them from the point of 
view of capital controls (Schwarz 1974, 373).  
Table 1: Largest categories of Sperrmark owners, as of 31st December 1953. 
 
The distribution of Sperrmark owners shown in Table 1 reflected the aforementioned sources, and 
the scattered distribution of original Sperrmark more generally. By the end of 1953, private 
individuals living in the U.S. constituted by far the largest category of historic owners, reflecting 
the role of the United States as both a prominent destination of German emigration and the most 
important home country of private investors during the interwar period (Ritschl 2002).  Concerning 
acquired Sperrmark, Switzerland was clearly at the centre of the international market. By the end 
of 1953, Swiss banks held more than a quarter of all acquired Sperrmark, while Table 2 shows that 
the overall Swiss share amounted to a full 46%. 
                                                 
7 The Bank deutscher Länder collected data on the composition of Sperrmark accounts during the period. The resulting 
statistics were annexed periodically to the protocols of the Central Bank Council, which can be accessed in the 
Bundesbank Archives under HABB B330. Unfortunately, the data is patchy as reporting methods changed repeatedly 
and a certain fraction of appendices has not survived. 
   Original Sperrmark    Acquired Sperrmark
percent of total percent of total
   US individuals 24,6%    Swiss banks 25,9%
   US companies 5,9%    Dutch companies 13,4%
   UK individuals 5,9%    Swiss companies 11,6%
   Swiss individuals 5,1%    Swiss individuals 7,8%
   French banks 4,3%    US individuals 6,9%
   Israeli individuals 4,3%    US companies 5,3%
   All six 50,0%    All six 70,9%
Source: HABB B330/76/2, Anlage zum Protokoll der 166. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats vom 31. März 1954 
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Table 2: Sperrmark ownership across countries, as of 31st December 1953. 
 
These figures correspond with Dernburg’s (1955, 25) verdict that Zurich was the most active 
market and as a whole a net buyer of Sperrmark, while New York was a net seller. Typically, 
Sperrmark was sold by original owners in the US or other countries to their local bank, which 
would in turn sell to large Swiss banks acting as market makers. Investors interested in purchasing 
assets in Germany would subsequently approach these banks for the necessary amounts of 
Sperrmark8. Dernburg (1955, 25) also identifies Zurich, New York and London as the three most 
important marketplaces, for which daily Sperrmark prices are given in Table 3. Regular daily price 
quotations for New York and Zurich first appeared in June 1951, three months after the legalisation 
of markets. Quotations for London start in January 1952 and end with the Sperrmark reform of 
September 1954. New York prices track Zurich prices very closely, if converted into Swiss Francs. 
This in itself is evidence to a highly integrated market between the only two financial centres with 
fully convertible national currencies during the early 1950s9. In this sense, the slightly higher price 
in London represented a convertibility premium on a national market with strict exchange controls.  
                                                 
8 The records of the German investment commission contains ample evidence for this process. For one example, see 
BArch B102.6774, 81. Sitzung (23.10.1953) Liste W., Nr. 40, Devisenprüfungsbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion 
Koblenz, vom 11.9.1954, p. 22. 
9 For conversion into Swiss Francs, I take the average of daily bid and ask prices (i.e. the mid-price) for the US-$ in 
Zurich, as reported by the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Technically, the Swiss Franc was not fully convertible with fellow 
currencies in the European Payments Union, depending on whether a given transaction was clearingpflichtig, i.e. had 
to be channelled via the EPU clearing system. 
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Table 3: Daily Sperrmark prices in Zurich, New York and London (all prices converted into CHF). 
 
Exchange controls and the regulation of foreign investment 
The technical history of Sperrmark introduced on the preceding pages is embedded into the 
broader historical context of Germany’s foreign financial relations during the early post-war 
period. These relations were shaped by an awkward compromise between two diverging policy 
objectives, namely a desire to liberalize the German economy and attract foreign investment on 
the one hand, and the perceived need for maintaining exchange controls on the other hand. As far 
as exchange controls are concerned, one episode neatly sums up their inherent dilemma: In June 
1952, the German economics minister Ludwig Erhard met with the Central Bank Council of the 
Bank deutscher Länder to discuss fundamental problems of exchange controls. Erhard made a 
passionate plea in favour of liberalisation. He argued for full Deutschmark convertibility as early 
as possible and wanted to retain controls only for capital account transactions. Wilhelm Vocke, 
the President of the Bank, replied drily that “in this case, they have to stay for everything”10.  
                                                 
10 HABB B330.57.1,  Prot. der 122. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 11.6.1952, Aussprache über die Probleme der 
Devisenbewirtschaftung, p. 9, Präs. Dr. Vocke: „Sie haben erklärt, Sie wollen zwar die Devisenzwangswirtschaft 
abschaffen, sind sich aber gleichzeitig der Notwendigkeit bewusst, dass sie für den Kapitalverkehr bleiben muss. Dann 
muss sie aber auch in toto bleiben“. 
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As Vocke realized, the effectiveness of controls required them to be pervasive, which quickly 
brought them into conflict with other policy aims. Private foreign investment during the early 
1950s offers a case in point for this problem. 
One striking feature of the historical context is that with the Allied occupation of Germany, 
governments of interwar creditor countries actually acquired military control over the defaulting 
debtor country for the time being. Such a situation could be interpreted as an extreme case of 
“supersanctions”, which had been occasionally applied against defaulting debtor countries before 
the First World War (Mitchener & Weidenmier 2010). If the analogy was accurate, the occupying 
powers would have ensured the swift and orderly resumption of payment on all external liabilities. 
The reality, however, was far more complex. The political dynamic of the nascent Cold War 
gravitated towards integrating West Germany into the Western Alliance, making it ever more 
unlikely that the country would be squeezed by external creditors11. Moreover, beyond these 
broader political considerations the occupation was costly to Allied governments on a purely 
financial level. Newly created state and Federal governments within Germany could be charged 
with internal occupation costs, but all external expenses had to be borne by Allied governments as 
long as German exports had not recovered sufficiently. For precisely this reason, the US insisted 
on a “first-charge principle” on German export revenue, which was to be spent on vital imports 
before any other claims, including returns on foreign-owned assets in Germany, could be satisfied 
(Buchheim 1990, 7). During 1947, in the context of an early proposal by American creditor banks 
for effectively unblocking their outstanding claims against German debtors, US Military 
Government rebuked the idea by pointing out that “such payment would in fact come from the 
American taxpayer who feeds Germany while the private creditor collects”12. The same rationale 
was one of the reasons why Allied governments imposed the embargo on new foreign investment 
into Germany in the first place. The returns on such investment would have constituted an 
additional liability on the country’s future foreign exchange revenue, already compromised by the 
eventual repayment of outstanding foreign debt and Allied assistance (Beckers 2014, 81)13.  
                                                 
11 This argument was already advanced in the contemporary press. On October 6, 1952, the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung published a piece on the rising creditworthiness of Germany among Swiss banks and financiers, writing about 
the mood of the latter (p. 7): “The danger of another German default can be discharged for the time being, because 
the Americans could not possibly allow West Germany to slide into default as a focal point of East-Western tensions”. 
12 IfZArch, OMGUS records, Shipment 2, Box 135-1, folder 7, Clear Text of Cable from OMGUS signed Keating to 
AGWAR, January 7, 1947. 
13 Two other reasons were: Firstly, early new foreign investment could have compromised other aspects of Allied 
policy such as dismantlement of German industry, possible socialisation of basic industries, and the chances of 
achieving a four-power agreement eventually (Buchheim 1990, 161). Secondly, the devaluated Reichsmark was 
retained as Germany’s currency for the time being. As a result, occupation authorities considered it undesirable that 
foreign investors would buy out large swaths of German industry at extremely favourable exchange rates if the 
embargo had been lifted before the currency reform (Becker 2014, 80). 
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At the outset, the American side had in fact intended the embargo in general, and the freezing of 
non-resident balances in particular to continue until a comprehensive debt settlement had been 
reached, in order to safeguard the interests of existing creditors. The European Allies, however, 
were opposed to this idea. For a time immediately after the end of the War, France had taken a 
number of initiatives to bring large companies in the French occupation zone under the control of 
French capital, even though such attempts were not successful in most cases (Eck 2003, 32). The 
British government on its part was under the intense pressure of its own standstill creditors to 
unfreeze blocked accounts, if not for direct convertibility than at least for use inside of Germany 
(Rombeck-Jaschinski 2005, 67). Over the course of the 1930s, British banks had become by far 
the most important holders of this particular type of German commercial credit which had been 
rolled over since the first standstill agreement of 1931 (Forbes 2000, 176). By settling with their 
German debtors in Deutschmark and selling the resulting Sperrmark, they would have been able 
to divest themselves of their frozen assets at an early point after the War14. As a consequence, the 
British side, assisted by demands made by Benelux governments, became the earliest and most 
determined proponents of opening up investment opportunities for Sperrmark reinvestment on the 
one hand, and for allowing indirect convertibility through Sperrmark tradability on the other hand 
(Buchheim 1990, 162). American officials were highly sceptical, pointing out that even limited 
reinvestment opportunities would already result in some degree of convertibility: “Even if 
relatively rigid enforcement [of] regulations were adopted, it seems impossible to us to prevent 
what would in effect be transfers to absentee owners through the mediary of residents of Western 
Germany”15. The American position, however, was not without its own contradictions. Following 
the stabilization of the German currency in mid-1948 and as part of the wider investment drive 
under the fledgling European Recovery Program, they started to argue for allowing new private 
foreign investment into Germany. These new investors, having paid for their German assets in 
foreign exchange, were supposed to have the right to subsequently convert asset returns back to 
their home country, while the returns of existing investments were to remain inconvertible and the 
use of Sperrmark inside Germany strictly limited (Buchheim 1990, 162). Such a policy would 
have resulted in discrimination of existing creditors, violating the principle of equal treatment that 
was otherwise defended by the US. In addition, strict discrimination between new and historic 
investors would likely have been an obstacle to fresh capital inflows.  
                                                 
14 British officials were quite frank on the importance of that ability, seeing it as a precondition of renewed German 
access to commercial credit provided by British banks; See HABB Prot. der 86. und 87. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats 
am 24.2., 28.2, und 1.3.1951, Bericht Dr. Stedtfeld of February 20, 1951. 
15 IfZArch, OMGUS records, Shipment 11, Box 322, folder 6, Office Memorandum from Fin.Div. - Mr. Leonard to 
GER - Mr. Koch, March 2, 1950. 
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As John McCloy, the US High Commissioner for Germany, noted in a memorandum to the US 
Secretary of State, “[…] from conversations with potential investors we seriously doubt any 
substantial volume [of] new money available under existing political and economic conditions if 
DM’s must be purchased at 4.20 rate or other fixed equivalent thereof. Moreover, new money for 
investment [is] unlikely while blocked DM overhang [remains]”16. As a consequence, and 
following lengthy negotiations, the American side essentially gave in to British and French 
demands. The embargo was lifted in June 1950 and broad opportunities for investment into 
German assets were opened up for Sperrmark owners. Furthermore, Sperrmark transferability 
among non-residents was to be introduced after an initial period of six months17. At the same time, 
direct convertibility of Sperrmark, including for new investment returns, was ruled out for the time 
being, in order to address US concerns about establishing a potentially costly precedent for a 
future, overall debt settlement. Even though Sperrmark owners were afforded indirect 
convertibility through the future Sperrmark market, the balances themselves remained locked in 
this way inside some type of German asset. For that purpose, they could be dispersed freely only 
into securities listed on official stock exchanges, as well as for verifiable building expenses. All 
other uses were subject to individual approval by the Bank deutscher Länder. Investments into 
German equity or loans to German companies were further subject to approval by the Federal 
finance and economics ministries, reunited with the Bank in an investment commission that made 
its decisions during biweekly meetings18. The commission was also charged with approving 
investment projects financed by foreign exchange. As far as regulatory practice was concerned, 
French and British negotiators insisted on liberal treatment. Any restrictions should be “no greater 
than applicable to German owners”19. The German authorities thus operated within a framework 
shaped by inter-Allied compromise. It was supposed to be both strict in enforcing convertibility 
restrictions in order to protect Germany’s foreign exchange revenue, and liberal in the treatment 
of foreign investors. According to Allied instructions, their regulatory practice ought to at the same 
time “safeguard Germany’s foreign exchange position, to prevent undue concentration of foreign 
capital in German industry and to provide equality of opportunity and treatment […] as between 
existing foreign owners of property, pre-war creditors and new foreign investors and German 
investors” (Rhein-Main Bank 1951, 21).  
                                                 
16 NARA RG 59-4351. Incoming Telegram No. 1341, McCloy to Acheson, received February 13, 1950. 
17 NARA RG 59-4351. Office Memorandum to Mr. John J. McCloy from Mr. Jean Cattier, subject foreign investment 
policy, dated May 6, 1950, p. 2. 
18 Original English-language versions of the regulations governing foreign investment after 1950 can be found in 
Rhein-Main Bank (1951). The complete records of the Investment Commission can be found in the Federal Archives 
in Koblenz, under the records of the Federal Economics Ministry from B102.6735 to B102.6811. 
19 NARA RG 59-4531. Telegram from Frankfort, signed Hays to Secretary of State, March 13, 1950. 
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Just as critics in the American administration had expected, the liberal regulatory practice thus 
stipulated enabled sundry opportunities for secretly unfreezing Sperrmark balances, despite the 
best efforts of the German authorities. Such opportunities existed already before Sperrmark 
became legally negotiable in March 1951. In fact, they existed even before the lifting of the 
embargo, through the so-called hollowing out (Aushöhlung) of blocked accounts. For that purpose, 
original account holders entered into a covert agreement with the bank managing the account. 
Holders would thereby pledge the account as collateral for bank lending to agents of the holder in 
Germany, while the agents would at the same time provide some form of token collateral for audit 
purposes. In this way, for example, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals could gain access to debt 
finance from German banks with the help of the nominally frozen assets of their foreign parents20. 
Moreover, Dernburg (1955, 24) reports the early post-war existence of a Sperrmark black market, 
in which transactions were effected through irrevocable powers of attorney. The original owner, 
having thus sold his account, would have achieved his aim of converting his frozen assets abroad. 
He would subsequently become a straw man for the new, effective owners. The latter could make 
him transfer his blocked account from its original German banking house to another, accomplice 
bank, typically a small private banking house, which accepted the account as a time deposit. The 
accomplice bank would then provide overdraft facilities to a German intermediary, ostensibly 
unrelated to, but in reality against the said deposit, who withdrew the balance in cash and 
transferred it abroad. This could be effected either by literally carrying a suitcase of Deutschmark 
notes across the border21, or by private clearing, in the context of which the intermediary repaid 
liabilities within Germany of a foreign individual or corporation in business with the effective 
Sperrmark owners abroad (so-called Zugunstenzahlung)22. In order to complete the scheme and 
balance the books of the accomplice bank, the effective owners would finally have the original 
owner apply for a licence with the German investment commission for granting a loan to the 
intermediary out of his time deposit, avowedly for the purpose of repaying her debts with the 
accomplice bank. In reality, the capital in question had long been converted abroad. These type of 
transactions worked because the German intermediary was either a dependent or a subsidiary of 
the effective Sperrmark owner23, or in fact the same person – through the use of shell companies24.  
                                                 
20 The corresponding example of the Swiss Siegfried AG is mentioned in BArch B.126.1560, sheet no. 92. 
21 One example of this method is given in BArch B126.1560 sheet no. 496, Letter Zollfahndungstelle Freiburg to 
Staatsanwaltschaft Freiburg, April 9, 1956. 
22 See for example BArch B126.1560 sheet no. 57, Letter Zollfahndungsstelle München to Oberfinanzdirektion 
München, December 3, 1952, p. 4; the same transaction is described in more detail in BArch B126.1561, sheet no. 
698-699. 
23 For an example of private clearing transactions involving foreign subsidiaries, see BArch B126.1561, sheet no. 104.  
24 A concise description of the practical functioning of these kind of transactions can be found in B126.1560 sheet no. 
66-67. Letter of  Gruppe DevÜ to OFD Nürnberg, June 18, 1952. 
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The way illegal conversion worked was clearly understood by German authorities and was 
believed to be widespread practice25. The introduction of legal Sperrmark tradability naturally 
widened conversion opportunities, and their profitability increased in the prevailing Sperrmark 
discount (Lückefahr 1958, 166). Original Sperrmark owners could henceforth legally sell their 
accounts, thereby creating a more transparent and more liquid market, which widened access to 
illegal conversion opportunities for interested parties that would otherwise not have been able to 
establish personal connections to original owners. Sperrmark loans could now be granted directly 
to an accomplice company in Germany, and the balance could be transferred abroad as soon as the 
investment commission had granted its approval. The high incentive towards illegal conversion 
via both cash transfers as well as private clearing transactions becomes clear from Table 4. During 
1952, 100 DM bought as Sperrmark for a price of about 65 CHF could be resold for about 90 CHF 
in the form of Deutschmark notes carried across the border. As far as private clearing is concerned, 
a Swiss entity with liabilities in Germany amounting to 100 DM could either use the official EPU 
clearing mechanism for a price of about 104 CHF. Alternatively, it could arrange a private clearing 
transaction for a price between 65 CHF and 104 CHF, thus allowing a healthy profit for all parties 
involved. To make matters worse, these deals were perfectly legal in Switzerland, as Swiss courts 
did not recognize exchange control legislation of other countries. As a consequence, the parties 
involved could even sue each other in Swiss courts for not keeping up their end of the bargain26.  
Illegal Sperrmark transactions did not only concern outward, but also inward conversion, 
specifically the repatriation of pre-war German flight capital into the Federal Republic. According 
to Lussy et al. (2001, 38), German nationals had transferred an estimated amount of 9.5 billion 
Reichsmark abroad between 1924 and 1930. A range of intermediaries and trustees abroad had 
been instrumental in safekeeping these funds during the National Socialist regime and the Second 
World War. Here again, Switzerland played a predominant role, notably also towards the end of 
the War, when German industrialists sought shelter for their capital in the expectation of 
impending German defeat (Uhlig et al. 2001, 107). In addition, Straumann (2006, 148) notes the 
continuing flow of flight capital to Switzerland during the early post-war period. The Swiss 
government eventually froze German-owned assets in February 1945 under intense Allied pressure 
(Uhlig et al. 2001, 298). They were unblocked only in March 1953, following lengthy negotiations 
between Allied governments, Switzerland, and later West Germany (von Castelmur 1992, 390). 
                                                 
25 HABB, Prot. der 90. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 29.3.1951, Wortprotokoll p. 2, Statement by Burkhardt. 
26 One example can be found among the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court: BGE Urteil 80 II 49, Auszug aus dem 
Urteil der I. Zivilabteilung vom 30. März 1954 i. S. Atlas Transatlantic Trading Co. gegen Winterstein & Co., access. 
via:http://relevancy.bger.ch/php/clir/http/index.php?lang=de&type=show_document&highlight_docid=atf://80-II-
49:de&print=yes, last accessed on February 15, 2019, 11.35am.  
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Table 4: Daily prices of Sperrmark, Deutschmark notes and Deutschmark (official) in Zurich. 
  
In the meantime, German owners of flight capital who had successfully camouflaged its national 
origin were able to repatriate it via Sperrmark loans granted by their foreign trustees. Even after 
March 1953, using Sperrmark loans was much more lucrative than selling CHF proceeds to the 
Bank deutscher Länder at the official exchange rate. As the Sperrmark price stood at about 60 
CHF for 100 DM during April 1953, illegal conversion allowed for transferring about 70% more 
in terms of Deutschmark value compared with the legal alternative27. The same rationale applied 
to any other financial claim, such as inheritances28, that were meant to be converted into 
Deutschmark for use in Germany. The German authorities involved in the regulation of Sperrmark 
investments struggled to deal with the problem. They defended their record against internal 
criticism by pointing to the “very generous” Allied guidelines, which only provided for denial of 
licences in case applicants had previously committed infringements or if applications did not 
formally conform with regulations29.  
                                                 
27 One example is given in great detail in: B102.6767, Kurzmeldung Zollfahndungsstelle Stuttgart an Herrn 
Bundesminister der Finanzen Ref. Dr. Grill, dated June 30, 1952. 
28 One example for the conversion of inheritance claims using Sperrmark loans can be found under: BArch B102.6788, 
94. Sitzung (7.5.1954), Liste W., Nr. 26, Begleitbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion Freiburg vom 29.10.1953. 
29 BArch B102.6745, Vermerk Bundesministerium der Finanzen Abteilung V Dev. vom 13.12.1951, p. 1: “Da die 
B.d.L. bei der Genehmigungserteilung an sehr großzügige Richtlinien der ABC gebunden ist, die sich ihrerseits die 
zur Ablehnung vorgesehenen Anträge bis vor kurzem zur Entscheidung und neuerdings zur Kenntnis vorlegen läßt, 
konnten Ablehnungen nur dann erfolgen, wenn dem Darlehensgeber oder Darlehensnehmer bereits früher begangene 
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In fact, of all the several thousands of applications for direct investment projects processed during 
the 122 meetings of the investment commission between September 1950 and September 1955, 
only about 9% were denied approval, equivalent to 10.5% of all funds invested. Moreover, the 
initial role of the Allied High Commission as the court of appeal for rejected applications helped 
enforce a liberal interpretation of regulations. Appeals were frequently successful, forcing the 
investment commission to revisit its earlier decision30. Allied supervisors could also intervene pre-
emptively in case important applications touched on questions of principle. During late 1952, the 
Bank deutscher Länder was determined to prevent the opening of a new banking house in Munich 
which was to be financed entirely with acquired Sperrmark, on the grounds that investment in a 
bank would make supervising the use of these blocked funds virtually impossible. The Central 
Bank, however, was forced to change its opinion, as the Allied Bank Commission considered a 
rejection to be contrary to Allied regulations. Instead, the projected institute was to be treated just 
like any other bank without foreign ownership shares31. In general, as noted already by Dickhaus 
(1996, 145-9), the Bank deutscher Länder took a cautious, conservative stance towards liberalizing 
exchange control. Preparing for minister Erhard’s visit in June 1952, the Bank took a decidedly 
gloomy perspective on the state of controls. It observed “enormous tendencies of capital flight”32 
and took it for granted that “almost every Sperrmark creditor simply wants to convert his balance 
one way or another”33. Importantly, this stance was not motivated by protectionism or a rejection 
of convertibility in principle. It was rather the memory of the early 1930s that haunted Central 
Bank officials. As late as Mai 1954, at a time when total currency reserves of the Bank already 
amounted to more than 2.2 billion US-$34, its officials voiced strong reservations against large new 
inflows of foreign capital as long as existing liabilities had not been amortised, justifying their 
restrictive attitude with the “crisis of 1931”35. The economics and finance ministries, on their part, 
were dissatisfied with lax investment regulations for more traditional, protectionist reasons.  
                                                 
Devisenzuwiderhandlungen nachgewiesen werden konnten oder aber die Investitionsanträge formell nicht den ABC-
Richtlinien entsprachen.” 
30 One example can be found in the appeal filed by Keller Hops Co. Inc. of New York in November 1951, cf. BArch 
B102.6736, 32. Sitzung (9.11.1951), Besonderheiten zu Anträgen der 32. Komm.Sitzung, p. 1. 
31 HABB, B330.63.2, Prot. der 135. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 17. und 18.12.1952, Anlage zu Punkt 9 der 
Tagesordnung, Letter by Vocke to Bernard, of December 9, 1952, p. 2. The foundation of the new bank did not 
materialize after all, because it was not able to meet all requirements under the German banking law, see ibidem p. 3. 
32 HABB B330.57.1, Prot. der 122. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 11. Juni 1952, Vermerk, signed by Wilhelm, May 
27, 1952, p. 1. 
33 HABB B330.57.1, Prot. der 122. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 11. Juni 1952, Vermerk, signed 6c – Devisenbe-
wirtschaftung, May 30, 1952, p. 4. 
34 Bank deutscher Länder (1955). Statistisches Handbuch der Bank deutscher Länder, Druck- und Verlagshaus 
Frankfurt a. M. p. 261. 
35 BArch B102.6954 1 von 2, Niederschrift über die am 29. 4. 1954 im Hause abgehaltene Sitzung über die Zulassung 
neuer mittel- und langfristiger Devisenanlagen im Inland vom 6.5.1954, p. 2.  
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As early as 1950, their officials complained about the absence of reciprocal treatment for German 
companies abroad36. They were also in favour of restricting the scope of permissible Sperrmark 
investments. According to their views, political considerations should assume a larger role in 
regulation. Foreign investment should be channeled towards “valuable projects from a 
macroeconomic point of view”, which was justified by the claim that the Investment Aid Law did 
the same with domestic investment37. The law of January 1952 established essentially a forced 
loan by profitable consumer goods industries for the sake of bottleneck industries that were still 
subject to price controls (Vonyó 2018, 189). Despite the many arguments thus brought forward, 
regulations themselves remained unaltered in the end. Allied supervisors were opposed to any 
changes, and the German side was concerned that too much pressure would endanger the 
liberalisation of foreign investment opportunities for German companies in turn38. Plans to 
officially restrict the scope of permissible Sperrmark investments were discarded, in order not to 
weaken the German negotiating stance during the London Debt Conference of 1951 and 195239. 
Overall, legal changes were considered “inopportune”40. On the level of regulatory practice, 
however, frequent attempts were made to at least make illegal conversion harder. More 
bureaucracy was added to the application process, for example by obtaining the advice of foreign 
exchange offices about each case41, or complicating disbursement formalities42. Moreover, the 
investment commission attempted to single out and reject applications that were considered 
especially prone to illegal conversion, while also being least desirable from their point of view. 
For a time, this was the case with Sperrmark loans to mere trading companies in order to finance 
imports43. It was the opinion of the Economics Ministry that there were already too many import 
companies, which were considered hardly “valuable” for the German economy44.  
                                                 
36 BArch B102.6741, Vermerk Abteilung VA6 vom 1.12.1950; such complaints appeared periodically thereafter, and 
as late as 1955: BArch B102/6954, Vermerk Abteilung VA13 vom 26.8.1955. 
37 BArch B102.6736, 34. Sitzung (7.12.1951), Vermerk, p. 3: „“Dr. Bergan regt an, die Investition des Auslandes 
entsprechend unserer eigenen inländischen Investition auf volkswirtschaftlich wertvolle Projekte zu lenken.“ 
38 BArch B102.6736, 27. Sitzung (7.9.1951), Vermerk, p. 1: “Grundsätzlich besteht Übereinstimmung darüber, dass 
eine Änderung der geltenden Investitionsbestimmungen im Sinne einer Berücksichtigung gesamtwirtschaftlicher 
Gesichtspunkte anzustreben ist. Es erscheint jedoch unzweckmäßig, im gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt mit entsprechenden 
Vorschlägen an die alliierten Stellen heranzutreten, da einmal die Gefahr besteht, dass durch eine Verschärfung der 
Investitionsbestimmungen die derzeit angestrebten Möglichkeiten für eine deutsche Investitionstätigkeit im Ausland 
erschwert werden und zum anderen von Seiten der Alliierten Bankkommission bereits gegen unser Rundschreiben 
Nr. 106/51 Bedenken erhoben wurden.”. 
39 BArch B102.6745, Vermerk Bundesministerium der Finanzen Abteilung V Dev. vom 13.12.1951, p. 3.  
40 BArch B102.6736, 44. Sitzung (5.5.1952), Vermerk, p. 2. 
41 BArch B102.6736, 42. Sitzung (4.4.1952), Vermerk, p. 2. 
42 BArch B102.6737, 50. Sitzung (1.8.1952), Vermerk, p. 2. 
43 BArch B102.6737, 51. Sitzung (15.8.1952), Vermerk, p. 1. 
44 This was a typical reason given internally for denying licences to importing companies, cf. for example BArch 
B102.6737, 42. Sitzung (4.4.1952), Anlage zum Vermerk, p. 1. 
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At the same time, the commission justified the rejection of such projects with the high risk of 
illegal conversion 45. Convertibility in the context of import finance could be achieved primarily 
through over-invoicing of imports, in which the domestic recipient of the Sperrmark investment 
would pay prices for imports from the foreign investor that were above market prices. The investor 
would thus receive the market price that she would receive from any other importer, plus the 
returns on her investment, which could subsequently be used for additional Sperrmark finance. 
Transfer pricing as a method of evading convertibility restrictions had already been widely 
practiced during the 1930s (Frech 2001, 219). It was not only detrimental to Germany’s profit tax 
revenue, but also to the country’s foreign exchange revenue. As a consequence, special control 
committees were supposed to supervise prices, but the commission recognized their limited 
efficacy46. Multinational corporations with subsidiaries in Germany were particularly prone to 
achieve convertibility of returns in this way47. Royalty payments and cross-border payment of 
management fees posed a similar problem. Both types of transactions had been reintroduced in 
1949 for the first time since the War, in each case subject to approval by the local Land economics 
ministry48. The transfer of production technology was officially welcomed, but regulating 
‘appropriate’ royalty payments was at the same time notoriously hard, providing an avenue 
specifically for foreign industrial companies to circumvent exchange controls. The investment 
commission tried to minimize the problem, for example by approving applications only if royalty 
agreements between the private partners had already been approved by German authorities before, 
or by restricting the level of future payments49. Furthermore, Sperrmark-financed companies were 
not supposed to transfer any management fees to foreign parent companies50. The problem, 
however, remained largely unabated and was a frequent matter of complaint among officials51. 
More radical remedies to illegal Sperrmark conversion, however, were rejected time and again, 
such as revoking their tradability or centralizing their holding in a state-owned bank. This would 
have resulted in unequal treatment between foreign and domestic investors. The Central Bank was 
also concerned that this would unduly alienate serious investors and future creditors52.  
                                                 
45 BArch B102.6737, Sondersitzung (12.9.1952), Vermerk, p. 5-6. 
46 BArch B102.6736, 49. Sitzung (18.7.1952), Vermerk, p. 2. 
47 There are numerous examples of such cases in the files of the investment commission. Most prominently, Philips 
NV of Eindhoven was reproached by the investment commission for according a minimal profit margin to its German 
daughter companies, see BArch B102.6738, 79. Sitzung (25.9.1953), Vermerk, p. 3. 
48 BArch B102.6764, letter Regierungspräsidium Südbaden to Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Verkehr vom 28.11.1952. 
49 BArch B102.6736, 37. Sitzung (25.1.1952), Vermerk, p. 1. 
50 BArch B102.6736, 50. Sitzung (29.8.1952), Vermerk, p. 3. 
51 BArch B102.6738, 79. Sitzung (25.9.1953), Vermerk, p. 3. 
52 BArch B102.6737, Schreiben BdL- 6b an Hauptabteilung 6c, vom 3.3.1953, p. 2. 
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The antagonism between a liberal framework imposed by Allied governments and a German desire 
for tighter regulation was resolved on a legal level by the successful conclusion of the London 
Debt Agreement in 1953, as this had been the precondition for passing sovereignty over German 
exchange controls from Allied powers to the Federal government (Rombeck-Jaschinski 2005, 
116). However, by the time the German side had regained their autonomy, the overall situation 
had changed fundamentally compared to only three years earlier. The rapid and continuous 
improvement in Germany’s balance of payments within the European Payments Union since the 
deficit crisis of 1950/51 rendered exchange controls increasingly obsolete (Kaplan & Schleiminger 
1989, 247). Large surpluses since April 1951 on the current account turned the Federal Republic 
into a net creditor of the EPU already by December. Surpluses persisted with the growth of German 
exports to Western Europe. Soon, Germany was to become the largest creditor of the clearing 
system by far. Already in October 1952, its ‘extreme creditor’ position triggered discussions on 
the EPU board of directors about whether Germany should introduce direct convertibility of 
investment returns53. This course of action was suggested repeatedly to the Federal Republic 
during the following months54, and Germany eventually committed to start liberalisation as soon 
as the London Debt Agreement would be ratified (Buchheim 1990, 164)55. Even though the pace 
of liberalisation was cautious at first at the direction of the Bank deutscher Länder, it was 
accelerated when the German creditor position approached a billion US-$ in early 195456. 
Convertibility restrictions, once impossible to enforce effectively, had become unnecessary to 
enforce effectively. Instead, allowing direct convertibility of Sperrmark at the official exchange 
rate, as well as virtually unblocking their use inside Germany became ways to deflect criticism by 
other EPU member states of Germany’s tight monetary policy aggravating the country’s surplus 
(Dickhaus 1994, 150). Controls on foreign investment projects were relaxed accordingly: The 
requirement for individual approval of the investment commission were dropped for loans in early 
1954, and for virtually all equity capital investments in June 195557.  
                                                 
53 HABB, Prot. der 131. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 15. 10. 1952, TOP 2: Devisenstatus und Außenhandelsfragen. 
54 HABB, Prot. der 144. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 30.4.1953, TOP 2: Devisenstatus und Außenhandelsfragen. 
55 HABB, Prot. der 154. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 30.9.1953, TOP 3: Transfer von Vermögenserträgnissen – 
Bericht über vorbereitende Besprechungen in Paris. 
56 HABB, Prot. der 160. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 1.6.1954, TOP 2: Devisenstatus, Außenhandelsfragen und 
internationaler Kapitalverkehr. 
57 Already by March 1955, German officials saw no more reason to maintain the individual licence requirements for 
equity investments: BArch B102/6954, Schreiben vom 4. April 1955 der Abteilung VI B 3 des BWM an Abteilung V 
A 12 betreffs Sitzung des Kapitaleinfuhrausschusses vom 29.3.1955, p. 4: “Devisenwirtschaftliche Gründe für die 
volle Beibehaltung des Einzelgenehmigungsverfahrens bestehen heute nicht mehr, zumal der Anreiz zu illegalen 
Transaktionen, wie er vor der Deblockierung der Sperrmark bestanden hat, entfallen ist. Das Bundeswirtschafts-
ministerium will für die Beibehaltung auch keine protektionistischen Gründe mehr geltend machen und schlägt daher 
vor, nunmehr auch Kapitalmark-Investierungen mit dem Ziel des Erwerbs von Unternehmen oder von Beteiligungen 
an solchen allgemein zu genehmigen”. 
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At the same time, liberalization was limited to capital outflows on the one hand, and Libka-Mark 
investments on the other hand. Sticking to its cautious stance, the Bank deutscher Länder was 
opposed to large new capital inflows for the time being (Buchheim 1990, 166)58.  
 
Sperrmark and international stock markets 
Against the background of the powerful incentive for illegal activities provided by the Sperrmark 
discount until the end of 1953, Sperrmark transactions had acquired a certain notoriety in public 
opinion (Lückefahr 1958, 165). A number of spectacular instances received wide publicity in 
German media59. In order to obtain a more systematic perspective on the problem, the German 
finance ministry commissioned a broad investigation by regional tax offices into illegal activities 
concerning Sperrmark investments in their respective jurisdictions. Their conclusions arrived in 
December 1953, right at the time that the discount was about to disappear. Of the 718 Sperrmark 
transactions investigated, 246, or roughly one third, were found to involve illegal activities60. The 
results also show that as far as the licencing of projects by the investment commission was 
concerned, lending was much more prone to Sperrmark fraud than equity investments. Among the 
two categories, loans amount to 76 percent of detected infringements. Overall, the investigation 
results convey a mixed message: On the one hand, they show that a sizeable share of transactions 
that supposedly involved serious foreign investment in fact represented merely instruments for 
illegal currency conversion. On the other hand, the latter still only amounted to a minority of all 
transactions, even among those suspect enough to come under investigation, and even taking into 
account a probably less than perfect detection rate. In this sense, Sperrmark transactions did in fact 
allow for serious foreign investment during an early post-war period. This verdict is confirmed by 
the legitimate role of Sperrmark as an international medium of exchange mentioned during the 
introduction. On a technical level, Sperrmark was able to become that medium in the first place 
because, as far as German legislation was concerned, it was freely exchangeable among all non-
residents, regardless of their particular foreign country of residence.  
                                                 
58 By August 1954, the Central Bank Council was of the opinion that German companies did no longer need foreign 
exchange credit, but rather fresh capital in Deutschmark. See HABB Prot. der 174. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 
11.8.1954, TOP 3: Verzinsung von DM-Guthaben von Devisenausländern. 
59 Most famous at the time was the case of the so-called “Jüdische Industrie- und Handelsbank” (extensively covered 
by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for the sentencing cf. issue of 25th August 1953 “Mit einer echten Bank nur 
den Namen gemein”, p. 4). The case surrounding an asset manager for parts of the Bavarian nobility also attracted 
attention (cf. DER SPIEGEL of 25th November 1953 “Die Heinzel-Männer”, pp. 14-18; for a retrospective account of 
the same episode cf. DIE ZEIT of 22nd October 1965 “Fini, die Sperrmark-Gräfin”).  
60 BArch B102.57662, Bemerkungen zur Gesamtübersicht über die Überprüfung von 718 Sperrmarkgeschäften, dated 
December 3, 1953. 
32 
 
In contrast, other countries, notably Great Britain, restricted exchange of their variety of non-
resident blocked currency accounts to transactions among residents of one country or one group 
of countries61. This regulatory difference was crucial, as free international transferability facilitated 
the use of Sperrmark as an instrument for international arbitrage between financial markets. Its 
actual use to such ends, however, was again conditional on exchange controls in other countries, 
which restricted transactions not only of non-residents in domestic currency, but also of residents 
in foreign currency. The Bank of England, for example, restricted the type of transactions for 
which UK residents were allowed to use Sperrmark. The Bank’s authorization of its use as a means 
to buy US-$ securities in New York provides the background of its characterisation of an 
international medium of exchange by the Financial Times62. In the absence of Pound Sterling 
convertibility, the existence of a market for Sperrmark in both London and New York allowed 
British investors to purchase Sperrmark at home, resell it New York and use the US-$ receipts 
thereof to buy US securities. Similarly, Dernburg (1955, 25) describes how British investors used 
Sperrmark transactions via Zurich to purchase Canadian securities. As already mentioned above, 
Zurich was at the center of the international Sperrmark market, and Switzerland more generally 
was the ideal hub for such international transactions at the time. It combined a convertible currency 
with mild financial regulation and a reputation for smooth financial intermediation already during 
the period (Tanner 2005). Beyond serving as an intermediary between third countries, Zurich also 
became the center of transactions with Germany directly, both for portfolio investment on and 
international arbitrage with German financial markets. Thus, it became customary to refer to 
Zurich when trying to infer the attitude of international financial markets towards the Federal 
Republic63. Within Germany, the movements of Sperrmark prices abroad, particularly in 
Switzerland, were frequently linked to changes in foreign investor demand on German stock 
exchanges64. Conversely, the fact that foreign investor demand was mentioned in the first place as 
factors of influence shows again that Sperrmark evidently facilitated legitimate investment 
transactions. As for arbitrage operations, they were facilitated by new German regulations in 
December 1951 authorizing the import of German stocks and their sale on domestic exchanges65. 
                                                 
61 During the period, the International Monetary Fund published an “Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions”, which 
contained detailed overviews of the respective regulations in member countries. For the example of 1953, see 
International Monetary Fund (1953). For Germany, see p. 164, for Great Britain, see p. 287. 
62 The Financial Times of Thursday, October 25, 1951, p. 4: “D-Marks as International Currency”. 
63 See, for example, The New York Times of Tuesday, August 18, 1953, p. 39: “Zurich interprets Sperrmarks’ rise”. 
64 See, for example, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 4, 1952, p. 8: „Gewinnmitnahmen am Montanmarkt“; 
Examples for the specific mention of the Sperrmark price in Zurich can be found in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
October 9, 1951, p. 7: “Sperrmark gefragt; also ibidem, August 14, 1953, p. 8: “Lebhaftes Geschäft an den 
Aktienmärkten”. 
65 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 19, 1951, p. 9: „Wertpapier-Einfuhr freigegeben.“ 
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This had not been permitted earlier, as only stocks that had undergone validation were allowed to 
trade on official exchanges (Sayatz 1998, 72). The reform created a direct link between the market 
for German stocks abroad and the market for the same stocks in Germany, via the Sperrmark 
exchange rate. Given a certain Sperrmark rate, an increase in the price of a stock in, for example, 
Frankfurt made it profitable to buy it in Zurich and import it for sale in Frankfurt, subsequently 
reconverting the proceeds into CHF on the Zurich Sperrmark market. A rise in the Sperrmark 
exchange rate, given a certain Frankfurt price, provided an equivalent incentive, leading to an 
increase in the Zurich stock price through increased demand66. These transactions imply a positive 
correlation between Sperrmark and Zurich stock prices on the one hand, and Frankfurt and Zurich 
stock prices on the other hand.  
 
The example of Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) stocks provides evidence that such 
arbitrage mechanisms were indeed at work during the period. AEG stocks are especially suitable 
for the task. They were among the most heavily traded German stocks in Zurich already during 
the interwar period (Lussy et al. 2001, 48). Moreover, among all German stocks traded on the 
Zurich market during the early 1950s, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung reports prices most frequently for 
AEG stocks, while at the same time providing equivalent prices for the Frankfurt market. The 
connection between the Zurich market, Sperrmark and the Frankfurt market can thus be tested 
through a simple Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model applied to the log returns of the three time 
series. Specifically, I restrict the sample to the period between June 1, 1951, and September 16, 
1954, the last day of the Sperrmark rather than the Libka-Mark-quote. As pointed out above, Libka-
Mark were convertible at the official Deutschmark parity, which likely diluted their correlation 
with stock prices by effectively pegging the Libka price to the official parity. In addition, I take 
weekly averages of prices in order to avoid interpolation of data, which would otherwise be 
necessary, in this way also allowing for a certain sluggishness in the adjustment of prices. Finally, 
instead of prices in levels I use daily returns, that is, relative price changes, in order to ensure the 
stationarity of the series and to resolve the problem raised by the fact that the quotation of AEG 
stocks was converted from Reichsmark to Deutschmark in April 195367. Building the VAR model, 
both the Likelihood-Ratio Test and the Akaike-Information Criterion suggest a lag order of One.  
                                                 
66 As similar operation on the supply side of the Zurich market is detailed in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of March 
14, 1953, p. 8: “Ausländer kaufen deutsche Wertpapiere”. 
67 The conversion from Reichsmark to Deutschmark creates one week with extremely high returns in absolute values 
for each of the two stock price series. Conversion occurred in Frankfurt on April 27, and in Zurich on June 1, 1953. I 
resolve this problem by setting the value for respective weeks equal to zero, that is, for week 18 of 1953 for Frankfurt 
and for week 23 of 1953 for Zurich. Alternatively, I reran estimations after setting these two values to missing, which 
did not change the significance pattern of the results.  
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]    (1) 
where 𝑎𝑒𝑔_𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑡 represents the weekly log return of the Frankfurt price of AEG stocks at time t, 
𝑎𝑒𝑔_𝑧𝑢𝑡 gives the equivalent figure for Zurich, and 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑟_𝑧𝑢𝑡 gives the weekly log return of the 
Sperrmark exchange rate. Table 5 shows the coefficients of the first lags in the VAR model and 
the results of Granger-causality tests between the three variables of interest. Importantly, both AEG 
stock returns in Frankfurt and Sperrmark returns Granger-cause AEG stock returns in Zurich. The 
average returns of Frankfurt AEG stocks and Sperrmark during the previous week (𝑡 − 1) 
significantly improve the forecast of the average return of Zurich AEG stocks during the present 
week (𝑡), while this is not the case the other way round. This is plausible, given the much bigger 
domestic German market for AEG stocks and the fact that the Sperrmark exchange rate was subject 
to a range of other influences like the third-country transactions described above. Beyond the 
obvious connection of Frankfurt and Zurich markets for the same stock, the significant impact of 
Sperrmark returns on the Zurich market in AEG stocks represents the main result of this exercise.  
It goes to show that Sperrmark transactions provided a viable instrument for international financial 
arbitrage during the early 1950s, as they established indirect convertibility for the benefit of non-
resident owners of German assets. 
Table 5: Granger causality tests for Sperrmark arbitrage with AEG stocks. 
 
 
VAR model Granger causality test
Equation Variable coefficient s. e. Wald F-statistic Prob > F
log returns aeg FFM log returns aeg ZU -0.049 (0.102) 0.232 0.631
log returns aeg FFM log returns Sperr 0.128 (0.170) 0.5653 0.453
log returns aeg FFM all 0.338 0.714
log returns aeg ZU log returns aeg FFM 0.240*** (0.092) 6.810*** 0.009
log returns aeg ZU log returns Sperr 0.511*** (0.159) 10.340*** 0.002
log returns aeg ZU all 8.334*** 0.000
log returns Sperr log returns aeg FFM -0.012 (0.043) 0.076 0.783
log returns Sperr log returns aeg ZU 0.041 (0.045) 0.818 0.367
log returns Sperr all 0.460 0.632
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




This paper studies the historical episode of inconvertible currencies across Western Europe during 
the post-war period for the case of the West German Deutschmark. During the quarter century 
following the financial crisis of 1931, a range of financial claims of non-resident companies and 
individuals towards Germany were blocked inside the country on inconvertible bank accounts, 
commonly referred to as Sperrmark. Blocked non-resident balances represented a common feature 
of contemporary exchange controls across many countries. In difference to other countries, 
however, the particular historical circumstances of Allied occupation and the resulting specifics of 
exchange controls turn the German example into a showcase of how inconvertibility was in reality 
an aspiration rather than an actual state. A peculiar compromise between conflicting aims among 
Allied powers provided for a relatively liberal legal framework for practical regulation. Against 
this background, German exchange restrictions indeed became “a penalty on loyalty and a 
premium on disloyalty” (Einzig 1977, 111), as sundry opportunities for illegal conversion of 
blocked assets show. At the same time, the legal tradability of Sperrmark among non-residents 
implied indirect convertibility for individual owners, several years before blocked assets became 
directly convertible at the official Deutschmark exchange rate. As a consequence, Sperrmark  
became a legitimate, international medium of exchange during the first half of the 1950s, opening 
up foreign investment and arbitrage opportunities across national stock markets at a relatively early 
point after the War. The example of the market for stocks of Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft 
provides evidence for the smooth functioning of such operations. In this way, the establishment of 
official Sperrmark convertibility in late 1954 was really only an intermediate stage, rather than the 
first starting point towards full Deutschmark convertibility within the Bretton Woods system. Its 
history starts in earnest by 1950, when Allied powers decided to open up West Germany for new 
foreign investment. 
This paper has not covered the question whether or not exchange controls were still necessary for 
the Federal Republic during the first half of the 1950s. Exchange controls have historically been 
the corollary of an overvalued national currency, in order to stem the resulting outflow of capital 
and the rise in imports (James 1996, 98). This connection was well understood already by 
contemporaries (Ellis 1941, 190). The Deutschmark parity has been a controversial issue in public 
opinion at the time as well as in the economic literature since (Delhaes-Guenther 2003, 164ff). At 
one extreme, Boltho (1996, 113) finds that Deutschmark was clearly undervalued already in 1950, 
and remained undervalued throughout the entire decade. At the other extreme, Buchheim (1990, 
178) argues that there is no evidence for undervaluation prior to the 1960s.  
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From his perspective, persistently high balance of payments surpluses reflected inelastic demand 
for German goods abroad, rather than a fundamental currency misalignment. Building on Giersch 
et al. (1992, 222), it seems reasonable to assume that the Deutschmark had been undervalued even 
with respect to the US-dollar since at least the late 1950s, while it was slightly overvalued with 
respect to other Western European currencies during the early 1950s, following the September 
1949 devaluations (Vonyó 2018, 140). This view concurs with Milton Friedman’s (1953, 163) 
implied assessment that the German balance of payments crisis of 1950/51 wouldn’t have been as 
severe had the Deutschmark not been overvalued within the contemporary system of fixed 
exchange rates. The history of Sperrmark broadly supports this view: In line with the argument 
made by Giersch et al. (1992, 92) based on the Deutschmark bank note rate in Zurich, Sperrmark 
traded at a sizeable discount with respect to the official parity up until early 1954. The discount is 
consistent with an overvalued Deutschmark until that point in time, at least with respect to fully 





















CHAPTER II – Exploring the extensive margin of financial liberalization – 
Very early FDI into West Germany after the Second World War 
 
This paper studies the composition of the first wave of foreign direct investment into West 
Germany after the end of the Second World War, across a period of roughly five years following 
the lifting of the Allied investment embargo in June 1950. Individual licencing requirements of 
the time make it possible to observe virtually the entire universe of inward investment projects in 
a rich archival dataset. After almost two decades during which the German economy had been cut 
off from international capital markets, foreign investors who had already been engaged in 
Germany during the interwar period play an important role for new post-war investment in several 
dimensions. They invest earlier and more frequently than other categories of investors, while the 
geographical location of their pre-war investment exerts significant influence on the locational 
choice of new entrants after 1950. German emigrants are also among the earliest investors, but 
only due to reinvestment of their existing capital within Germany. Overall, the paper reveals an 
example of highly persistent investment patterns across an extended and dramatic period of crisis 
of the international economy. By providing firm-level evidence for a comparatively early period 
after the Second World War, it adds an historical micro-perspective to the otherwise extensive 
literature on capital-account liberalization. It also provides further evidence to recent findings on 
the role of historic connections on the personal level in determining foreign investment outcomes. 
 
Introduction 
Extensive research has been devoted to capital-account liberalization and its economic effects. 
Two aspects of the empirical literature stand out: Firstly, most of it is based on aggregated, bilateral 
data (Edison et al. 2004): Cross-country variation in the timing and extent of liberalization is 
exploited in order to gauge liberalization effects on a macro-economic level, for example on FDI 
flows (Noy & Vu 2007) or on economic growth (Quinn & Toyoda 2008). In contrast, a number of 
relatively recent contributions introduce firm-level data to the debate: Larrain & Stumpner (2017) 
study the effect of liberalization on total factor productivity through its impact on capital allocation 
across firms in a sample of Eastern European countries since the mid-1990s. Desai et al. (2006) 
show that US multinationals react to the relaxation of local capital controls by increasing their 
investment in the respective market relative to other destinations. Firm-level data naturally allow 
addressing a wider range of questions than country- or sector-level data (Henry 2007, 918).  
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Secondly, the literature hardly goes further back in time than the 1960s. Especially for research 
based on firm-level evidence, this is simply a matter of data availability. Comprehensive FDI 
microdata has so far been available only from the 1970s onwards. In the case of Germany, for 
example, the MIDI database provided by the Bundesbank covers all firm-level FDI into and out of 
the Federal Republic starting in 1976 (Lipponer 2011). As a consequence, existing research on 
earlier periods has been limited to studying indirect evidence, in the form of more readily 
accessible financial data such as stock returns (Voth 2003). Exploiting firm-level evidence on FDI 
is thus restricted to a period prior to which the international economy had been highly integrated 
for decades. Exports across Western Europe grew by around 10% each year during the 1950s and 
1960s, and continued to grow thereafter (Eichengreen 1996, 54). Western European currencies 
transitioned to full current-account convertibility during the second half of the 1950s (James 1996, 
85), at a time when international finance resurged due to the development of euro-dollar markets 
(Schenk 1998). Lagging behind trade by about a decade, international investment started to expand 
during the late 1950s, and grew rapidly during the 1960s68. Financial liberalisation remained 
fragile, and FDI was largely limited to Western industrialized economies until the 1980s (Jones 
2005a, 98). Among the latter group of countries, however, international investment was able to 
flourish without any major reversals for decades. Thus, developing countries since the 1980s and 
Eastern Europe during the early 1990s opened their capital account to a well-integrated Western 
world economy. From a global point of view, existing firm-level FDI data therefore only covers 
the intensive margin of liberalisation: One country or a group of countries at a time is added to the 
established choice set of historically developed FDI destinations. This paper contributes to the 
literature by offering a glimpse at the extensive margin of very early FDI after the end of the 
Second World War: Before Allied occupation authorities lifted the post-war embargo on new 
incoming FDI in June 1950, Germany had been isolated from international capital markets for 
almost twenty years. The Reich government reacted to the 1931 financial crisis by imposing 
stringent capital controls that were tightened further during following years (Banken 2006). The 
Second World War subsequently brought international capital flows everywhere to a halt, a 
situation that lasted well into the early post-war period (Obstfeld & Taylor 1997, 26). At the time, 
early liberalization measures such as the lifting of the German embargo in 1950 represented the 
first cracks in an investment environment that continued to be highly regulated for almost another 
decade. While early FDI remained quantitatively small under these circumstances, it laid the 
groundwork for the subsequent investment boom towards the end of the 1950s.  
                                                 
68 For the case of Germany, see Table 6 below. 
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Observing the extensive margin at all is made possible by the fact that individual investors required 
a permit for every single FDI project, regardless of its size, for several years after June 1950. This 
results in a rich archival data set of several thousands of investors, who represent virtually the 
universe of FDI into West Germany (excluding West Berlin) during the period. I complement 
these data with information on all US corporations holding assets in Germany by 1943, retrieved 
from wartime US Treasury files. 
The comparison drawn with 1990s Eastern Europe is informative in another respect: In the context 
of early capital flows from West to East Germany following reunification, Burchardi and Hassan 
(2013) show that individual investor characteristics matter for investment decisions. A high 
population share of West Germans with historic ties to East Germany significantly increased 
corporate investment flows from their West German home regions to the East. The importance of 
who invests in general, and of historic connections specifically, is confirmed in a different context 
by Burchardi et al. (2018). As of the year 2014, ancestral relations on the level of US counties had 
a significant influence on the geographical distribution of the investment activity of local 
companies across foreign host countries. The present paper provides evidence broadly in support 
of these findings: Despite two decades of crisis and war, firms and individuals who had already 
invested in Germany before the Second World War are the most important protagonists among the 
first wave of post-war FDI into the Federal Republic. These pre-war investors invest earlier and 
more frequently than new entrants. Moreover, they were not only prominent post-war investors 
themselves, but their historic presence also served as reference for new entrants. The number of 
companies under considerable foreign ownership at the time of liberalization significantly predicts 
the locational choice of new equity investment projects across German districts (Landkreise) 
during the following five years. This is in line with evidence from the extensive management 
literature on FDI location choice, where local agglomeration of foreign-owned enterprises helps 
overcome the “liability of foreignness” otherwise experienced by new entrants in a host country 
(Nielsen et al. 2017). Besides pre-war investors, individuals identifiable as German emigrants also 
invested significantly earlier than those from other ethnic backgrounds. However, this is due to the 
fact that they reinvested disposable funds which they retained inside Germany. Their prominent 
role vanishes once the sample is restricted to investments made with new capital.  
My findings also complement the historical literature on the post-war German economy. Vonyó 
(2018, 150) recently confirmed earlier findings that the geographical pattern of West German 
foreign trade during the “miracle” years recovered its traditional, interwar pattern, despite 
diversion attempts by the National Socialist regime.  
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I am able to add a micro-level analogy to such persistence in the geography of foreign trade, by 
showing the prominent role of pre-war investors for inward FDI after 1950.  
Importantly, the post-war role of pre-war investors cannot simply be explained as autocorrelation 
over time: These empirical findings are derived exclusively from the set of cases in which foreign 
firms or individuals planned to invest additional amounts of their foreign capital into German 
companies. This excludes all cases of reinvestment of German assets the investor already owned 
before, directly or indirectly. At the same time, retained earnings were by far the most important 
source of corporate finance all across Western Europe during the period (Straus 2011, 211), and 
this was no different for existing subsidiaries of foreign parent companies in Germany (Wilkins 
1974, 308). Moreover, these subsidiaries were able to tap the local capital market for debt finance. 
From a narrowly financial point of view, therefore, pre-war investors should actually have been 
less likely to invest additional foreign capital compared to new entrants. They already owned assets 
inside the country that could generate the funds necessary for investment or that could give them 
access to the German capital market. New entrants, on the other hand, could enter the German 
market only by investing new foreign capital (Kiesewetter 1992a, 69).  
Otherwise, autocorrelation could arise due to two types of composition effect: Firstly, Felbermayr 
and Jung (2011) show that in theory, only sufficiently productive companies will engage in 
outward FDI at any point in time. This introduces sorting among potential investors within their 
respective home countries, which might have remained unaltered for decades. Historic investors 
were potentially still the only companies able to engage in FDI after the War, thus explaining their 
predominance. Available evidence for investment by companies from the most important source 
country runs counter to this contention. According to Kiesewetter (1992a, 72), the fluctuation 
among US corporate investors was in fact much higher than suggested by the limited number of 
large multinationals active on the German market. In 1943, 124 US corporations owned a German 
subsidiary. In contrast, the number of US companies with FDI in Germany had grown to 370 by 
1958 and to 555 by 1960 (Hartmann 1963, 35). It seems implausible that post-war entrants were 
technologically and financially incapable of entering the German market during the first half of 
the 1950s, while they were perfectly capable of doing so a few years later. Secondly, the post-war 
investment data suffer from right-truncation, as they contain no information on potential investors 
who chose not to invest or might have done so immediately after the end of the period under 
investigation. At the same time, pre-war investors differed as to the relative importance Germany 
had for each individual investor among all her pre-war destination countries. The combination of 
these two facts could explain the observed prominence of pre-war investors in the post-war data. 
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The latter might simply pick up the right tail of the distribution concerning the relative importance 
of Germany for pre-war investors, because higher historic importance could plausibly explain 
earlier investment after the War. If this were true, it would not be surprising that pre-war investors 
observed in the truncated post-war data invested more and more frequently than new post-war 
entrants. Evidence available for US corporations with a pre-war German subsidiary, however, does 
not support this conjecture. The relative importance of Germany as a destination country during 
the interwar era does not explain which corporations were active during the post-war period under 
investigation. 
The definition of foreign direct investment employed in this paper is driven by the scope of the 
underlying historical sources. It does not aspire to include every type of transaction classifiable as 
FDI more generally. Investment is direct for two reasons: Firstly, direct investment as understood 
in this paper describes the employment in a German company of foreign-owned capital directly 
by the foreign capital owner herself or by a foreign intermediary on her behalf. As a result, it does 
not include acquisitions carried out by existing German subsidiaries of foreign parent companies, 
even though such transactions increased total assets owned by the foreign parent within Germany. 
Secondly, it is direct inasmuch as the transactions under consideration occur outside organized 
stock exchanges, directly between the foreign investor and the destination company. In this sense, 
the definition is broader than the one employed by Jones (2005b, 5), for whom managerial control 
over the investment destination distinguishes FDI from portfolio investment. In this paper, 
fractional equity participations also classify as direct investment, as long as they are based on a 
direct, in the sense of personal, relation between investor and destination company. Finally, 
beyond actual equity investments, the historical sources also contain all direct loans by foreign 
companies or individuals to domestic companies for the sub-period until the end of 1953. All 
estimations performed separately for that sub-period are based on a joint sample of both equity 
investments and direct lending. On the one hand, the underlying interest of this paper lies with the 
willingness of foreign investors to commit additional foreign capital to the German economy 
during the early 1950s, rather than with the distinction between equity capital and debt capital on 
company balance sheets. On the other hand, that distinction is fluid in case the creditor is identical 
with the foreign parent company, as is frequently the case in the post-war data. Moreover, 
contemporary investment regulation stipulated a minimum maturity of three to five years for 
projected loans. Short-term loans are thus not part of the post-war data, while they would be least 
similar to equity capital.  
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The scope of the data and the resulting definition of FDI will receive further detailed attention over 
the course of this paper. At first, however, the next section will introduce the historical context of 
foreign investment in Germany during the early 1950s. This will be followed by a thorough 
discussion of the data used, and separately of a number of important caveats to their interpretation. 
Estimation results subsequently presented precede the conclusions summarized in the final section. 
 
Foreign investment in Germany  
Few contributions to the historical literature on FDI into Germany provide comprehensive 
summaries of the topic at hand. Pohl (1992) combines several papers on different source countries, 
discussing their respective historical influence on the German economy. Eck (2003) studies the 
performance of French companies on the German market during the quarter century following the 
end of the Second World War, while Wubs (2012) conducts a similar exercise for Dutch 
multinationals. Otherwise, the literature mostly consists of monographs on individual, large 
multinational enterprises. A number of their German subsidiaries have been the subject of 
corporate biographies, as for the case of Saint-Gobain (Möller 2001) or British Petrol (Förster 
1979). The focus on MNEs can be explained by the fact that they dominated foreign investment 
quantitatively throughout history. According to Wubs (2008, 41), direct investment by just the 
Anglo-Dutch Unilever conglomerate equalled roughly 80 percent of the 1940 value of total US 
manufacturing FDI in Germany. Similarly, General Motors acquired the largest European 
carmaker, Adam Opel AG, between 1929 and 1931. This was done for the enormous sum of 33.3 
million US-$ (Turner 2005, 3), which was equivalent to almost a quarter of the 1929 stock of US 
manufacturing FDI in Germany (Wilkins 1974, 185). A number of relatively recent contributions 
has resulted from the political controversy inherent in heavy financial involvement with National 
Socialist Germany. These include studies on American carmakers (Billstein et al. 2004), General 
Motors in particular (Turner 2005), International Business Machines (Heide 2004), British 
multinationals (Forbes 2000, 133) and Unilever (Wubs 2008). For Switzerland, an historical 
commission has published extensive findings, on a selection of Swiss companies from different 
sectors (Ruch et al. 2001), as well as specifically on large chemical corporations (Straumann and 
Wildmann 2001) and on the armaments sector (Hug 2002). The dual focus on large corporations 
and the pre-1945 period limits the scope of the literature: On the one hand, there is scant evidence 
on the experience of small and medium-sized companies, even though they represented the vast 
majority of investors. On the other hand, little is known about the interlude between the end of the 
Second World War and the investment boom of the 1960s.  
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This blank spot risks forgoing interesting historical lessons, as it is situated right at the time when 
foreign investment was allowed to resume following a very long and severe crisis. As a matter of 
fact, the lifting of the Allied embargo in June 1950 occurred on the background of a turbulent half-
century for foreign investors, in the context of which the aftermath of the 1931 financial crisis only 
represented the final of four distinct periods for FDI into Germany: A first wave of FDI at the turn 
of the 20th century ended abruptly with the First World War, while the short-lived investment boom 
during the second half of the 1920s gave way to crisis and dictatorship. 
Industrialists from neighbouring countries had been active in the different German states already 
during the 18th and early 19th century, as was the case for Swiss textile manufacturers in the later 
territory of Baden (Boelcke 1987, 130) or Belgian heavy industry in the vicinity of Aix-la-Chapelle 
(Devos 1986, 107). French glass-makers started to open German subsidiaries as early as the 1850s 
(Möller 2001, 21). Large-scale manufacturing FDI, however, only occurred around the turn of the 
20th century. Thus, the Singer Manufacturing Co. decided to start production in Germany in 1902, 
even though it had serviced the German market since the 1860s (Blaich 1984, 28). Similarly, 
McCormick (International Harvester) had sold its agricultural machines via sales agents for 
decades before it opened up a factory in Neuss in 1908 (Kiesewetter 1989, 122). Standard Oil 
opened a network of refineries in Germany around 1910 (Kiesewetter 1992b, 180). The Swiss 
chemical company Geigy opened a factory on the German side of the Rhine in 1898 (Straumann 
& Wildmann 2001, 59), while its compatriot Maggi did the same in 1897, followed by Alusuisse 
in 1898, Brown Boveri & Cie. in 1900 and Nestlé in 1903 (Ruch et al. 2001, 73). This 
mushrooming of subsidiaries of foreign companies in Germany around 1900 has been explained 
by a combination of three factors: The upswing of the global economy during the 1890s led to an 
internationalization of industrial production everywhere. German patent law stipulated timely 
exploitation of the patented process and thus forced some foreign innovators to start production in 
the country (Blaich 1984, 9). Finally, rising protectionism towards the end of the 19th century made 
market access conditional on localized production (Bläsing 1992, 75). However, the investment 
boom came to a sudden halt at the beginning of the First World War. Just like other belligerents, 
the German Empire sequestered and subsequently expropriated enemy assets (Lindner 1991, 16). 
Compensation for, or reacquisition of lost assets after the War was costly and could take several 
years. Specifically for Great Britain, Jones (1992, 102) argues that this negative experience may 
explain the relatively small share of British investors in German inward FDI during the following 
decades, when compared with the predominant role of British capital on a global scale. 
Nevertheless, the Weimar Republic experienced an unprecedented inflow of foreign capital after 
the stabilization of its currency (Ritschl 2002).  
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US investors in particular supplied the bulk of the capital inflow, to the extent that interwar 
Germany became “the main base of the US in Europe” (Berghahn 1986, 22). Even though an 
important part of this inflow took the form of German bonds on the US market, corporate FDI 
surged as well. Record investments were made, notably in the car industry. Dutch multinationals 
also invested heavily, taking advantage of the Amsterdam capital market to finance their German 
acquisitions (Wubs 2012, 18). Importantly, the FDI surge was not limited to long-time foreign 
investors with pre-war experience of market conditions in Germany. Examples of prominent new 
entries include the US car industry mentioned before, as well as Swiss pharmaceutical companies 
(Straumann & Wildmann 2001, 165), the Italian FIAT (Hertner 1992, 51), or the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (Förster 1979, 124). In any case, the interwar investment spree lasted only for a few 
years, as worldwide capital flows started to decrease considerably by 1928 (Eichengreen & 
Accominotti 2016). Foreign capital owners began to withdraw their funds from Germany by 1930. 
The country experienced a quick reversal of the high inflows of preceding years (Ritschl 2012, 
13). Capital flight became rampant as the crisis proceeded, and the government reacted by 
imposing capital controls in July 1931 (Schnabel 2004). Foreign investors were barred henceforth 
from liquidating their German assets and converting the proceeds, while asset returns remained 
convertible for the time being. This changed fundamentally with the advent of the National 
Socialist regime, which defaulted on virtually all of the country’s external liabilities in June 1933 
(Clement 2004, 38). International payments were highly bureaucratized, and it became ever more 
difficult to legally convert returns into the currencies of foreign parent companies (Boelcke 1994, 
21). Any payments due to non-residents had to be either reinvested or credited to frozen non-
resident accounts, commonly known as Sperrmark (Dernburg 1955). The regime had a profound 
impact on foreign investors beyond convertibility concerns. The growing importance of public 
procurement contracts for financial success, combined with aggressive economic nationalism 
made the position of foreign subsidiaries precarious (Turner 2005, 44). In the short run, parent 
companies reacted with appeasement: “Non-Aryan” employees were quickly removed from 
payrolls (Straumann & Wildmann 2001, 168). Subsidiaries took great pains to become certified as 
“German” companies in spite of their foreign ownership (Heide 2004, 158). Regime loyalists had 
to be installed on company boards and as powerful employee representatives. Foreign parents 
managed to retain legal ownership of their subsidiaries, despite attempts to the contrary, often by 
local Nazi officials (Turner 2005, 68). The price was the gradual loss of managerial control (Boon 
& Wubs 2016). Profits inside Germany grew quickly, however, especially for companies profiting 
from the armaments boom (Ruch et al. 2001, 92). In the medium run, foreign multinationals 
attempted to weather the regime and retain all future options, while minimizing financial exposure. 
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Subsidiaries thus actively sought regime contracts in order to retain their German market share 
(Turner 2005, 31). Excess liquidity from inconvertible profits was hedged by investing it broadly 
across the German economy, without necessarily any connection to core business. The American 
food processing giant Corn Products Refining Company, for example, eventually ended up owning 
a music hall, a cement factory and a typewriter producer, among other assets69. Multinationals 
deemed sufficiently important for the German economy were also allowed to convert parts of their 
profits by special deals, such as shipbuilding contracts for German shipyards (Wubs 2008, 48). At 
the same time, foreign parents avoided supplying fresh capital to their German subsidiaries, and 
increasingly so the more likely war became. In March 1939, General Motors decided that “no 
commitment shall be made in respect to our German operations that will involve the investment 
of any additional dollars in Germany” (Turner 2005, 87). Around the same time, Geigy refused to 
supply any more Swiss Francs for the expansion of its German subsidiary (Straumann & 
Wildmann 2001, 97). At the outbreak of the War, enemy companies lost all remaining control of 
their subsidiaries (Förster 1979, 210). This was the case even for some parents located in neutral 
countries (Ruch et al. 2001, 279). Enemy assets were sequestered, yet owners were not 
expropriated (Möller 2001, 124). Sequestration could even turn out to their advantage, as it 
protected their assets from hostile takeovers by German competitors or the SS (Lindner 1991, 85). 
By that time, on the other hand, foreign parents had likely written down their German assets. When 
the US entered the War, Congress introduced a special write-off facility for any property of US 
multinationals located in enemy territory (Kent 1943). By 1943, virtually all companies concerned 
had taken advantage of this opportunity.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the regulatory framework of FDI changed little with the Allied Occupation 
of Germany at the end of the War. Foreign assets continued to be sequestered for the time being. 
Even though owners were able to investigate their fate, they were barred from either taking control 
or injecting fresh foreign capital (Förster 1979, 233). Treatment of foreign assets subsequently 
depended on their location: Those located in the Soviet zone were eventually expropriated without 
compensation, just like most other private enterprise (Hartmann 1963, 48). Those located in the 
three Western zones were gradually decontrolled70. Managerial control of subsidiaries by non-
resident owners was restored in July 1948 and the former were allowed to operate much like any 
other German company by the end of 1949.  
                                                 
69 NARA RG 256, Entry Code NC8-2, Box 484. 
70 The following chronology of FDI regulation can be verified in Kühne (1984), who provides an extremely detailed 
account of West German exchange control legislation between 1945 and 1961. During that period, Allied occupation 
laws governed exchange control, while the respective Federal German law was passed only at the latter date. 
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The owners could also liquidate their assets since May 1949. Liquidation proceeds, like any other 
non-trade payments due to non-residents, however, remained inconvertible. A simplified version 
of the pre-war Sperrmark system was retained after the War (Dernburg 1955, 22). At the same 
time, the prevailing investment embargo meant that subsidiaries could not draw on their foreign 
owners for financial help, and the latter were allowed neither to import new capital into Germany, 
nor to spend their frozen funds for the benefit of their subsidiaries, except for the narrow purpose 
of physical reconstruction. Removing the embargo in June 1950 thus represented the first major 
step towards liberalization of foreign investment into Germany after the War. Henceforth, 
Sperrmark owners were authorized to spend their frozen funds for virtually any immovable asset 
inside Germany. They could do so without any further regulatory interference for portfolio 
investment purposes. For each individual direct investment project, including direct loans to 
residents, they required the prior permission of a specially established Investment Commission 
made up of Bank deutscher Länder and Government officials. Potential investors without their 
own Sperrmark were able to invest on the same terms by selling foreign exchange to the Bank 
deutscher Länder. Even though the resulting amounts were small, it opened up a window for new 
capital inflows for the first time since the end of the War. In addition, Sperrmark became legally 
tradeable among non-residents in March 1951. As these ‘acquired Sperrmark’ traded at a sizeable 
discount on international markets until late 1953, they represented a cheaper and readily available 
alternative to foreign exchange. In fact ‘acquired Sperrmark’ and their substitute after September 
1954 (‘liberalisierte Kapitalkonten’ or Libka-Mark) remained the primary instrument for foreign 
investment until 1958, as the Bank deutscher Länder was reluctant to allow large new inflows of 
foreign capital via foreign exchange for the time being (Buchheim 1990, 165). Thus, the capital 
account of the German economy continued to be tightly regulated despite these significant steps 
towards liberalization. Nevertheless, investments with acquired Sperrmark represented genuinely 
additional capital expenditures for the individual non-resident investor, as she exchanged her 
foreign assets for assets inside the Federal Republic. That is the case even though existing 
liabilities were merely exchanged among non-residents on the macroeconomic level, and only the 
eventual investment returns represented an additional charge on the balance of payments. These 
returns remained directly inconvertible until February 1954, when they became transferable at the 
official Deutschmark parity, while they had been indirectly convertible at the prevailing discount 
via the Sperrmark market since March 1951. Just as investment returns became directly 
convertible in February 1954, direct loans to German companies were liberalized to a large extent, 
while the individual requirement for an Investment Commission permit in the case of equity 
investments was retained until June 1955.  
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Aggregated data for foreign investment into Germany are available only for the post-war period. 
Table 6 gives gross inflows for several categories of long-term, private foreign investment during 
the two decades following the lifting of the Allied investment embargo. According to Bundesbank 
(1976, 336), the definition of FDI as a subgroup of total investment includes all investment into 
non-securitised equity, investment into share capital if foreign ownership exceeds 25%, long-term 
loans to foreign subsidiaries in Germany, as well as reinvested earnings. The figure for lending is 
thus already adjusted for intercompany loans. The remaining difference between FDI and lending 
on the one hand and total foreign investment on the other hand consists almost exclusively of 
portfolio investments. Table 6 therefore yields a comprehensive measure of FDI, which shows the 
clear discontinuity in the data between the 1950s and the 1960s. FDI remained at low levels until 
1958 and picked up the year later, with an additional sharp increase during the mid-1960s. A 
comparable pattern can be identified for portfolio investment. Bank deutscher Länder policy to 
restrict foreign investment largely to Sperrmark and Libka-Mark before 1958 was evidently 
effective. By implication, it represents evidence that the records of the investment commission 
charged with licencing Sperrmark (and foreign exchange) investments actually do match the 
universe of inward FDI during the early 1950s, however defined, and however low the aggregate 
amount invested.  
At the same time, the dichotomy between two distinct post-war phases was not peculiar to 
Germany, as indicated by the development of US outward FDI to Europe presented in Table 7. 
According to the US Department of Commerce (1981, 39), the direct investment position abroad 
describes the net book value of US direct investor’s equity in their foreign affiliates, including 
outstanding loans. It provides a similarly broad measure to the German aggregate in Table 6, as it 
includes reinvested earnings and intercompany receivables of the US parent corporation. Growth 
in the European position of US investors picked up considerably during the early 1960s, both in 
absolute value and as a share of worldwide American FDI. Berghahn (1982, 153) attributes the 
discontinuity to the prospect of the Common Market, which attracted investors to Western Europe. 
Another explanation can be found in the maturing of the Bretton Woods system. All Western 
European currencies moved to full non-resident convertibility on the current account in late 1958, 
after eight years during which the European Payments Union had ensured convertibility only of 
trade payments among its members (James 1996, 85). Incomplete convertibility of European 
currencies is one major factor for explaining the paucity of cross-border capital flows during the 
first half of the decade. In fact, Wilkins (1974, 342) directly attributes the growth of US investment 
in Europe to the restoration of convertibility.  
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Table 6: Gross inflow of long-term, private foreign investment into Germany, 1950-1969. 
 




Contemporary sources support the connection between convertibility and FDI growth. In April 
1951, the US President’s Committee for Financing Foreign Trade commissioned a report on 
“Obstacles to Direct Foreign Investment”.71 The report was based on a survey of US corporations 
that had been engaged in FDI already, and processed the answers according to the type of obstacle 
encountered. For the case of Germany, convertibility concerns were paramount. 26 out of 39 
respondents complained about existing limitations on remittance of profits, 19 mentioned control 
of capital movements, and 20 saw import quotas as an obstacle. In contrast, virtually no one raised 
concerns about restrictions on foreign investment within Germany, taxation or government 
instability72. Despite the clear verdict, these findings nevertheless need to be qualified in two 
important dimensions: On the one hand, the number of respondents is low, amounting to roughly 
a third of all US corporations with pre-war subsidiaries in Germany, thus raising the question of 
self-selection. More importantly, convertibility does not seem to have been an end in itself, but 
rather signalled the return to a normal investment environment. Otherwise, investors would have 
converted most of their liquid assets as soon as direct convertibility had been restored. This was 
not the case, however, as shown by contemporary Bank deutscher Länder figures. During the 
second half of 1954, i.e. right after asset returns had been unblocked, only 37% of dividends and 
other profit participations accruing to US citizens were converted immediately. The remainder was 
voluntarily deposited as Sperrmark (Libka-Mark)73. 
 
The data 
The Investment Commission charged with licencing inward FDI projects met 122 times between 
September 1950 and September 1955 and in the process ruled on more than 6,000 applications. 
For each of these bi-weekly meetings, its records74 contain a list of the applications under 
consideration, with information on each FDI project in condensed form. It yields the name and 
place of residence of the investor and the investment destination, the type of project (equity 
investment, loan, or other residual types), the amount of money invested and the source of these 
funds (‘original’ Sperrmark, ‘acquired’ Sperrmark or foreign exchange). It also states the prior 
relation of investor and destination, and whether the application was approved, denied or deferred. 
                                                 
71 National Industrial Conference Board (1951). Obstacles to Direct Foreign Investment, Report Prepared for The 
President’s Committee for Financing Foreign Trade.  
72 National Industrial Conference Board (1951), p. 299. 
73 HABB, B330.2849, Vermerk Abteilung 6a/610 an Abteilung 653 vom 11.5.1955, betr. Deutsch-amerikanisches 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, p. 2. 
74 The files can be accessed in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz, under the records of the Federal Economics 
Ministry from shelf marks B102/6735 to B102/6811. 
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For the investment destination, it additionally contains the legal form, founding year, pre-existing 
nominal capital, and economic activity, which allows to attribute the destination companies to 
different sectors of the economy. Moreover, if the project involves a loan, its interest rate, duration 
and type of security is provided, as well as a broad description of the intended use of the funds 
invested. Detailed application papers are available for most projects75, which contain the actual 
form and expert opinions of Land authorities in which the destination company was located. From 
case to case, these documents allow for collecting a range of additional information on the projects 
concerned. For estimation purposes, however, only such information is used which is in principle 
retrievable for all projects. Being able to distinguish projects with respect to the type of funds 
employed represents a fundamental advantage of the data. It allows to discriminate investors 
according to whether they planned to invest additional foreign, i.e. “new capital”, in the form of 
foreign exchange or acquired Sperrmark; or whether they only reinvested “existing capital” they 
already possessed within Germany, in the form of their own Sperrmark or equivalent liquidity. 
Observability of the ultimate decision rendered by the investment commission on each individual 
project represents a second, crucial advantage. In fact, the licencing regime was fairly liberal and 
most applications were approved, even if they were deferred to further consideration for a while76. 
Overall, only 9% of all projects were denied. Nevertheless, being able to observe both ultimately 
approved and ultimately rejected projects prevents selection bias coming from the regulatory 
process on the German side.  
Besides these advantages, the data are burdened with a number of complexities regarding their 
digitisation and the subsequent construction of variables for estimation purposes, distinct from 
problems of data interpretation that are addressed separately below. First of all, based on the 
information available from the commission records, applications can be reliably dated only to the 
quarter in which they were submitted, rather than to a monthly or daily frequency77. Moreover, 
projects for which detailed application papers are not retrievable from the records cannot be dated 
by themselves. To solve this problem, I assign to them the rounded average quarter of submission 
across all datable applications discussed in the same commission meeting. Finally, the ultimate 
consistency of the data set requires the exclusion of a range of applications before the data can be 
used for meaningful interpretation and estimation purposes.  
                                                 
75 Application papers are missing for a small minority of projects due to their contemporary refiling with other 
government departments or agencies that took an interest in them. Their current whereabouts are not traceable. 
76 For details see Chapter One. 
77 Applicants submitted their papers at their respective Landeszentralbank, and it typically took three months until the 
Investment Commission reached a decision on the federal level. Thus, even though the individual licencing 
requirement was abolished only in July 1955, the Commission data contains the universe of FDI projects only until 
the end of March 1955. All applications remaining in the process were summarily approved by September 1955. 
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One important example for this requirement is the occurrence of Sperrmark fraud described in 
Chapter One. Illegal conversion attempts gave rise to bogus investment applications. They were 
bogus in the sense that they did not express a serious willingness to invest capital on a long-term 
basis in Germany, but simply represented a means for covertly transferring capital across the 
border. Appendix C discusses the different reasons for excluding applications in detail and lists all 
corresponding applications by the reason for their exclusion. Once these applications are excluded, 
and given the regulatory history outlined above, the final data contain the universe of both equity 
investment and direct lending projects within the Federal Republic planned by non-resident 
applicants between July 1950 and December 1953, and the universe of equity investment projects 
between July 1950 and March 1955. Specifically, they contain all projects directly involving the 
non-resident applicant and a German company located within the three Western zones of 
occupation. They do not include real estate transactions that did not involve a company on the 
German side, nor charitable loans from abroad to private individuals. Importantly, they also do not 
include West Berlin. Regulations governing foreign investment were based on Allied occupation 
laws, and the special Cold War status of Berlin led to a separate licencing regime for West Berlin, 
the records of which are irretrievable78.  
A number of stylized facts summarize the commission data: Firstly, the population of investors is 
composed of a small number of very large multinationals, and a very large number of small 
investors. Table 8 matches new capital invested with pre-existing nominal capital of the destination 
company, for the entire dataset except company foundations. For both variables, the mean is much 
higher than the median. While the median investors spent 50,000 DM per project, a few very large 
investments drove the mean to approximately five times that value. Similarly, the median 
destination company was equipped with about 60,000 DM of nominal capital, and a mean of about 
853,000 DM. Taking out the 1% largest companies reduces the mean to roughly 308,000 DM. In 
comparison, the mean German limited company had nominal capital of about 233,000 DM at the 
end of the 1953, 7.5 million DM being the equivalent value for stock companies (StJB 1954, 213). 
An early conclusion of the paper therefore lies with the observation that the first wave of FDI into 
Germany after the end of the Second World War is not at all restricted to the small number of large 
multinationals that much of the historical literature on international investment is focused on. The 
fact that even in the early 1950s, these few corporations dominate purely in terms of money spent 
obscures the rich variety of small and medium-sized enterprises that newly enter into Germany or 
return to the country just as early.  
                                                 
78 The separate Berlin regime is mentioned e.g. in BArch B.102.6739, 89. Sitzung (19.2.1954), Vermerk, p. 3. 
52 
 
Table 8: Amounts invested and pre-existing nominal capital of destination companies. 
Both equity investment (3rd quarter 1950 - 1st quarter 1955) and lending (3rd quarter 1950 - 4th quarter 1953). 
 
 
Secondly, an investor count reveals that returnees were much fewer than new entrants. The relation 
among equity investors is roughly one to ten, while it is hardly less including lending projects. At 
the same time, pre-war investors were a prominent group. Above all, they invested more. This 
observation is not driven by few multinationals, even though the latter had typically invested in 
Germany since before the War. Table 9 shows that median amounts spent by pre-war investors are 
consistently higher than the 75th quantile of capital invested by new entrants. It also shows that the 
variation was much lower for the latter group, which contains hardly any investments above 
100,000 DM. In contrast, roughly a quarter of their pre-war peers can be found in the medium 
range of 100,000 DM to a quarter million DM. Not surprisingly, these quantitative differences are 
largely driven by the fact that a much greater share of new entrants invested in company 
foundations, which tended to involve only small amounts each. Conversely, the virtual absence of 




Table 9: Size distribution of new capital invested, for pre-war investors and new entrants. 
a) Equity (3q50-1q55) and lending (3q50-4q53)       b) Equity only (3q50-1q55) 
 
Thirdly, investing new capital into Germany was not limited to one-time transactions. On the 
contrary, Table 10 illustrates that many investors occurred frequently in the Commission records. 
The table matches a serial number assigned to each investor according to her earliest appearance 
in the records with the quarters in which she filed any investment applications. The scatter plot 
would be a step-function along the main diagonal if every investor only ever filed a single 
application during the entire period. Instead, multiple observations along the vertical line indicate 
numerous instances of recurring investments. Their determinants warrant more formal 
examination in the following section, because even though investing repeatedly can be a sign of 
both success and failure from a purely financial point of view, it is clearly a sign of commitment 
to the German market. If foreign companies had not seriously attempted to gain or extend their 
foothold, investing repeatedly would not have made economic sense, however successful the initial 
project. Taking the table as the basis for a simple applications count reveals also that returnees 
tended to invest on average slightly earlier than new entrants. Pre-war investors in the data had 
filed a majority of their applications by March 1953, while it took the others a quarter longer. This 
narrow difference, however, might be driven by a range of covariates that will need to be controlled 
for more formally. In addition, Table 10 literally shows the truncation of the data after the 1st 
quarter of 1955. They reveal information neither on investors entering the market just afterwards, 




Table 10: Equity investments (3q50-1q55) with new capital – Distribution over time. 
 
Finally, proximity to the respective home country seems to be an important determinant for 
location choice within the Federal Republic, at least as far as investors from neighbouring countries 
are concerned. In Table 11, this effect is most clearly apparent for the case of the Netherlands, the 
residents of which hardly invest in South Germany at all, even though the Dutch as a whole 
represent the third largest investor nation during the period. Investments from Austria, France, 
Belgium-Luxembourg and Denmark show a similar proximity pattern. The greater dispersion of 
Swiss projects is due to the role of Switzerland as the most important source for Sperrmark loans 
of the time, which dilutes the more clearly visible pattern for equity investments alone. In fact, the 
proximity pattern observable in the Commission data for the early 1950s mirrors the findings of 
the existing historical literature. For the early 19th century, Swiss capital has been credited with 
developing much of the burgeoning textile industry in the south-western corner of Germany 
(Mathis 1992, 129). For as recently as the 1980s, Bläsing (1992, 79) observed important proximity 
patterns for Dutch and Belgian investments. This congruence between the literature and the 
Commission data is important in two dimensions: On a technical level, it represents a robustness 
check for the archival data at hand. On a fundamental level, it is indicative of historical continuity 
that points again to the important role of established foreign investors for post-war FDI. Not only 
did pre-war investors resume control of their German subsidiaries after the War and furnish them 
with new capital.  
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The existing subsidiaries themselves served as important points of reference for new entrants – 
located as they were relatively close to the border. At the same time, foreign investment was a 
reality even in regions further away from a border with FDI source countries: 65% of all German 
districts were home to at least one project involving new capital, even though large cities such as 
Hamburg, Frankfurt or Cologne were the dominant destinations in absolute numbers. 





Technically speaking, the Commission data represent a register of FDI projects for a period of 
approximately five years. Individual investors and investment targets appear at least once in the 
data at some point in time during the 19 quarters of observation. They may appear repeatedly over 
time, either as a pair or on their own with other partners, but neither of them does necessarily. At 
the same time, the register contains no information on foreign companies or individuals who chose 
not to invest in Germany before March 1955, but may have done so immediately after the latter 
date. The data are therefore right-truncated across time. The underlying self-selection of investors 
into the Commission data raises serious problems with respect to data interpretation. The 
observation made in Table 9, for example, that pre-war investors typically spend larger amounts 
than new entrants might not be generalizable to all pre-war investors. Instead, those who do invest 
during the early 1950s might be distinct from their pre-war peers in some unobservable dimension 
which both motivated self-selection and led them to invest larger sums than new entrants after 
1950. Addressing this issue comprehensively requires detailed, yet unavailable information on the 
universe of pre-war investors.  
Nevertheless, evidence is available at least for the United States of America, the most important 
source country of FDI during the post-war era (Schmitz-Esser 1969, 10). As part of Trading with 
the Enemy legislation, the US established a Foreign Funds Control administration in 1940, which 
took a census of American-owned assets abroad in 1943 (Reeves 1945, 58). All US residents were 
obliged to report in detail on any type of asset they owned outside the United States by May 31, 
1943, even if they had already written them off. The case files of the Foreign Funds Control have 
survived in the US National Archives79 and deliver relevant information for the 124 US 
corporations which owned a subsidiary in Germany by 194380. They allow controlling for US-
based holding structures and indirect ownership of German subsidiaries through third country 
subsidiaries. Among other details, reporters had to provide their total assets, as well as cost 
estimates for each of their foreign assets. This makes it possible to compute the share of German 
assets in both total assets and total foreign assets. Both measures are natural indicators for possible 
self-selection into the Commission data. The more important Germany had been for a particular 
corporation as a destination country, the more likely it may have been to invest early on post-
liberalization.  
                                                 
79 The records are available in the National Archives in College Park/MD under RG 256: Records of the Foreign 
Assets Controls, 1941-1996, Entry No. NC 8 – 2, TFR-500: Original Reports Series A II (by Organization) – 1943-
1945, Boxes 459-575. 
80 In this particular context, Germany refers to Deutsches Reich in its 1937 borders. The Original reports filed by US 
residents are ordered according to type of reporters, which are corporations, individuals and trustees. The present 
paper only uses the records pertaining to corporations. The definition of corporations applied by Foreign Funds 
Control is wide: Besides manufacturing companies, it includes banks, universities, and holding companies.  
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The reverse could also be true, given the relatively greater exposure to Germany’s default and the 
ensuing war. Similarly, corporations active in more countries may have been readier to take the 
risk of investing early during the post-war period in the Federal Republic, independently of the 
financial relevance of their existing German assets. Appendix H provides additional details on the 
records and the adjustments made to the raw data. 
In addition, exploiting the geographical variation of investment projects across German districts 
allows for estimating the determinants of FDI location choice without problems of truncation. This 
is especially interesting for the initial location choice made by new post-war entrants, as they were 
not constrained by prior location choices that pre-war investors had made at some point. 
Importantly, being able to distinguish new entrants as a group makes it possible to estimate the 
influence of those prior locations on their own choices. To this end, the distribution of foreign-
owned companies across the Federal Republic just prior to the lifting of the investment embargo 
is available through a publication by the Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951). The East German 
institute intended to provide a summary of foreign influence on the West German economy and 
compiled an extensive list of all West German companies under foreign ownership. The list is 
based primarily on published business manuals from the late 1930s, such as the “Handbuch der 
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften”, the British “The Bankers Almanac and Year Book”, or the 
American “Moody’s Industrials” (Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut 1951, 53). Its sole focus on West 
Germany precludes its use as the universe of pre-war investors in the German Empire. However, 
it can be used as a geographical variable of interest, approximating the number of foreign-owned 
enterprises per West German district as of June 1950. To ensure its reliability irrespective of 
ideology, I only retain the companies for which a precise foreign-ownership share is given, for 
which the latter exceeds the threshold value of 10%, and which were founded before June 1950. 
Thus cleaning the data yields a total of 663 companies spread out across 144 districts. The 
corresponding figure on the local level can be interpreted as a lower benchmark of the overall 
presence of foreign corporations, as long as the Deutsche Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951) is assumed to 
have captured at least all foreign-owned companies above a certain quantitative threshold. The 
data are not, however, employed as higher-dimensional control variables by differentiating them 
according to countries of origin of the foreign parent company, even though the structure of the 
data would technically allow for that. The sources used in the publication focus on British and US 
investors and are thus likely to systematically underestimate the presence of investors from other 
countries. Further details on the data source and necessary adjustments made to the raw data are 
contained in Appendix I. 
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Caveats to data interpretation 
Three important qualifications need to be introduced before the Commission data can be used for 
estimation purposes.  
Firstly, meaningful conclusions about FDI at the extensive margin of liberalization require a 
restriction on the scope of the data used: All estimations presented in the following section other 
than some Poisson regressions shown in Tables 12 and 13 are based exclusively on investment 
projects which were funded by new capital and received a permit by the Investment Commission. 
The restriction to projects funded by either acquired Sperrmark or foreign exchange is above all 
due to the fact that these projects are comprehensively observable in the Commission data, which 
is not the case for particular types of investments financed with existing capital. As outlined above, 
the data contain all projects in which the non-resident applicant was directly involved. The 
investment of new capital obviously required the direct involvement of the non-resident applicant, 
or at least of a non-resident trustee on her behalf. In the case of reinvesting of existing capital, 
however, she was only directly involved if she invested out of her own, historic Sperrmark 
accounts, or if she was using liquidity on the balance sheet of her subsidiary that was explicitly 
due to her, such as accrued profits due to owner. In other words, the licencing requirement could 
be avoided if the subsidiary made investments financed by its own reserves or through German 
bank loans. Such transactions increased the foreign parent’s total investment in the German 
economy without her immediate financial involvement. They were commonplace at the time, as 
shown by Wubs (2012, 39) for Dutch multinationals and by Wilkins (1974, 308) for their US 
counterparts. This peculiar loophole was due to the fact that capital controls were strictly speaking 
foreign exchange controls. The principle of national treatment allowed foreign subsidiaries to do 
business essentially just like any other German company, as long as it did not immediately affect 
financial liabilities to non-residents. Another, more fundamental reason for considering only new 
capital is the potential ambiguity of reinvesting existing capital. The practice of hedging excess 
liquidity by investing it in a broad variety of assets during the National Socialist regime has already 
been described above. Eck (2003, 43) confirms this strategy also for the immediate post-war period 
for the case of French companies. After all, non-resident owners saw their existing Sperrmark 
wiped out by the currency reform of June 1948 (Dernburg 1955, 23). Even though the legalization 
of trading in Sperrmark in March 1951 introduced effective convertibility, it did so at the 
prevailing discount with respect to the official exchange rate. Despite the fact that investing in 
marketable German securities was the more convenient option for hedging purposes, the latter 
motive cannot be a priori excluded for FDI projects financed with existing capital.  
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Considering only new capital therefore represents a way to ensure that the observed projects 
reflected long-term investment motives. For the same reason, I use the approval of applications as 
a filter against potential bogus applications that I have not been able to identify as such. The 
following estimations are therefore based only on all projects that were ultimately approved. As a 
robustness check, however, Appendix A contains identical estimations based on both approved 
and denied applications.  
The second qualification arises from the fact that the early 1950s were a period of pervasive capital 
controls all over Europe (Obstfeld & Taylor 1997, 26). With few exceptions, prospective foreign 
investors required the permission not only of the German investment commission, but also of the 
competent authorities in their respective home countries81. Home-country regulation might be an 
additional source of selection bias, because it worked as an upstream filter, preventing a fraction 
of potentially serious investment projects from appearing in the German commission data in the 
first place. This bias would be worse for any particular home country the more discretionary its 
regulation of outward foreign investment was at the time. Moreover, the impact of home-country 
regulation on the applications that arrived at the German Investment Commission is essentially 
unobservable beyond anecdotal evidence. A straightforward way to assess the severity of this bias, 
however, is to explicitly control for non-control countries in the estimations. Moreover, regulatory 
pressure at home was frequently evaded: Multinationals were able to invest in Germany via 
subsidiaries located in third countries with less stringent regulation. Even relatively small 
companies could make use of a range of intermediaries from Switzerland, a country that had been 
at the centre of such transactions since the 19th century82. British investors offer a case in point. 
The United Kingdom employed strict capital controls on all transactions outside the Sterling Area 
(Rollings 2011, 407). Moreover, the Bank of England centralized the allocation of funds for 
investment in Germany after September 1954, by obliging British residents to offer their Libka-
Mark holdings for sale to the Bank. Nevertheless, British companies were able to use Swiss 
trustees and did so repeatedly83. Whenever observable in the commission data, I attribute the 
respective investment projects to the original principal and not the agent from Switzerland or other 
countries. 
                                                 
81 As a rule, the few countries with convertible currencies at the time did not control outward FDI. These are notably 
the United States of America, Switzerland, Canada and Portugal. The United States introduced a mild form of outward 
capital controls only during the 1960s, in order to alleviate balance of payments pressures (Rollings 2011). The Swiss 
Franc was fully convertible expect for trade payments with fellow EPU member states (Schwerdtel 1992). 
82 Hausman et al. (2007) discuss the late 19th century example of Swiss holding structures for FDI in the electric 
industry. The special role of Swiss trustees in relation to Germany during the mid-20th century is discussed in detail 
by Uhlig et al. (2001). 
83 One example in the commission records is given in: BArch B102.6767, 71. Sitzung (5.6.1953), Liste D, Nr. 1. 
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Finally, a third qualification is a product of the fact that obtaining an investment permit was a one-
off requirement, meaning that the eventual implementation, longevity and financial success of 
submitted investment projects are not systematically observable. Unobserved implementation 
represents the lesser restriction on data interpretation, inasmuch as the sincerity of the respective 
project is concerned. Submitting a licence application was costly, as it involved a considerable 
amount of paperwork. There is also no evidence of speculative hoarding of licences in the data.  
 
Estimation results 
The Commission data lend themselves to estimation purposes along three dimensions: Firstly, I 
identify the groups who invested relatively earlier than others by using Poisson regressions to 
explain the timing of first investment. Secondly, focussing on investors with more than one project 
allows interpreting the Commission data as failure time data. I estimate the determinants of 
recurrent investment correspondingly along the lines of a conditional risk set model proposed by 
Prentice et al. (1981). Thirdly, I model location choice by new entrants across German districts 
during the entire period of observation. For this purpose, I employ the McFadden (1974) 
alternative-specific conditional logit model extensively used in the FDI location choice literature 
(Nielsen et al. 2017). As discussed already, lending by non-residents to German companies is no 
longer fully observed in the Commission records after February 1954. I therefore estimate all 
models separately for two subgroups of the data: One includes all equity investment projects 
between July 1950 and March 1955 (henceforth called the “long sample”); the other includes all 
equity investment projects, as well as all lending activity, for the period between July 1950 and 
December 1953 (henceforth called the “short sample”). 
A failure-time interpretation is suggested by the structure of the Commission data: At some point 
during the observational window spanning the period July 1950 to March 1955, individual 
investors enter observation by filing their first investment application. Once they have entered, 
they can fail repeatedly, so to speak, by submitting additional projects over time. All investors are 
censored in March 1955, regardless of whether they have experienced failure since their first 
application. As a first step, I explain the timing of this first application by a Poisson count data 
model of the quarter of first application84. Table 12 provides the results for the long sample. 
Column (1) yields the results for the baseline model, confirming the descriptive result of Table 10: 
                                                 
84 Strict distributional assumptions are one important problem in the context of using Poisson regressions. To control 
for this, I estimated all regressions presented in Table 12 and Table 13 alternatively using a negative binomial model. 
The results are equivalent, notably with respect to pre-war investors and German emigrants. 
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Pre-war investors did invest significantly earlier than new post-war entrants. This result is robust 
to alternative specifications including a range of further covariates, such as sectoral indicator 
variables, in Column (2). At the same time, being a German emigrant did not result in significantly 
earlier investment compared to investors born outside Germany. Equally, family relations between 
the investor and any person involved with a German destination company do not cause particularly 
early investment of new capital. The equivalent holds true for foreign trustees. Like family or 
ethnic relations, trustees are natural candidates for early investors.  




Sample  New capital  New and existing capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prewar investor -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.067** -0.073**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.033) (0.034)
German origin -0.057 -0.050 -0.094*** -0.091***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.032) (0.034)
Family -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.013
(0.051) (0.051) (0.042) (0.042)
Trustee -0.029 0.030 -0.028 0.011
(0.059) (0.063) (0.054) (0.057)
No control -0.092*** -0.063**
(0.035) (0.032)
WWII neutrals -0.031 0.004
(0.047) (0.042)
Investment size 0.006 0.005
(million DM) (0.006) (0.008)
Switzerland 0.006 -0.022
(0.062) (0.056)
Sector FE YES YES
Constant 2.447*** 2.452*** 2.415*** 2.427***
(0.013) (0.031) (0.013) (0.028)
Observations 2,059 2,059 2,485 2,485
Wald chi2 15.95 82.87 16.05 67.32
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In so far as the riskiness of investing in the Federal Republic decreased gradually during the first 
half of the 1950s, trustees ought to be concentrated during the beginning of the period. The fact 
that German emigrants were not among the particularly early investors according to models (1) 
and (2) of Table 12 is contrary to the findings by Burchardi et al. (2018), that ethnic ties play an 
important role in explaining outward FDI location choice of present-day US investors. However, 
the type of investment finance considered plays a crucial role in this context. German emigrants 
were not particularly early investors of new capital, but they were among the earliest, once the 
reinvestment of existing capital is taken into consideration in models (3) and (4). 
Table 13: Timing of first investment: Poisson model, equity investment and lending. 
 
Period  3q50-4q53
Sample  New capital  New and existing capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prewar investor -0.170*** -0.196*** -0.113*** -0.129***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.031) (0.031)
German origin 0.055* 0.041 -0.061** -0.074**
(0.030) (0.033) (0.027) (0.029)
Family 0.012 0.019 0.042 0.042
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Trustee -0.027 0.015 -0.007 0.023
(0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.042)
No control -0.040 -0.015
(0.032) (0.030)
WWII neutrals -0.061 -0.002
(0.042) (0.039)
Investment size 0.013 0.010
(million DM) (0.009) (0.008)
Switzerland -0.014 -0.059
(0.054) (0.051)
Sector FE YES YES
Constant 2.099*** 2.131*** 2.059*** 2.091***
(0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.026)
Observations 2,502 2,502 3.065 3.065
Wald chi2 27.77 75.90 22.09 60.35
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In this sense, the equivalent results to Burchardi et al. (2018) in the context of post-war Germany 
would be that German emigrants did not invest early because of their ethnicity itself, but because 
their ethnicity was concomitant with owning disposable German assets which they started 
reinvesting as soon as this was permissible after the end of the War. However, the results of models 
(3) and (4) of Table 12 should be viewed with caution. Hedging of liquidity in anticipation of 
future convertibility is likely to be an important driver of emigrant investments during the early 
1950s, especially since a considerable fraction of the corresponding investment money originated 
with restitution accounts, i.e. accounts owned by victims of the National Socialist regime. 
Concerning other factors of influence, investors from countries which did not regulate FDI by their 
nationals invested significantly earlier than investors from exchange control countries. Controlling 
separately for Swiss investors does not change the results either. Table 13 reproduces the models 
given in Table 12 for the short sample. In the baseline model (1), German origin is actually 
associated with belated timing of first investment. This, however, is only significant at the 10% 
level and vanishes once additional covariates are taken into account. Otherwise, the results are 
identical with Table 12, except that investors from control-free countries are no longer identified 
as particularly early investors. Including rejected applications in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 
A does not change the results either. In all cases, the fact that pre-war investors started to invest 
significantly earlier than new entrants is the most prominent feature of the results. 
Not only did pre-war investors start to invest earlier, they also invested on average more often than 
new entrants. Table 14 yields the results of estimating the determinants of recurrent investment by 
a conditional risk set model (time from entry) according to Prentice et al. (1981). This model 
incorporates the possibility of multiple failures per subject into a Cox proportional hazard model. 
This is done by stratifying the model by the number of repeated failures, which means that the risk 
set used to calculate the hazard function for each subject at any point in time is composed only of 
the subjects who have previously experienced the identical number of failures. In the context of 
this paper, the model thus allows to control explicitly for different frequencies of investment, as 
the determinants of an additional investment project might change depending on how many 
previous projects the investor already had. Being a pre-war investor might, for example, have 
increased the risk of investing a second time, but it might not matter anymore when comparing 
investors, each of whom had already invested four times over. The results show that pre-war 
investors are consistently at a higher risk of investing again, so to speak, even when controlling 
for the previous number of investments. This effect is robust to controlling for previous 
investment, that is, the amount of money already spent by the investor on projects submitted prior 
to the application under consideration.  
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Table 14: Determinants of recurring investments: Conditional risk set model. 
 
Previous investment represents an especially important control, because frequent investments do 
not necessarily indicate higher overall investments. Spending a particular amount of money once 
is equivalent to disbursing it incrementally, other things being equal. As a matter of fact, the 
amount of previous investment has an independently significant effect, increasing the hazard of 
investing another time. Thus there is a certain degree of autocorrelation in the data: Already having 
spent considerable sums of new capital on German assets since liberalization makes it more likely 
to invest again, which is especially true for the short sample in models (3) and (4).  
Period  3q1950-1q1955  3q1950 - 4q1953
Sample  Equity investment  Equity investment and lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prewar investor 0.683*** 0.679*** 0.570*** 0.501***
(0.140) (0.145) (0.096) (0.099)
German emigrant -0.035 0.131 0.132 0.210
(0.202) (0.219) (0.123) (0.134)
Family -0.607** -0.601** -0.272** -0.260**
(0.295) (0.292) (0.119) (0.119)
Trustee 0.202 0.263 0.488*** 0.474***
(0.203) (0.209) (0.126) (0.132)
No control -0.046 -0.276 0.125 0.051
(0.132) (0.220) (0.097) (0.136)
WWII neutrals 0.525*** 0.327 0.314*** 0.226
(0.134) (0.220) (0.095) (0.172)
Previous investment 0.159* 0.164* 0.063*** 0.063***
(million DM) (0.093) (0.099) (0.021) (0.022)
Nominal capital of -0.068* -0.074* -0.014 -0.018
destination (million DM) (0.041) (0.044) (0.013) (0.014)
Switzerland 0.390 0.159
(0.328) (0.222)
Sector FE YES YES
Observations 2,249 2,249 2,971 2,971
Subjects 1,925 1,925 2,319 2,319
Failures 354 354 730 730
Wald chi2 62.66 96.54 134.33 184.17
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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This observation is not driven by the small number of very large multinationals in the data but 
reflects a general phenomenon. The existing nominal capital of German destination companies 
actually has a significantly negative effect on investment frequency, at least when considering only 
equity investments in regressions (1) and (2). Personal relations, on the other hand, do not lead to 
more frequent projects. German emigrants do not play a significant role, while family relations 
rarely give rise to repeated transactions, resulting in the significantly negative coefficients of Table 
14. As with the timing of the first investment, including rejected applications into the sample in 
Table A.3 of Appendix A does not change the results in any important dimension.  
Autocorrelation in the Commission data points to one of the pitfalls of right truncation. As outlined 
above, the significance of pre-war investors for post-war investment might simply reflect 
autocorrelation across the two decades during which Germany had been isolated from international 
capital markets. Those pre-war investors who self-selected into the post-war Commission data 
might be the ones who had also historically invested more than other pre-war owners of German 
assets. If this were true, the fact that the same companies and individuals invested earlier and more 
frequently than others also after 1950 would not be surprising. This effect would not already be 
captured by controlling for the nominal capital of the destination company. Controlling for it 
would require observing the universe of pre-war investors instead. In this paper, I use the universe 
of corporations from the United States with a pre-war subsidiary in Germany to approximate the 
larger, yet unavailable, sample. US investors represented the largest national group during the 
post-war period in the Federal Republic (Schmitz-Esser 1969, 10), which would make historic 
autocorrelation in their case especially problematic for the purpose of this paper. Table 15 shows 
that US corporations which appear in the Commission data and already had a German subsidiary 
before the War are on average not statistically distinguishable from the “holdouts”, i.e. those 
corporations which owned a subsidiary in Germany by 1943, but did not invest in the Federal 
Republic prior to March 1955. This overall result is robust to including investments made with 
existing funds. Among all 124 corporations85, 13% invested new equity capital between July 1950 
and March 1955. The ratio increases to 19% if existing funds are included. Both ratios are 
somewhat higher for the short sample.  
                                                 
85 The original number of US corporations owning any equity shares within Germany is 221. For estimation purposes, 
I only use corporations with a subsidiary in Germany, in order to ensure comparability. The original data includes a 
number of holding companies for mere portfolio investments. I also exclude corporations if their continued existence 
cannot be verified at least until 1955. Deceased corporations were obviously unable to appear in the Commission data 
in the first place. Moreover, I merge pure holding structures with their parent companies. The largest corporations 
typically held a fraction of their German assets by themselves, while pooling the remainder in specialised holding 
entities. Not controlling for this fact would seriously underestimate the extent of German investments of the parent 
corporation. Finally, I exclude holding companies administering the German property of Germans or very recent 
emigrants, as it did not constitute foreign capital at the time of investment. For details, see Appendix H. 
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Overall, investors and holdouts were very similar regarding the three dimensions considered, and 
the difference between the groups is hardly ever statistically significant. Only for the short sample 
are investors on average active in significantly more countries than holdouts, but the sample is 
prone to outliers given the relatively low number of observations. 
Table 15: Post-war investment of US corporations in relation to their multinational activities, as 
reported in 1943. 
 
Pre-war subsidiary located anywhere in Germany of 1937 (124 US corporations)
equity investments (3q50-1q55) equity and lending (3q50-4q53)
investors holdouts difference investors holdouts difference
existing funds and new capital 23 101 29 95
number of countries 21.91 18.01    3.90 24.28 17.04    7.23**
German share in non-US assets 0.25 0.27   -0.03 0.27 0.27   -0.00
German share in total assets 0.07 0.06   -0.02 0.04 0.07   -0.02
new capital only 16 108 24 100
number of countries 19.88 18.57    1.31 24.83 17.27    7.56**
German share in non-US assets 0.22 0.28   -0.06 0.28 0.27    0.02
German share in total assets 0.05 0.06   -0.02 0.05 0.06   -0.01
Pre-war subsidiary located in later West Germany or West Berlin (107 US corporations)
existing funds and new capital 19 88 24 83
number of countries 20.42 18.10    2.32 23.29 17.13    6.16
German share in non-US assets 0.26 0.27   -0.01 0.28 0.27    0.02
German share in total assets 0.09 0.06    0.03 0.05 0.07   -0.02
new capital only 13 94 20 87
number of countries 15.85 18.88   -3.04 22.75 17.54    5.21
German share in non-US assets 0.26 0.27   -0.01 0.32 0.26    0.07
German share in total assets 0.06 0.07   -0.01 0.06 0.07   -0.01
Pre-war subsidiary located in later West Germany (76 US corporations)
existing funds and new capital 14 62 19 57
number of countries 21.86 18.1    3.76 25.11 16.68    8.42*
German share in non-US assets 0.28 0.28    0.00 0.30 0.27    0.03
German share in total assets 0.11 0.06    0.05 0.06 0.07   -0.02
new capital only 8 68 15 61
number of countries 15.5 19.18   -3.68 24.87 17.3    7.57
German share in non-US assets 0.30 0.28    0.03 0.37 0.26    0.11
German share in total assets 0.08 0.07    0.01 0.07 0.07    0.00
Number of countries refers to the no. of countries for which the US corporation reported any assets.
T-Tests of significant difference in means: * p < 0.1;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01
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There is an additional chance that the overall results for all of 1937 Germany in the first panel of 
Table 15 are distorted by the absence of West Berlin from the Commission Data. Similarly, the 
corporations were affected differently by Communist expropriation in the Soviet sector and in the 
formerly German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Losing relatively more property might 
have made corporations relatively more reluctant to invest in West Germany after 1950.  At the 
same time, it might have made them relatively more likely to invest, given the ceteris paribus 
greater need to invest in order to service the German market. The second and third panels of Table 
15 therefore reproduce the results according to the different locations of their pre-war subsidiaries. 
Again, there is no statistical difference between investors and holdouts in the means of the three 
variables, even when considering only those corporations which had a pre-war subsidiary in later 
West Germany, excluding West Berlin.  
Estimation results so far have shown that pre-war investors played an important role in post-war 
investment, while the example of US corporations indicates that this role cannot be explained 
simply as a statistical artefact. By investing relatively early and often just after the lifting of the 
Allied investment embargo, they were themselves key protagonists in resuming FDI into Germany 
after the Second World War. The role of established investors, however, went beyond their own 
contribution to post-war FDI. Their historic presence exerted significant influence on the 
investment decisions of new entrants. Specifically, it affected the location of the initial investment 
of new entrants across Germany. In fact, this relationship is a common feature of the FDI location 
choice literature. An historically important agglomeration of foreigners or foreign-owned 
companies in a particular locality helps new entrants alleviate the “liability of foreignness” caused 
by asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors about the local investment 
environment (Goerzen et al. 2013). The basic model of the location choice literature is the 
McFadden (1974) alternative-specific conditional logit model, in which investors maximize their 
utility across available location choices. Following the specification by Guimaraes et. al (2000, 
121) who estimate the model in a similar context, investor 𝑖 expects to derive the utility level 𝑢𝑖𝑗 
from investing in locality 𝑗, where 
                                                       𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑈𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2) 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is an i.i. Weibull-distributed stochastic error term. The deterministic, representative utility 








The investor will prefer locality 𝑗 over any other locality 𝑚 if     
𝑢𝑖𝑗 > 𝑢𝑖𝑚           ∀𝑚,   𝑚 ≠ 𝑗    (4) 
Assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives, the probability 𝑃𝑖𝑗 that investor 𝑖 chooses 
locality 𝑗 for her investment takes the form 





   (5) 
In this paper, the newly arriving investor chooses among 466 German districts86 given the 
properties of her investment project and observable district characteristics. Table 16 contains the 
results. Columns (1) and (4) report the effects of investor-specific variables for the long and short 
sample respectively. Sectoral agglomeration evidently played an important role in determining 
location choice, regardless of the type of sample considered. The share of the investing sector in 
the total district workforce of 1950 has a strongly positive and significant effect on the likelihood 
of investing in any particular district87. At the same time, all the estimations confirm the proximity 
effect apparent already in Table 11. The distance-to-border variable measures the shortest linear 
distance between the chosen district within Germany and the border of the respective home country 
for investors from neighbouring countries, and between that district and the Western border of 
Germany for investors from anywhere else. Its significant coefficient is always strongly negative 
as expected. New entrants after July 1950 tended to invest in Germany geographically close to 
their home, whether directly or indirectly via neighbouring third countries. In addition, investors 
from the United States, Great Britain and France are more likely to invest in areas of West 
Germany occupied by their own national government than in those occupied respectively by the 
two other powers. Table 11 indicates the presence of this effect visually for the case of France. 
While the location of the French occupation zone within Germany is highly correlated with 
distance to the French border, it still exerts an independently positive effect on the likelihood of 
French investors choosing a particular district for investment, potentially mirroring the efforts of 
the French government to encourage French private FDI into its zone (Eck 2003, 134).  
                                                 
86 The total number of West German districts was 557 at the time, which comprised both cities that were their own 
district (kreisfreie Städte) and districts containing several municipalities (Landkreise). The surrounding rural areas of 
kreisfreie Städte were often organized as their own Landkreise. This is a problem for the purpose of estimation, as 
such Landkreise by design have very little economic activity and thus also foreign investment of their own. To address 
this problem I merge all kreisfreie Städte and Landkreise for which the administrative seat of the Landkreis is the 
kreisfreie Stadt. The total number of districts is thus reduced to 466; For details see Appendix J. 
87 Employment data are taken from the German employment census of September 13, 1950, which was published for 
each Land separately. For details, cf. list of published data sources below. 
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Finally, in order to make sure that the number of foreign-owned companies on the district level 
retrieved from Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951) really captures an independent effect on the 
initial location decision of new entrants, I control for a second, and potentially confounding source 
of information about the local investment environment. The variable ‘own consulate’ indicates 
whether a given district hosted any kind of diplomatic representative of the investor home country 
by early 195188. All else equal, representatives were likely located in cities which had greater 
economic importance for the respective country, whether close mercantile connections or indeed 
subsidiaries of domestic companies. Denmark, for example, was the only country represented in 
Flensburg, while the same holds for the Netherlands in Emden. Taking into account such 
representation controls for agglomeration specific to the respective home country, thus isolating 
agglomeration effects through the presence of established foreign investors in general. The 
asserted link between consular representation and country-specific agglomeration is corroborated 
by evidence from the German population census of 1933, which also yields citizenship data by 
country of origin for 36 larger cities located within later West Germany (excluding West Berlin). 
Comparing the incidence of a country’s official representation in a particular city by early 1951 
on the one hand, with the number of its citizens in that city in 1933 on the other hand yields a 
positive correlation of between 60 and 65%, depending on the measurement used89. This high 
correlation is unlikely to be explained by the representations themselves, assuming that their 
location had not changed across the period. Foreign embassies with potentially large personnel 
were located in Berlin in 1933, and the later Western capital city of Bonn is not included among 
the larger West German cities of the 1930s. In fact, ‘own consulate’ has a highly significant, 
positive effect on location choice in both the long and the short sample. 
Columns (2) and (3) for the long sample and columns (5) and (6) for the short sample extend the 
baseline models (1) and (4) to include a range of district-specific variables. Most importantly, the 
number of established foreign-owned companies exerts a positive and significant influence on the 
initial location choice of new entrants.  
                                                 
88 The data on official representatives are taken from Berliner Bank (1951). I do not discriminate between different 
types of representations, i.e. embassy, consulate, vice consulate, military attaché, commercial attaché, etc.  
89 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b). The information given in the census publication allows for distinguishing nationals 
of a particular country according to whether German was their native language. Considering all foreign nationals 
regardless of their mother tongue results in a coefficient of correlation with 1951 representation of 60.77%. Restricting 
the sample to foreign nationals who have a native language other than German, except for nationals of the (partly) 
German-speaking countries Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland, raises the coefficient to 61.06%. Yugoslavia is an 
extreme outlier, as its 1951 representation across Germany is virtually uncorrelated with the distribution of Yugoslavs 
across Germany in 1933. Taking Yugoslavia out of the sample increases the coefficient to 64.02% (all foreign 
nationals), and 65.33% respectively (non-German native speakers, including all Austrians, Luxembourgers and 
Swiss). In the above, I only consider countries that were potential home countries of investment during the 1950s. 
Thus, for example, I exclude the Soviet Union or Poland, even though corresponding data in both sources exist. 
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All else equal, the latter tended to concentrate in areas in which there had been many foreign 
subsidiaries since before the War. Observing such an effect, however, could be due to spurious 
correlation resulting from a range of potentially omitted variables. Thus, the positive effect might 
be explained by the persistent industrial geography of Germany. 
Table 16: First location choice of new entrants: Alternative-specific conditional logit model. 
 
Period  3q1950 - 1q1955  3q1950 - 4q1953
Investment sample  Equity investment  Equity investment and lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sectoral employment share 7.341*** 7.795*** 7.883*** 7.082*** 7.652*** 7.750***
(0.585) (0.330) (0.335) (0.500) (0.305) (0.308)
Distance to border -6.491*** -7.617*** -7.607*** -5.298*** -6.453*** -6.438***
(0.323) (0.314) (0.315) (0.261) (0.243) (0.244)
Own occupation zone 0.603*** 0.640*** 0.634*** 0.745*** 0.916*** 0.904***
(0.099) (0.104) (0.103) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093)
Own consulate 0.517*** 1.455*** 1.510*** 0.380*** 1.089*** 1.154***
(0.110) (0.131) (0.132) (0.106) (0.111) (0.115)
Foreign-owned companies 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
P.c. retail turnover 1950 0.314*** 0.390***
(0.072) (0.051)
P.c. industry turnover 1935 0.017 0.027
(0.037) (0.034)
Population density 1950 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Large city 1950 (>500,000) 1.450*** 1.519*** 1.612*** 1.692***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.126) (0.126)
Seaport -0.110 -0.150 0.339** 0.312*
(0.248) (0.255) (0.172) (0.176)
Rhine 0.782*** 0.831*** 0.593*** 0.645***
(0.078) (0.083) (0.069) (0.0724)
Hamburg-Frankfurt 1.048*** 1.093*** 0.856*** 0.922***
(0.139) (0.149) (0.125) (0.134)
District FE YES YES
Observations 874,216 874,216 874,216 1,046,170 1,046,170 1,046,170
Wald chi2 640.62 10,849.58 10,639.24 700.79 12,179.4 11,963.14
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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If foreign corporations had invested in traditional industrial centres of Germany before the First 
World War and during the interwar era, they might have done so also after 1950. I measure 
established centres of industry by per capita industrial turnover in 1935. The data are taken from 
official turnover tax statistics for that year90. However, 1935 industrial turnover has no significant 
effect of its own in models (3) and (6) respectively, while the coefficient for foreign-owned 
companies is unaffected. Retail turnover figures for 1950 provide an alternative measure for local 
economic activity. In fact, they are extremely highly correlated with district-level GDP in 1957, 
which represent the earliest available data for local GDP in West Germany91. Replacing 1935 
industrial turnover with 1950 retail turnover in models (2) and (5) does not change the positive 
significance of foreign-owned companies, while retail turnover does have a significant positive 
effect of its own. Population density serves a proxy for urban agglomeration, reflecting the fact 
that investment projects tended to be concentrated in urban centres92. In addition, I control 
specifically for the largest cities of the time, each of which were also popular investment 
destination. Both variables are always significant, as is controlling for Hamburg and Frankfurt, the 
two single most important investment destinations, separately. Finally, two important features of 
Germany’s economic geography in the form of seaports93 and districts located on the Rhine are 
included. While a location on the Rhine has the expected positive and significant influence on 
location choice, being a seaport does not, which could be due to the fact that the two most 
important ports as well as investment destinations, Hamburg and Bremen, are already captured by 
other variables. As with the previous estimations, including rejected applications in Table A.4 of 





                                                 
90 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939). Per capita industrial turnover refers to district population figures of 1933, which 
are provided in the same publication. Employing 1935 data on the district level requires prior adjustments for changes 
in district boundaries between 1935 and 1950. I base adjustments on population shares of 1950 districts in 1935 
districts, taking population data on the municipality level from the population census of 1933, provided in Statistisches 
Reichsamt (1936a). For details on the adjustments made, see Appendix J.2. 
91 1950 turnover data are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (1955), 1957 GDP data from Gemeinschafts-
veröffentlichung der Statistischen Landesämter (1964). The correlation between the two series amounts to 0.9793. 
92 Population data for 1950 are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (1955). 
93 The indicator variable ‘seaport’ takes the value 1 for all districts in which a seaport is located that is listed separately 
as a port in the seaport cargo handling statistics of 1952 (StJB 1952, 297). These are: Lübeck, Kiel, Flensburg, 




This paper studies very early FDI into the Federal Republic of Germany during the initial years 
following the lifting of the Allied investment embargo in June 1950. It draws on a unique archival 
data set containing the universe of equity investment projects directly involving a foreign investor 
between July 1950 and March 1955, and the corresponding universe of lending projects until the 
end of 1953. In addition, previously unexplored evidence on US corporations with pre-war 
subsidiaries in Germany is used as a robustness check against concerns arising from right-
truncation in the post-war data. At a time when foreign investment remained highly regulated all 
over Europe and international capital markets were virtually non-existent, interested foreign 
investors were already able to spend additional amounts of their outside capital on long-term assets 
within Germany. The lifting of the Allied embargo therefore lies at the extensive margin of 
financial liberalisation for all of Europe after the end of the Second World War. 
After almost two decades of isolation from international capital markets, FDI into Germany was 
resumed prominently by companies and individuals who had already owned a stake in the country 
before the War. Pre-war investors invested new foreign capital significantly earlier and more 
frequently than new entrants, even though they should have been less likely to inject new capital 
into their German activities, as other, less regulated alternatives were available to them. Evidence 
for US investors suggests that these findings are also not driven simply by historical 
autocorrelation. Furthermore, returning investors were important after 1950 not only by 
themselves. Their established presence across German districts exerted significant influence on 
the initial location decision of investments by new post-war entrants. The paper thus reveals 












CHAPTER III – The London Debt Agreement of 1953 and foreign investment 
into West Germany 
 
 
The 1953 London Agreement on Germany’s outstanding foreign obligations has been frequently 
highlighted as a major contribution to the strong performance of the West German economy during 
the ‘miracle years’ of the 1950s and 1960s. However, there has been little empirical research so 
far on the Agreement’s actual, contemporaneous impact. It is commonly asserted that the 
Agreement restored Germany’s creditworthiness abroad. I test this assertion by investigating the 
link between outstanding pre-war foreign debt, the London Agreement and foreign investment into 
West Germany during the first half of the 1950s. The conclusion of the Agreement in itself was 
not sufficient to restore confidence abroad, while it represented a necessary precondition for the 
gradual removal of exchange controls, which in turn had a strong positive impact on investor 
expectations. On the other hand, the residual importance of outstanding pre-war debt for post-war 
investment twenty years after the default of the 1930s must not be overestimated: The presence of 
pre-war debt, as well as its settlement in the London Agreement did not determine investment 
patterns on the local level in the early Federal Republic. More fundamental economic factors 
clearly took precedence over Germany’s painful default history. 
 
Introduction 
 In a 1986 contribution to a volume on West Germany’s94 early post-war history, Christoph 
Buchheim remarked the curious absence of any scholarly literature on the London Debt Agreement 
of 1953, which corresponded in his opinion to the lack of public interest in the topic (Buchheim 
1986, 222). The same can certainly no longer be said thirty years later. In the wake of the sovereign 
debt crises of the early 1990s, and again during the European debt crisis after 2008 the history of 
Germany’s default and its settlement has attracted considerable attention, both in the literature and 
more broadly in public opinion. The historical irony seems striking: The proponent of austerity 
within the Eurozone prevents Greece and other indebted countries from benefiting from as 
favourable a treatment as Germany had itself received after the Second World War.  
                                                 
94 In this paper I will use the terms West Germany, the Federal Republic and Germany interchangeably. East Germany, 




As a matter of fact, the London Agreement did involve a substantial reduction of Germany’s 
outstanding foreign liabilities: The three Western Allied governments renounced on the repayment 
of about 57% of their post-war aid to their zones of occupation, while pre-war liabilities were 
reduced by some 40% (Guinnane 2015, 16). Moreover, it effectively precluded future reparation 
demands against the Federal Republic, as any claims arising from the Second World War were 
expressly excluded and made secondary to the fulfilment of the Agreement (Buxbaum 2005). 
Under this condition Germany was also able to avoid repaying most of its substantial clearing debt 
which it had amassed during the War with respect to neutral and occupied European countries 
(Berger & Ritschl 1995, 495). The literature typically mentions two broad classes of benefits for 
the German economy from such favourable treatment: Firstly, the Agreement removed the 
contingency of unsustainably large debt repayments from the German sovereign and private 
debtors, thereby stabilizing public finances and freeing up resources for productive internal uses. 
Secondly, it restored German creditworthiness abroad, facilitating the country’s reintegration with 
international trade and finance.  
While the political process of the negotiations and the financial terms of the settlement have 
already received considerable attention in the literature, there is as yet very little empirical research 
trying to test these hypothesised benefits. After its ratification in 1953, the London Agreement had 
been implemented smoothly, and its implementation coincided with more than a decade of 
spectacular economic growth during which Germany did reintegrate quickly with the world 
economy95. This overall success story both allows for generous assertions about the Agreement’s 
benign effects and at the same time makes it hard to empirically test these effects in existing 
macroeconomic data. A null hypothesis of ‘any positive effects’ can hardly be rejected. 
Conversely, any attempt to quantify the effects depends crucially on the choice of historical 
counterfactual: The importance of concluding the London Agreement increases in the assumed 
fallout from a hypothetical failure to settle Germany’s pre-war default. Choosing such 
counterfactual for an issue of international economic diplomacy, however, is a delicate matter of 
plausibility for a period of dramatic international confrontation like the early 1950s. On a more 
practical level, the first half of the 1950s was a period of rapid innovations in West German 
economic policy and a variety of simultaneous international developments are prone to obscure 
the Agreement’s ‘treatment effect’ on economic or fiscal aggregates.  
                                                 
95 Between 1950 and 1955 average annual GDP growth amounted to more than 9% (Ritschl and Spoerer 1997, 53) 
and unemployment halved from 10,4% in 1950 to 5,2% in 1955 (Sachverständigenrat 1995, p.369). Industrial 
production almost doubled (Bank deutscher Länder, monthly report for September 1956, p. 94) and total exports of 
goods more than tripled during the period, with the 1955 surplus on the balance of trade amounting to 5% of the value 
of exports (Bank deutscher Länder, monthly report for February 1956, p.82). High growth rates continued until the 
mid-1960s. Buchheim (1990) provides a comprehensive account of Germany’s post-war integration. 
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Specifically with respect to Germany’s creditworthiness abroad, the naked fact that international 
capital flows into the Federal Republic did resurge after 1953 naturally vindicates the positive role 
of the Debt Agreement. This observation, however, raises three questions: Does correlation mean 
causation? If it does, is the Agreement itself a sufficient, or ‘merely’ a necessary condition for 
restoring Germany’s financial reputation? Finally, which type of obstacle to creditworthiness does 
the Agreement remove? Does outstanding pre-war debt represent a solvency risk for the individual 
German debtor, whether she be a public jurisdiction or a private company? Or does it represent a 
currency risk, which materialized as a convertibility problem in the era of fixed exchange rates 
and inconvertible currencies of the 1940s and 1950s? Contemporaneously referred to as the 
‘transfer’ problem, the latter would be exogenous to the individual debtor, and should therefore 
not have affected her private creditworthiness differently from any debt-free entity within the 
Federal Republic.  
In order to address these questions from an empirical angle it would be necessary to observe 
international capital flows to Germany both before and after the conclusion of the London 
Agreement in February 1953. However, Table 17 shows that on the aggregate level, there was 
virtually no new foreign investment into the country before 1953. This observation would preclude 
any further discussion, were it not for a peculiar feature of German capital controls of the time that 
allows for observing the cross-sectional dimension of foreign investment, thus going beyond the 
discussion of low-frequency time series data. Blocked non-resident DM accounts with German 
banks (commonly known as Sperrmark until September 1954 when they were renamed into Libka-
Mark) could be re-invested into a broad range of German assets after the lifting of the Allied 
investment embargo in June 1950. In addition, Sperrmark became indirectly convertible in March 
1951 as they became legally tradable outside Germany. Two features make them particularly 
interesting in the context of this paper: Through their free exchange among potential investors 
outside Germany, the individual investor was able to commit additional amounts of her capital to 
the German economy, even though this resulted in no additional inflow of foreign capital on the 
level of Germany’s balance of payments. Moreover, reinvesting these balances directly into 
German companies, as opposed to mere portfolio investment on German stock exchanges, required 
an individual permit by a German government body. This makes it possible to observe virtually 
the entire universe of firm-level Foreign Direct Investment into German equity capital between 
June 1950 and March 1955, and the corresponding universe of foreign lending to German 
companies for a shorter period until the end of 1953. As a result, the observational window thus 
stretches the period during which the London Debt Agreement was negotiated, concluded and 
when its implementation began. 
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Table 17: Long-term gross private foreign investment inflow into Germany, 1950-1965. 
 
Even though Table 17, which includes Sperrmark investments, shows that the latter did not involve 
quantitatively large amounts of capital, the cross-sectional dimension of the data derived from the 
official licencing procedure provides a way to nevertheless estimate the effect of the London 
Agreement on foreign investment. The contribution of this paper is thus based on exploiting a rich 
archival data set, both of daily Sperrmark prices on international markets, and of the firm-level 
population of the first five years of foreign direct investment projects into Germany after the War. 
These post-war data are complemented by information on the amount of pre-war foreign debt on 
the level of German districts that was still outstanding by September 1950. The empirical part of 
the paper is structured accordingly: A structural break estimation of the daily Sperrmark and 
Libka-Mark prices is followed by a difference-in-differences model on the level of German 
districts that uses the incidence of pre-war debt on the district level to define treatment and control 
groups. The two preceding sections will discuss the existing literature on the London Debt 
Agreement, and provide an introduction to German capital controls of the early 1950s. 
The London Debt Agreement and the post-war German economy 
The political history of the London Debt Agreement is described in authoritative detail by 
Rombeck-Jaschinski (2005). On the economic side, Guinnane (2015) provides a comprehensive 
discussion of its financial provisions and its broader context, both as a sequel to the Versailles 
Treaty and a product of incipient Cold War confrontation.  
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The third major contribution has been written by Hermann Josef Abs, himself the leader of the 
German delegation at the debt negotiations, and provides an interesting autobiographical 
perspective on the negotiations leading up to the London Agreement (Abs 1991). How best to deal 
with Germany’s outstanding obligations had been a constant subject of debate among Allied 
governments since the late stages of the War. The necessity to sustain the German population 
through Allied aid programmes during the years immediately following Germany’s defeat added 
substantial sums to this bill. So did the US decision to organize the European Recovery Program 
in the form of loans rather than grants with respect to the three Western zones of occupation in 
Germany (Hardach 1994, 120). More than a year after the establishment of the new Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Allied High Commission formally requested on October 23, 1950, that 
the new government recognize all outstanding pre-war foreign debt, as well as the obligation to 
reimburse the Allies for post-war assistance. An explicit link was established between such 
recognition and any further transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic. After months of debate 
the Adenauer government finally acceded to Allied demands on March 6, 1951. The ensuing debt 
negotiations progressed in several stages and concluded on August 8, 1952, at which point the 
final report of the London Debt Conference already contained the gist of the later Agreement. The 
latter was finally signed on February 27, 1953, ratified by Germany and all three Allied powers 
until July 13, and entered into force on September 16, 1953. Three related sets of Agreements were 
struck simultaneously to the main negotiations in London: On the side lines of the main 
Conference, the German Credit Agreement of June 11, 1952, resolved the longstanding issue of 
standstill debt. These were nominally short-term credit lines maintained since September 1931 by 
foreign banks in order to prevent the collapse of German foreign trade following the 1931 financial 
crisis. The German Credit Agreement, however, was to be part of the larger Debt Agreement and 
could therefore not enter into force before the latter (Rombeck-Jaschinski 2005, 340). In addition, 
Germany concluded a series of Agreements with Switzerland on August 28, 1952. In contrast to 
other European governments, the Swiss government insisted successfully on the repayment of the 
‘Clearing billion’, the substantial clearing debt that Germany had accumulated with Switzerland 
between 1934 and 1945. With Allied consent German pre-war assets in Switzerland were 
unblocked in return (von Castelmur 1992). Most important from a political and financial point of 
view, however, was the Luxembourg Agreement with Israel and the Jewish Claims Conference of 
September 10, 1952. Highly controversial at the time among German decision makers, the Federal 
Republic agreed to pay about 3.5 billion DM over a period of 14 years (Goschler 2005, 172). Abs 
was an early critic of the negotiations with Israel, as he feared that large payments under the 
Luxembourg Agreement would undermine his negotiating stance in London (Gall 2006, 176). 
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On a macro-economic level particular relevance has been attributed to the amortisation schedule 
agreed upon in the London Agreement: Debt service was to be limited to Germany’s regular 
capacity to transfer repayment annuities in foreign exchange, that is, to its export surplus 
(Guinnane 2015, 20). The overarching aim was to prevent harsh settlement terms from 
endangering the financial health of the German economy and its public budgets. The treaty 
establishing a European Defence Community had been signed in May 1952 and was awaiting 
ratification by national parliaments96. West Germany had to co-finance the Allied occupation, as 
well as the stationing of Western troops across its territory (Zimmermann 2004). The Federal 
Republic was thus expected to make large contributions to Western defence in the imminent future. 
This, rather than debt repayment, was the top priority, especially for the United States government 
(Rombeck-Jaschinski 2005, 210). Accordingly, Article 5 of the London Agreement shelved all 
War-related claims, including reparations against Germany until after a future reunification of the 
country (Buxbaum 2005). Even though the Agreement did not involve any reduction of the 
principal of pre-war debt, no compound interest was charged for the period between default and 
settlement. The originally prevalent gold clauses on pre-war bonded debt were substituted by a 
US-$ clause, which implied an important haircut for German debtors (Guinnane 2014, 90)97. 
Moreover, a certain range of payment obligations were also postponed until after German 
reunification98. The resulting reduction in the total debt burden is difficult to pin down exactly, 
because the total sum of outstanding debt in the first place requires choices of interest and 
exchange rates that are not straightforward. It becomes even more difficult if potential reparations 
and other War-related claims are to be included. It seems reasonable therefore to argue with 
Guinnane (2015, 17) that Germany was required “to pay at the very most half of what she owed”. 
The subsequent repayment annuities were fixed at 567 million DM (135 million US-$) per year 
for the first five years, and at 765 million DM (182 million US-$) per year thereafter.  
 
Because of its large haircut the London Agreement has been frequently cited as a model for the 
solution of sovereign debt crises during the 1990s and today, for example by Kaiser (2013) or 
Sachs (2015). Guinnane (2015, 25ff) and recently Rombeck-Jaschinski (2017, 520ff) have 
discussed these comparisons convincingly as often misleading and ahistorical. For the purpose of 
the present paper, they are interesting in as much as they imply a distinct type of impact of the 
London Agreement.  
                                                 
96 Ratification eventually failed on August 30, 1954. Noack (1977) gives a detailed account of the ratification crisis. 
After the failure of the European Defence Community Germany was admitted to NATO instead during 1955. 
97 Gold clauses were substituted by a Swiss Franc clause for debt denominated in Swiss Francs, respectively. 
98 Glasemann (1993, 43-52) provides a detailed description of these deferred types of debt. 
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The leniency of creditors with respect to the defaulting debtor country gave Germany a “fresh 
start” (Sachs 2015) not only on international capital markets, but also with respect to its public 
finances. Full debt service would have condemned the young Federal Republic to years of austerity 
with the resulting political and social unrest. Conversely, the Agreement as concluded removed 
the contingency of this large financial burden from the German fiscal state, freeing up resources 
for more productive internal uses. Recently, Galofré-Vilà et al. (2019) comprehensively discuss 
the “economic consequences” of the Debt Agreement and perform an empirical test of this 
particular channel of influence. They find a strong positive effect of the London Agreement on 
public expenditure through its effect on social spending. Specifically, they propose a difference-
in-differences model to test this connection, in which social spending is defined as the treatment 
group and all other categories as the control group. The observed differential increase of social 
spending over other categories of spending in aggregated public expenditure data after 1953 is 
thus attributed to the increased ‘fiscal space’ of the German state implicit in the terms of the 
Agreement. Their choice of empirical strategy, however, is problematic as the debt settlement itself 
treats all categories of spending in an identical way. By their choice of control group they assume 
implicitly that the contingency of ‘austerity’ was removed exclusively from social spending, while 
it remained on all other categories. This is true regardless of the spending priorities of the German 
government. On a more fundamental level, the fiscal channel of influence requires a counterfactual 
scenario in which the Federal Republic either would have been forced to service its debt in terms 
of a much harsher Agreement, or would have been paralyzed permanently by financial uncertainty 
in case of no Agreement. To assess the likelihood of such scenarios is inherently a matter of 
speculation, but it runs counter to the above discussion about contemporaries’ understanding of 
West Germany’s importance during the incipient Cold War. On an empirical level there is also no 
compelling identification strategy for the Agreement’s impact on fiscal aggregates, which are only 
available in yearly intervals. 
Hermann Josef Abs himself, a central figure in German private banking since the 1930s, saw the 
purpose of the settlement of outstanding foreign debt primarily in restoring German 
creditworthiness abroad99. Abs’ notion of creditworthiness was not only financial but also moral. 
Concluding the Debt Agreement was meant to show to the world that Germany could be trusted 
again as a people (Abs 1991, ix).  
                                                 
99 In fact, one of the earliest historical publications on the London Debt Agreement was the transcript of a lecture Abs 
gave in April 1980. The publication was entitled “The restoration of German credit” (Schwarz 1982). It also featured 
the transcript of a lecture Abs had given in September 1949, in which he pleaded for the settlement of outstanding 
foreign debt already at a time when this would still seem illusory to most observers (Schwarz 1982,  80).   
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The economic effects of moral rehabilitation are impossible to measure, but such considerations 
should be noted as an important motive on the German side100. In financial terms, a comprehensive 
debt settlement was meant to overcome Germany’s long isolation from international capital 
markets that had begun in 1930 (Guinnane 2014, 76) when the ratification of the Young Plan dried 
up the inflow of foreign capital to the Weimar Republic and eventually led to severe waves of 
capital flight (Ritschl 2012, 13). Ending isolation meant attracting fresh foreign capital to the 
German economy, in the form of both long-term investment capital and short-term commercial 
credit. Creditworthiness was an important aim in itself, but it was also seen by Abs as an essential 
precondition for full DM convertibility (Schwarz 1982, 36). Full convertibility implied lifting 
exchange controls to an extent that foreign creditors were able to freely convert their DM assets 
into their home currencies without quantitative limits. In the absence of an anterior Debt 
Agreement, full convertibility would have led to instantaneous mass conversion of liquid foreign 
assets, which in turn would have put an unsustainable strain on Germany’s foreign exchange 
reserves, quickly upending the move towards convertibility (Buchheim 1986, 224). 
The absence of private commercial credit for Germany’s foreign trade through international 
banking connections was in fact an important policy concern for the Bank deutscher Länder during 
the early 1950s (Dickhaus 1996, 112). In practical terms, German importers would not be granted 
otherwise customary terms of credit by their foreign suppliers, while German exporters would not 
receive down payments by their foreign clients. Pohl (1973, 137) cites the example of German 
shipbuilders which would get paid only after delivery to their US clients, as any accounts payable 
to German companies risked being attached in the US by pre-war creditors (Schwarz 1982, 56). 
Abs also mentions large multinationals which would only supply raw materials to the German 
market if additional payment guarantees or advance payments had been furnished (Schwarz 1982, 
40). These circumstances made imports more expensive and exports less competitive than would 
otherwise have been the case. They should also have made it harder for Germany to accumulate 
foreign exchange reserves: Imported inputs for export production were payable immediately in 
foreign exchange, while the resulting export revenue would only accrue once the product was 
delivered abroad – in the case of ships possibly several years after costs had been incurred by the 
German producer. “The lack of an adequate source of credit on commercial terms” has indeed 
been cited as a major reason for Germany’s critical balance of payments crisis during the winter 
of 1950/51 (Giersch et al. 1992, 105).  
                                                 
100 For German Chancellor Adenauer, political considerations clearly took precedence over narrow financial concerns, 
to the dismay of his Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer. This becomes especially clear in the context of the negotiations 
with Israel (Gall 2006, 180). 
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Fast import growth and lacklustre export performance during the first few weeks of 1951 forced 
the Federal government in late February to suspend trade liberalisation and reintroduce 
quantitative controls on all imports from OEEC countries for the remainder of the year101. The 
implication of this argument is that once the London Debt Agreement had been concluded 
successfully, German foreign trade should have grown more quickly, and exchange reserves of the 
Central Bank should have accumulated faster than before, due to restored access to international 
commercial credit. Indeed, Scholtyseck (2013, 346) claims exactly that. At the same time, 
however, he notes a variety of simultaneous developments that could equally well explain 
Germany’s strong trade growth: investment-friendly taxation laws that stimulated internal 
financing of companies; political integration with Western Europe; and joining the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in August 1952. One could also add joining GATT in October 
1951, as Grünbacher (2004, 216) does in his account of the benefits of the London Debt 
Agreement102. Moreover, the Korean Armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, that is, five months 
after the conclusion of the Debt Agreement and less than two months before its entry into force. 
This list of events again exemplifies the difficulty of clearly identifying the effect of the Agreement 
in low-frequency time series aggregates such as foreign trade, public expenditure or GDP. More 
specifically on the issue of commercial credit, Temin (1995, 749) notes that the German import 
boom following the start of the Korean War affected all categories of imports equally. In fact, 
during the four weeks prior to the suspension of import liberalization, about two-thirds of 
outstanding import licenses in liberalized sectors were for textiles, leather products, coffee and 
tobacco103. These goods were hardly inputs into export production. This is not to say that the 
absence of private, international sources of trade finance prior to the Debt Agreement had not been 
costly to the German economy. It calls into question, however, the size of its negative impact on 
the country’s foreign trade, which might be overestimated by a literature dealing with the London 
Debt Agreement as an important event in German post-war history.  
Outstanding debt, especially short-term standstill liabilities, were undoubtedly a real obstacle to 
new commercial credit. Private banks in the U.S. and Great Britain made debt settlement a 
precondition for normalized relations with their German counterparts (Horstmann 1991, 197). 
Especially British banks had made painful experiences with these pre-war credit facilities during 
Germany’s default (Forbes 2000, 166ff).  
                                                 
101 The German balance of payments crisis of 1950/51 has frequently been mentioned in the literature on the European 
Payments Union, such as in Kaplan and Schleiminger (1989). Hentschel (1989) provides a concise chronology of the 
crisis, stressing the positive role of the EPU in crisis solution. 
102 Jerchow (1979) provides an historical account of the negotiation process leading up to Germany’s GATT accession.  
103 See German Federal Ministry for the Marshall Plan, BArch B146.479, document dated February 19, 1951. 
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Then again, this does not mean that debt settlement alone was sufficient for normalizing short-
term credit relations with West Germany. German Central Bank officials met with representatives 
of private British banks during negotiations in London over the Federal Republic joining the 
Transferable Sterling Account Area (TAA) in February 1951104. Opening up commercial credit 
lines was an important motivation of the Central Bank in considering to join the TAA. At the 
meeting the German side was expressly told that the British Banker’s Association had decided its 
members should not finance German imports for the following reasons: “1.) unpublished bank 
balance sheets; 2.) unresolved standstill question; 3.)  - and this is the main reason [sic!] – the risk 
of War on the territory of the Federal Republic”105. 
On the empirical side, the Bank deutscher Länder started collecting end-of-month data for the level 
of short-term, foreign commercial credit lines of German banks in November 1953106. For the 
following two years these credit lines grew in size both absolutely and relatively, from about 4 
percent to about 20 percent of the value of total monthly imports into Germany by early 1956 (cf. 
Appendix B, Table B.1). Their fast growth after late 1953 constitutes factual evidence that the 
Debt Agreement did indeed restore Germany’s financial ties abroad in an important dimension. 
Yet how necessary were these renewed credit lines for Germany’s foreign trade performance at 
the time? Table B.2 in the Appendix shows the ratio of the currency reserves of the Bank deutscher 
Länder and the value of total monthly imports into Germany, i.e. it shows how many months of 
imports could be financed during any given month by existing currency reserves between 1951 
and 1955. The ratio of total reserves to imports increases sharply after March 1952. Technically 
this is due to a prolonged decline in the value of imports overall and also more narrowly from 
within the OEEC area, while the value of exports continued to grow steadily. The ratio 
subsequently levels off at the beginning of 1954, which in turn is due to imports, and this time 
their prolonged increase. The value of both total imports into Germany and imports from OEEC 
countries grew by almost half in the two years after November 1953, which amounted to a 
considerable acceleration compared to the two previous years.  
                                                 
104 HABB B330.39.2, Prot. der 86. und 87. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 24.2., 28.2, und 1.3.1951, Angebot der 
Treasury bzw. der Bank of England an die Bundesrepublik auf Eintritt in die “Transferable Pfund-Sterling Account 
Area” und das Ergebnis der dieserhalb in London vom 12. – 17.12.1951 geführten Besprechungen, 23.2.1951. 
105 ibidem, p. 8: “Besprechungen bei der Midland Bank, Overseas Branch, Barclays Bank, Chief Foreign Branch, 
Kleinwort, Sons & Co., Guinness, Mahon & Co. ergaben, dass eine Anordnung der Bank of England, Import-Kredite 
an deutsche Banken oder Importeure abzulehnen, nicht besteht. Die Bankers’ Association hat aber beschlossen, solche 
Kredite an Westdeutschland nicht zu geben aus folgenden Gründen: 1.) Nicht veröffentliche Bankbilanzen, 2.) 
ungelöste Stillhalte-Frage, 3.) – und das ist der Hauptgrund – das Kriegsrisiko für das Bundesgebiet.” 
106 Monthly tables on ‘von deutschen Banken im Ausland in Anspruch genommene Rembourskredite’ were attached 
the Minutes of the Central Bank Council and can be accessed at the Bundesbank Archives, starting with the 174th 
meeting of the Central Bank Council on August 11, 1954; see HABB B330.79.1. 
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Conversely, currency reserves in absolute values show steady growth across these four years, with 
no apparent turning point around the end of 1953. There is thus suggestive evidence that private 
international trade finance indeed benefited German foreign trade, specifically by allowing for a 
faster growth of imports. Exports and thus export revenue on the other hand were not affected by 
this change in any readily apparent way.  
With respect to long-term investment capital, its lack for the German economy constitutes one of 
the enduring themes of economic policy debates in Germany during the late 1940s and the 1950s 
(Giersch et al 1992, 48). Private capital markets were highly regulated in order to channel renewed 
savings after the currency reform towards financing large-scale, heavily subsidized public housing 
programmes. Beckers (2014) provides an excellent account of the successive investment laws 
which exerted a dominating influence on capital markets during the 1950s. He describes the basic 
tension between the supply side of private savings that were considered inadequate on the one 
hand and the political pressure to keep interest rates low in order to provide cheap financing for 
reconstruction programmes on the other hand. Under these circumstances attracting new long-term 
foreign capital to the German economy was frequently proposed as an essential solution (Dickhaus 
1996, 146). There was, however, consensus that new foreign capital would not be forthcoming 
before the outstanding debt had not been settled in a satisfactory way for pre-war creditors (Abs 
1991, 54). For Hermann Josef Abs, the connection between attracting new foreign capital and 
settling old debts was immediate, as he said during a lecture in September 1949 that “the creditors 
of yesterday are the potential creditors of tomorrow” (Schwarz 1982, 90). Accordingly, attracting 
new foreign investment into Germany has often been cited as one of the main benefits of the 
London Debt Agreement, for example by Buchheim (1986, 227), Grünbacher (2004, 216) or 
Guinnane (2014, 91)107. Indeed, as Table 17 has shown, private foreign investment did resume 
after 1953. While the resumption was largely confined to portfolio investment until 1958, foreign 
direct investment picked up thereafter, too. On the face of it this evidence leaves little doubt that 
attracting new foreign capital was one important benefit of the London Debt Agreement, which in 
turn helped ease the shortage of investment capital in the German economy.  
At this point it is worthwhile, however, to take a closer look and make two observations that have 
already been made by Buchheim (1986, 227/8) when discussing these data: Firstly, 1954 was not 
only the first post-Agreement year, but it was also the year during which current returns on foreign 
investment had been made convertible again.  
                                                 
107 Grünbacher (2004,  83) even credits the Agreement with returning financial markets in Germany to “normal”, even 
though he does not specify the exact meaning of this characteristic. 
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It is not a priori clear whether the higher investment figures of that year reflect the isolated impact 
of restored creditworthiness achieved by the Agreement, or the return to normal business 
conditions, newly undistorted by convertibility restrictions, or both. In the second case higher 
investment could still be observed. As a matter of fact, the decision to allow convertibility of 
current returns was not taken independently of the London Debt Agreement. To the contrary, the 
Bank deutscher Länder made the successful conclusion of the Agreement a precondition for 
subsequently relaxing capital controls (Dickhaus 1994, 148). On the aggregate level of Table 17, 
this conditionality means that the London Debt Agreement is undoubtedly the technical cause – 
whether directly or indirectly – for the large-scale return of foreign investment. Conditionality on 
the political level, however, need not prejudge the private decision-making process of individual 
foreign investors. It is possible that they made new investment into Germany primarily conditional 
on the successful settlement of pre-war debt. In this case convertibility restrictions represented 
merely a technical impediment of minor importance. Conversely, it is equally possible that they 
made new investment primarily conditional on the removal of convertibility restrictions. In this 
case the successful settlement of pre-war debt represented merely a technical precondition of 
minor importance, yet imposed from above for political reasons. These are two extreme scenarios, 
but they suggest the following important question: Did the London Debt Agreement in itself 
represent a sufficient condition for restoring German creditworthiness, as manifest in the 
development of foreign investment? Or was it ‘merely’ a necessary condition in that it facilitated 
the loosening of capital controls?  
Asking how the settlement of outstanding pre-war debt impacted post-war foreign investment begs 
a follow-up question: How did outstanding pre-war debt impact post-war foreign investment in 
the first place? Which type of impediment to creditworthiness, if any, did these liabilities 
represent? Two possible types come to mind: On the one hand, outstanding pre-war debt might 
have constituted a looming solvency risk for individual debtors: Resuming debt service under a 
hypothetically harsh Debt Agreement would bankrupt them, because the high revaluation of 
outstanding debt would make their net worth negative. Thus any post-war investment would be 
lost as well, rendering the debtor not creditworthy in the first place. Under a less extreme scenario, 
outstanding foreign debt might have made it harder for these debtors to access credit markets even 
within Germany, as potential German creditors would be cautious to lend as long as the fate of 
pre-war foreign debt had not been decided. By implication these debtors would be less 
creditworthy to potential foreign investors as well, compared to German private companies or 
public jurisdictions that owed no outstanding foreign debt.  
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On the other hand, in the absence of individual solvency risk pre-war debt might still have 
constituted a source of currency risk, or more specifically, convertibility risk: Individual debtors 
would be financially able to both resume debt service under any counterfactual Debt Agreement 
and generate the returns on new post-war investment in Deutschmark. They would be prevented, 
however, from remitting abroad these payments at the same time. In the extreme case that no debt 
settlement would ever have been concluded, monetary authorities might never have lifted 
convertibility restrictions on current investment returns. The reintroduction of convertibility might 
have been short-termed if lifting restrictions had inevitably resulted in mass capital flight, as 
implied by Buchheim (1986, 224). In case of a harsh Debt Agreement Germany’s currency 
reserves might have only been sufficient for debt service, leaving no room for investment returns. 
As a consequence the individual debtor would be creditworthy in Deutschmark, but not 
creditworthy for a foreign investor, as long as it was not clear precisely how costly the settlement 
of pre-war debt (and post-war aid) would be. As convertibility of returns on new investment would 
not be guaranteed, foreign capital owners would be deterred from investing in the first place. In 
contrast, solvency risk by definition only affected potential investment targets that owed 
outstanding pre-war debt, whether they were private companies or public jurisdictions in the form 
of the Federal Republic as the successor of the Reich, the individual states or any municipality. 
Convertibility risk, however, would have been independent of the individual investment target. 
Even private companies or sub-national jurisdictions that did not default on any foreign debt during 
the 1930s would have been affected, because limited availability of foreign exchange in the 
international monetary system of the 1950s would have been the binding constraint, not individual 
debtor characteristics. This observation suggests the empirical approach of testing which type of 
impediment to creditworthiness outstanding pre-war debt represented. More precisely, it allows 
for testing whether or not pre-war debt represented a solvency risk. This would be the case if the 
presence of pre-war debt had a negative and significant effect on post-war foreign investment 
across the universe of sub-national investment targets within the Federal Republic. It would also 
be the case if the settlement of pre-war debt, i.e. the removal of the solvency risk problem, 
increased investment into the debtors relative to the debt-free among all sub-national investment 
targets. The literature so far is ambiguous on whether outstanding debt represented a solvency risk 
to individual debtors. Rombeck-Jaschinski (2005, 240) quotes contemporary German sources 
saying that private debtors were by and large able to repay their foreign debts without risking 
insolvency. According to Grünbacher (2004, 157) on the other hand, the Debt Agreement did 
restore creditworthiness to the individual private debtor, in his case the successor companies of 
the Vereinigte Stahlwerke. 
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The second observation made by Buchheim (1986, 228) refers to the fairly restrictive official 
policy on the German side with respect to new foreign investment even after the conclusion of the 
London Debt Agreement. He notes the sharp upturn in both foreign portfolio and direct investment 
after 1958 when the Deutschmark was made fully convertible and restrictions on long-term capital 
inflows were removed. The Bundesbank thus “lost control” of foreign investment (Buchheim 
1986, 229). Conversely, German authorities had imposed restrictions on the amount of inward 
foreign investment before 1958. By refusing as a rule to convert additional foreign exchange into 
Deutschmark for investment purposes, they made Sperrmark and Libka-Mark balances essentially 
the only source of investment finance. This policy implied a quantitative limit to the amount of 
foreign investment allowed to take place at any point in time, equal to the amount of Sperrmark 
or Libka-Mark balances on offer on currency exchanges outside Germany. Such quantitative limit, 
however, compromises the explanatory power of time series investment aggregates such as shown 
in Table 17 for the purpose of testing the effect of the London Debt Agreement on German 
creditworthiness. Foreign direct investment would arguably have been higher in the absence of 
these limits. In addition, the first upturn of foreign portfolio investment between 1953 and 1958 
might to a large extent reflect so-called ‘hot-money’ flows (Buchheim 1986, 228). Since at least 
1956 the Deutschmark was considered a candidate for appreciation, due to its balance of payments 
surpluses (Emminger 1986, 78). Therefore the cleanest way to isolate the marginal effect of the 
London Agreement on Germany’s creditworthiness lies with analysing foreign direct investment, 
and moving beyond time series aggregates into the cross-section of direct investment projects. 
Fortunately, the contemporary requirement until mid-1955 to obtain an official licence for every 












The German capital controls regime during the early 1950s 
At the end of the War Allied governments decreed an embargo on foreign investment in 
Germany108. Not only were new investment projects prohibited, but all existing non-resident assets 
were blocked109. Trustees were appointed to manage subsidiaries of foreign parent companies and 
the latter did not fully regain control until September 1949110. Convertibility of investment returns 
and other liquid non-resident assets had first been restricted almost twenty years earlier in July 
1931, and restrictions were gradually tightened under the National Socialist regime111. Any 
remaining legal conversion opportunities ceased after the break-off of Swiss-German relations in 
early 1945 (Frech 2001, 244)112. Investment returns or sale proceeds of assets were instead to be 
credited to blocked non-resident accounts with German banks, commonly referred to as 
Sperrmark. New regulations in June 1950 permitted the reinvestment of these balances by their 
owners for the first time since the end of the War, into by and large all types of assets within the 
Federal Republic113. While both real estate transactions and portfolio investments on German stock 
exchanges could be made without official restrictions, direct investment projects individually 
required a licence by an investment commission made up of German government and Central Bank 
officials114.  
                                                 
108 Beckers (2014, 80-81) cites three reasons for the embargo: Firstly, Reichsmark was retained as Germany’s currency 
until the reform of June 1948. It was practically worthless, which would have made it extremely cheap for foreign 
investors to acquire assets in Germany. Allied authorities wanted to avoid a widespread buyout of German industry 
by foreigners for political reasons. Secondly, reparation payments in the form of removing large parts of German 
industry were still official Allied policy immediately after the War. Such reparations could naturally not remove 
industry that was already owned by foreigners. Allowing large foreign investments would thus have prejudged the 
outcome of reparations negotiations among the Allied powers. Thirdly, new foreign investments would have created 
new claims against Germany’s foreign exchange revenue in the form of investment returns. The Allies, especially the 
U.S., were not willing to allow this as long as it had not become clear that the German economy and a future German 
state would likely be able to raise the necessary revenue without further assistance by Allied taxpayers. Allowing it 
would also have had a negative impact on the position of pre-war creditors that had waited for their money for more 
than a decade (Kühne 1984, 51). 
109 Kühne (1984) provides an extremely detailed, chronological account of the development of West German foreign 
exchange regulations under Allied laws that remained in force until 1961.  
110 Since May 1949 non-resident owners could already sell their assets. They could also raise loans within Germany 
in order to cover operating costs or restore their assets to their pre-war state. This was strictly regulated, however, and 
the proceeds from selling assets had to be credited to non-resident blocked accounts, (Kühne 1984, 87). 
111 Banken (2006) provides a concise summary of German capital controls during the 1930s. He also explains the 
gradual hardening of foreign exchange restrictions in the context of National Socialist looting of Jewish property. 
112 For more details on the history of German exchange controls during the 1930s and 1940s, see Chapter One. 
113 Sperrmark could also be used for own travelling expenses inside the Federal Republic, the payment of taxes and 
the support of destitute relatives. Travel expenses and support payments were subject to official approval and tight 
monthly limits applied in order to prevent capital flight, cf. Kühne (1948, 130ff). 
114 Portfolio investment was literally free from official interference. Real estate transactions were in fact subject to a 
condensed approval procedure by the appropriate Land Central Bank, but approval was virtually automatic. Original 
English-language versions of the regulations governing foreign investment after 1950 can be found in Rhein-Main 
Bank (1951). The complete records of the Investment Commission can be found in the Federal Archives in Koblenz, 
under the records of the Federal Economics Ministry from B102.6735 to B102.6811. 
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The definition of direct investment covers direct loans and equity capital investments to German 
companies, including exchange-listed companies beyond mere portfolio investment. Direct loans 
were liberalized in early 1954, but individual licence requirements were maintained for all equity 
capital investments until June 1955. The commission was also charged with licencing the isolated 
instances when direct investments were financed by conversion of foreign exchange. There was 
no minimum amount invested below which the licencing requirement might have been waived. 
The records of the investment commission thus make it possible to observe the universe of foreign 
equity capital investment projects for almost five years during the first half of the 1950s, and the 
universe of direct loans from abroad to German companies until the end of 1953115. The official 
source naturally gives rise to concerns about bias in the data. Observed investment projects would 
be unsuitable for testing the impact of outstanding pre-war debt on foreign investment if criteria 
for granting licences had been arbitrary, or if these criteria had changed significantly just around 
the time the London Debt Agreement was concluded. The licencing regime, however, was liberal 
and essentially stable across the entire period. Only about nine percent of submitted projects in 
total were rejected by the commission. Projects were predominantly rejected in order to prevent 
illegal Sperrmark conversion. Especially loans to straw man trading firms could be used to 
unfreeze blocked balances before legal convertibility at the official exchange rate was restored 
during 1954116. Considerations of reciprocal treatment or sectoral protectionism do emerge from 
time to time in internal discussions among commission members, but they are by and large rejected 
for three reasons: Firstly, the commission worked under Allied supervision until the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the Federal Republic in the wake of the London Debt Agreement. Allied 
supervisors were keen on protecting the rights of non-resident Sperrmark owners, and there was 
to be no discrimination of foreign compared to domestic investors117.  
                                                 
115 The noteworthy exception are investments into West Berlin. Due to the complicated legal status of the city, projects 
concerning companies in West Berlin were authorized by the Berlin Central Bank, and the pertaining records could 
not be retrieved. It is highly unlikely, however, that this should influence the conclusions of this paper in any 
significant way. Due to the particular geographical isolation of the city under the circumstances of the Cold War West 
Berlin was likely not an important destination for foreign investment. Concerning the period of time covered by the 
Commission Data, the population of equity investment projects is in practice only observable up to and including 
March, i.e. the first quarter of 1955. This is due to the average delay needed to process a licence application between 
filing the application at the appropriate Land Central Bank and the decision of the investment commission at the 
Federal level. Applications between April and June 1955 still had to be filed under the established regulations, but 
were summarily approved after June, which means that the commission records do not systematically contain them 
anymore. Cutting off the data three months before the change in regulations also addresses the important concern 
about strategic expectations by applicants. Potential investors might have delayed their project deliberately for a short 
period immediately prior to the change in regulations, if the change was expected to happen soon. They would thus 
have avoided the bureaucratic burden and disclosing information about their project to German officials. 
116 For details, see Chapter One and Appendix C. 
117 Evidence of Allied insistence on liberal German implementation of Allied investment regulations can be found 
frequently in the Investment Commission records, such as in BArch B102.6736, 27. Sitzung (7.9.1951), Vermerk p. 
1;  ibidem, 34. Sitzung (7.12.1951), Vermerk, p. 2; or ibidem, 36. Sitzung (11.1.1952), Vermerk, p. 2. 
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Secondly, the German side was concerned that making the licencing regime more restrictive would 
be considered an unfriendly act during the negotiations and later the implementation of the Debt 
Agreement118. Finally, the Federal Republic had become an ‘extreme creditor’ inside the EPU 
already by 1953. Freely licencing disbursements from non-resident accounts was a way to 
accommodate pressure by other member states for Germany to relax restrictions on capital 
outflows (Dickhaus 1994, 150). Convertibility restrictions as such were relaxed incrementally 
following the successful ratification of the Debt Agreement. The first step was taken on September 
30, 1953 when current returns on pre-1931 investments were made convertible with respect to 
countries that had signed the London Debt Agreement119. Further relaxations occurred on 
December 19 and finally on February 1, 1954, when current returns on all non-resident assets were 
made convertible with respect to all countries. Sperrmark balances as such could be converted to 
other EPU currencies after the introduction of so-called limited convertible non-resident DM 
accounts (Beko-Mark) on April 8 and to all currencies after September 13, 1954. Sperrmark were 
substituted by liberalized capital accounts (Libka-Mark) at the latter date. For the purpose of 
foreign investment Sperrmark and Libka-Mark can be treated identically. The former was the 
means of investing in Germany between July 1950 and September 1954. The latter inherited this 
role until complete liberalization of the capital account in July 1958120. 
One crucial regulatory change occurred on March 3, 1951, when Sperrmark became legally 
negotiable among non-residents. While there had been earlier black markets, this new regulation 
allowed for the emergence of official currency markets for so-called ‘acquired’ Sperrmark121 
outside the Federal Republic. From now on, a prospective investor who had never before owned 
any assets in Germany was able to newly commit her foreign capital to the German economy. On 
the level of the German balance of payments, she would buy an existing claim against Germany 
from another non-resident, not giving rise to any additional capital inflow. On the individual level, 
however, she would have exchanged capital in her home country against capital in Germany. 
Subsequently disbursing the acquired Sperrmark balance for a German asset of her choice would 
create genuinely additional foreign investment on the individual, if not on the macro level.  
                                                 
118 During the period of the London Conference in spring 1952 the Investment Commission considered the tightening 
of investment regulations “inopportune”, see BArch B102.6736, 44. Sitzung (5.5.1952), Vermerk, p. 2. 
119 The very first relaxation occurred on August 7, 1953, when Israeli citizens who could prove personal hardship 
were henceforth allowed to spend 200 DM per month out of their blocked accounts in order to purchase groceries in 
Germany and have them sent to Israel. 
120 The preceding chronology can be verified in Kühne (1984), p. 50, 86, 311, 407, 410 and 641. 
121 In the absence of legal negotiability, Sperrmark balances were exchanged among non-residents with the help of 
irrevocable powers of attorney (Dernburg 1955, 24). The buyer could effectively dispose of the balance, while the 




Table 18: Daily Sperrmark prices in Zurich, New York and London (converted into CHF).
 
Table 18 shows the development of the three most important international markets for Sperrmark 
during the first half of the 1950s, as identified contemporaneously by Dernburg (1955, 25). 
Regular daily price quotations for New York and Zurich first appeared in June 1951, three months 
after the legalisation of markets. Quotations for London start in January 1952 and end with the 
transition from Sperrmark to Libka-Mark in September 1954. Overall, the Sperrmark exchange 
rate oscillated at around 60 CHF for 100 DM until August 1953, when it started to rise rapidly 
towards the official CHF-DM exchange rate. After September 1954, it remained fairly stable until 
the end of 1955, at a slight discount with respect to the official rate. Among the three markets 
Zurich was the most important. As with any other currency market the crucial market makers were 
large private banks122. This is reflected in the fact that about 46 percent of acquired Sperrmark 
balances were owned by Swiss nationals at the end of 1953, while banks owned 57 percent of the 
Swiss share123. In contrast, Dernburg (1955, 25) notes that trading on the New York market was at 
times “rather sporadic”. The listed prices for New York do in fact track the Zurich prices very 
closely, if converted into Swiss Francs. This likely reflects a highly integrated market between the 
only two financial centres with convertible national currencies during the early 1950s.  
                                                 
122 The role of banks in foreign exchange markets of the 1950s is confirmed for New York by Holmes (1960). 
123 See HABB B330.76.2, Anlage 1 zum Prot. der 166. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats vom 31.3.1954. 
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The London Debt Agreement and the market for acquired Sperrmark 
The identification of Sperrmark and Libka-Mark as the Deutschmark of the foreign investor calls 
for testing the impact of the London Debt Agreement on the international Sperrmark market. 
Specifically it calls for applying established time series structural break methodology to daily 
Sperrmark prices. A significant effect of the London Agreement on German creditworthiness 
should translate immediately into international prices of the means of investing in the Federal 
Republic. A rational investor would buy Sperrmark instantly after the conclusion of the 
Agreement, if she believed that the latter would directly result in increased investor interest in 
German assets, because this would inevitably lead to higher Sperrmark prices given supply. The 
predominant role of the Zurich market and the extremely close correlation of prices on different 
markets makes the Sperrmark price in Zurich the natural candidate for estimation purposes124. 
Three objections come to mind when using Sperrmark prices in structural break estimations. 
Firstly, this somewhat dubiously sounding Sperrmark market might just be extremely thin during 
the entire time period under consideration, and not only in New York but everywhere. The driving 
force behind any estimated structural break might just be single, erratic transactions that dominate 
the entire market, while the newspaper quotations in between might be only notional. There is 
strong evidence that this was not the case. Kostolany (1961, 236) talks of large volumes traded 
both in Switzerland and the United States. Table B.3 in Appendix B provides monthly turnover 
data for acquired Sperrmark between October 1951 and November 1953. With one slight 
exception turnover was always higher than 100 million DM per month. In comparison, by a wide 
margin the single biggest direct investment project between 1950 and 1955 was a 50 million DM 
capital increase of Deutsche Shell AG by Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company Ltd125. Three quarters 
of equity capital projects were smaller than 50,000 DM, and three quarters of direct loans to 
German companies were smaller than 150,000 DM.  
                                                 
124 Zurich is also most adequate on a practical level, because its Saturday market results in more daily price quotations 
than for New York or London, which apparently traded Monday to Friday only. 
125 In fact, the single biggest direct investment project during that period was the sale of Harpener Bergbau AG by 
the German Flick group to the French heavy industry consortium Sidéchar. Flick sold a 60% majority of the shares 
(nom. about 76 million DM) to the French consortium for a total price of 180 million DM in May 1954. Of these, 76.5 
million DM were paid in French Francs, and the remainder via the EPU clearing mechanism, that is, in Gold or US-$ 
(cf. B330.2849: Vermerk betr. Zulassung neuer mittel- und langfristiger Devisenanlagen des Auslandes im Inland of 
July 28, 1954). I exclude this transaction from my data for three reasons: Firstly, the sheer size of the transaction and 
its relation to Allied deconcentration efforts turned it into a matter of international diplomacy that received newspaper 
attention (such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Monday, May 10, 1954, p. 7: “Die Harpen-Majorität ist 
verkauft”). It would thus be absurd for this specific case to maintain the assertion of the previous section that German 
regulation of inward foreign investment was immune to political considerations. Secondly, by its size it represents an 
extreme outlier value that would distort empirical results for the entire data set if it was retained. Thirdly, its peculiar 
terms of payment are highly unusual for the period and do not fit the pattern applicable to all other investment projects. 
Priemel (2007, 690-3) provides a detailed account of this case in the wider context of the history of the Flick group.  
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The Sperrmark market was also fairly liquid in relative terms. Monthly turnover amounted to an 
average of 78 percent of all existing acquired Sperrmark balances. Secondly, the sharp rise in 
prices from August 1953 onwards may be supply-driven instead of investor demand-driven. As 
pointed out above, there was political conditionality between the successful conclusion of the 
London Debt Agreement and the relaxation of convertibility restrictions. The owner of an original 
Sperrmark account – for example a ‘restituted’ émigré victim of National Socialist persecution126 
- would have desisted from selling her account during the summer of 1953 if she expected that she 
would be allowed to convert it at the much higher official exchange rate soon. Thus the rise in 
prices after August might be due to a supply-side drying up of the market. It would be a fallacy to 
attribute it to the demand side of renewed investor confidence. Even though the available data are 
unfortunately patchy, Table B.4 in Appendix B shows that this cannot have been the case. The 
monthly sales of Sperrmark by their original owners do not drop in any readily discernible way 
during the second half of 1953. The monthly amount sold after August 1953 lies within the usual 
range of the previous two years, both absolutely and relatively as a share of the end-of-month total 
of acquired Sperrmark balances overall. Moreover, Table B.3 shows that turnover in absolute 
values increased notably in August and September 1953, which constitutes additional evidence 
against a drying-up of the market after the conclusion of the Debt Agreement. 
Thirdly, inference from Sperrmark prices to private investor expectations would be untenable if 
there had been official intervention in the Sperrmark market, for example by the German Central 
Bank. The latter might have had a desire to create the impression of improved German 
creditworthiness by propping up the Sperrmark rate. The Bank of England in fact intervened in 
similar markets for Sterling accounts at the time (Schenk 2010, 111). If this was the case for 
Sperrmark it would not be possible to isolate private investor behaviour from official intervention, 
especially if the timing and volume of intervention was unknown. However, to the best of my 
knowledge there was no such intervention by the Bank deutscher Länder or any other official 
institution. Occasional discussions indeed took place about intervening in the Sperrmark market. 
Proposals were aired about using Sperrmark to be bought cheaply by the Bank deutscher Länder 
in order to provide financial aid to Berlin or to promote German exports.  
                                                 
126 Restitution payments represented a considerable source of non-resident blocked accounts. The Allied restitution 
laws enacted during the late 1940s were in principle limited to restoring property of physical objects to persecuted 
individuals or their heirs. Compensatory payments could be made if physical restitution was not possible or if both 
the persecuted claimant and the intermediate owner wanted to avoid litigation. Most claimants lived outside Germany 
by the end of the 1940s. Such payments were not directly convertible, however, and had to be credited to non-resident 
blocked accounts just like any other non-resident claim. There is large literature by now on the question of National 




However, such considerations were consistently rejected by the Central Bank Council, which 
called the price of Sperrmark abroad “completely ignored” as late as September 1953127. 
Intervention was considered too delicate on a political level. Export price dumping via Sperrmark 
transactions was a notorious method of choice for the Reichsbank during the 1930s, leading to 
widespread resentment among creditors (Ebi 2004, 40). After the War, using Sperrmark for export 
promotion would have been in violation of Allied laws and would also have conflicted with the 
Federal Republic’s new commitments under GATT128. 
The estimation of structural breaks or turning points in time series has been introduced first into 
the field of economic history by Willard et. al (1996) in their seminal study of the Greenback 
Market during the US Civil War. Their paper has subsequently triggered a wave of studies using 
different modifications of their original model in order to estimate break points in a variety of 
historical settings. Whereas Willard et. al (1996) themselves, as well as Weidenmier (2002) and 
recently Hileman (2017) study currency markets, most of the literature employs bond prices. In a 
German context, Frey and Kucher (2000) and later Frey and Waldenström (2004) analyse the 
markets in Zurich and Stockholm for German bonds during the Second World War based on 
monthly bond price indices. Brown and Burdekin (2002) use weekly closing prices of the Dawes 
and Young bond in London from 1933 to 1945 to estimate turning points in British perception of 
National Socialist Germany. Jopp (2014) in turn studies the performance of German bonds on the 
Amsterdam market during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. The appeal of this 
widely used model lies with the fact that structural breaks are identified independently of 
preconceived notions at which point in time such a turning point should occur. As Willard et. al 
(1996, 1005) note, not every large price movement observed in the data is necessarily explained 
by the impact of some historical event. The estimation of turning points is done in a three-step 
procedure: In the first step, an autoregressive model is estimated with Ordinary Least Squares for 
a rolling window of 100 days length over the entire time series129. Rather than the Sperrmark price 
itself, the discount of the Sperrmark price to the official exchange rate between Swiss Francs and 
Deutschmark seems better suited for this purpose.  
                                                 
127 HABB B330.72.2, Prot. der 154. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats am 30.9.1953, Anlage, Bericht von Herrn Dr. 
Emminger über den Verlauf der Jahrestagung der Weltbank und des Weltwährungsfonds in Washington, p. 19. 
128 BArch B102.6737, 65. Sitzung (6.3.1953), Vermerk p. 3: “Abgesehen von den entgegenstehenden devisenrecht-
lichen Bestimmungen begegnet die beantragte Verwendung erworbener DM-Sperrguthaben auch handelspolitische 
Bedenken. Die Havanna-Charter hat den beteiligten Nationen ausdrücklich auferlegt, auf Dumping-Maßnahmen zur 
Förderung des Exports zu verzichten. Eine Verbilligung des deutschen Exports durch Verwendung erworbener DM-
Sperrguthaben würde zweifellos als eine solche Dumping-Maßnahme […] angesehen werden und entsprechende 
Abwehrmaßnahmen herausfordern”. 
129 The choice of 100 days as window size is standard in the literature, following Willard et al. (1996, p. 1008). 
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The official exchange rate clearly served as a benchmark for Sperrmark, especially after the 
introduction of direct convertibility in September 1954, even though it was technically not an 
upper bound. In addition, the opening of controlled foreign exchange markets for a number of 
European currencies in May 1953 transformed the official exchange rate from a fixed clearing rate 
to a market exchange rate, even if within narrow bands. By using the discount I can thus control 
for factors that influence both the official and the Sperrmark exchange rate at the same time, which 
allows for better isolating the impact of investment demand for Sperrmark. The discount 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 at 




Using the Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares test I cannot reject the presence of a unit root at 
conventional levels of significance, neither for the natural logarithm of the Sperrmark price itself 
nor for the natural logarithm of the discount. For this reason the model is estimated in first 
differences, which is equivalent to the returns of the discount so to speak. Both the Schwartz 
information criterion and the backward selection procedure according to Perron (1989) suggest a 
lag length 𝑘 of 1 for the autoregressive process. The model for the first differences of the logged 
Sperrmark discount is thus given by 
∆ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡   (6) 
The first window of estimation is given by June 25, 1951 until October 2, 1951130. For each window 
I test the significance of the coefficient of an indicator variable that is one on and after the middle 
of the window and zero otherwise. I thus test for the potential presence of a break in the intercept 
of the model occurring in the middle of the window. The larger the related F-test statistic, the less 
well the model under the null hypothesis of no break in the intercept fits the data within the 
window, potentially indicating a break in the mean of the entire time series. The window is 
subsequently moved one day further, the estimation is performed anew, and the F test statistic for 
the break indicator is recovered, until the entire time series has been covered. Table 19 yields the 
resulting plot of F test statistics. In the second step, significant outliers among all F test statistics 
from the first step are identified via Monte-Carlo simulated critical values131.  
                                                 
130 The window starts on June 25 rather than June 1 in order to allow for its extension by 25 days in the third step. 
131 The 99% critical value is given by 6.467, the 98% equivalent is given by 5.294. The outlier F-statistics for the 
breaks on August 8, 1953, and August 20, 1954, are in between these two values and therefore represent only 
marginally significant outliers. For comparison, the 95% critical value is given by 3.688. Similarly to Willard et al. 
(1996, 1009), I generate critical values for the first-step F-statistics in three steps: First, I simulate a time series of 
length T=1,000 based on the null model without break 𝑦𝑡 = 0.0017 − 0.0463 ∙ 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0,1) and the 
coefficient values are taken from an AR(1) model of first differences of the Sperrmark discount. In the second step, I 
estimate the model with a break in the middle of the simulated time series and retrieve the F statistic of the break 
indicator variable. Thirdly, I repeat the first two steps 5,000 times. The quantiles of the distribution of the 5,000 F 
statistics represent the simulated critical values. These values are very similar for a range of choices regarding the 
coefficient values for the null model. 
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Table 19: First step F-statistics identifying windows in which a structural break likely occurs. 




The identified outliers are the candidates for windows most likely to contain an actual break in the 
mean of the entire return series. The third step is then dedicated to finding the specific day within 
each of the identified windows that corresponds to the actual break, which does not necessarily 
have to be the middle day imposed in step one. To do this, the following model is estimated 
recursively within each window: 
∆ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠−1) + 𝛽2𝐵𝑅𝑠 + 𝑢𝑠   (7) 
where 𝐵𝑅𝑠 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≥ 𝑠
  0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  is an indicator variable that is one for all days 𝑡 greater or equal to 
step 𝑠 of the recursive estimation and 𝑠 = [1,100]. In other words, I estimate 100 regressions in 
each candidate window, and move the break indicator 𝐵𝑅𝑠 one day further at a time. The one step 
𝑡 = 𝑠 with the highest F-statistic for 𝐵𝑅𝑠 then corresponds to the estimated break date. In order to 
include the days at the very beginning and end of the 100-day window, I enlarge the window by 
25 days on each side for the third step. 
Table 21 yields the estimated break dates and Table 20 visualizes them in a graph of the Sperrmark 
discount. The first estimated break occurs on July 30, 1952. The estimated percent change in the 
mean of the differenced series of -0.47% corresponds to a drop in the discount over the following 
month of 11.4%. There is no direct indication in contemporary newspapers of why the Sperrmark 
price rose to such an extent, but two explanations can plausibly be ventured: The Federal Republic 
joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on July 28, 1952. The commitment 
of the IMF to eventual, full current account convertibility of member currencies could have raised 
hopes for greater Sperrmark liberalization in the near future. Equally plausible would be an early 
expectation of the successful conclusion of the Debt Conference in London that would occur on 
August 8. The negotiations themselves, however, were protracted and success was not assured 
until the very end (Rombeck-Jaschinski 2005, 345ff). This does not preclude the possibility of 
optimistic market expectations, yet there is also no evidence to that effect. The development was 
apparently not driven, however, by large-scale foreign investment operations in Germany. The 
slow rise in the Sperrmark price already during the first half of July was reportedly driven by Swiss 
arbitrage in IG Farben stocks between Zurich and Frankfurt132. The faster rise in early August on 
the other hand was said to have put off foreign demand on German stock exchanges as it made 
portfolio investment relatively more expensive133.  
                                                 
132 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Thursday, July 17, 1952, p. 10: “Arbitrage in I.G.- Aktien.” 
133 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Saturday, August 2, 1952, p. 6: “Freundlicher Wochenschluss; Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of Tuesday, August 5, 1952, p. 8: “Freundliche Grundstimmung an den Börsen”. 
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Table 21: Estimated break dates for the first difference of the Sperrmark discount134. 
 
There is much more direct evidence for the next break date, August 8, 1953. The 0.5% negative 
shift in the mean of the differenced series corresponds to a decline in the discount over the 
following month of almost 24%. On the previous day the Bank deutscher Länder authorized a 
narrow window for Sperrmark convertibility for the first time since 1931. Israeli citizens who 
could prove personal hardship were henceforth allowed to spend 200 DM per month out of their 
blocked accounts in order to purchase groceries in Germany and have them sent to Israel135. The 
reform seems petty and fits into the broader history of post-war Germany’s bureaucratic treatment 
of the victims of National Socialism. It did, however, represent the very first move towards 
Sperrmark liberalization after the War. This possibly triggered expectations outside Germany of 
future liberalization soon, driving down the Sperrmark discount. The coincidence is striking and 
the argument appealing, yet there is no direct evidence in support of this story. Such evidence, on 
the other hand, is provided by the New York Times of August 18136. Under the headline “Zurich 
interprets Sperrmark’s rise” it ran an extended article explaining the price rise of late.  
                                                 
134 The estimated percent change in the return of the discount is calculated following Jopp (2014, 173) and is given 
by 100 ∙ [exp(𝛽2) − 1], where 𝛽2 is the coefficient of the indicator variable 𝐵𝑅𝑠 in the third-step regression equation 
(7) above. In general, the time series used for identifying turning points in the first differences of the Sperrmark 
discount need to be interpolated for estimation purposes. I do so by assigning the most recent available value to the 
days without their own values (lagged interpolation). The alternative would be linear interpolation, which is less 
appealing from a theoretical point of view, as it assumes a specific, that is, linear path for price formation. Lagged 
interpolation, on the other hand, takes existing prices as given, as long as no new price signal is recorded in the data. 
Jopp (2014, 181) also uses lagged interpolation.  
135 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Saturday, August 8, 1953, p. 7: “Beschränkte Sperrmarkfreigabe”. 




change in return of 
discount
Plausible cause
July 30, 1952 -0.47%
The Federal Republic joining IMF and World Bank on July 28.                            
Possibly expectation of successful London Debt conference on August 8.
August 8, 1953 -0.5%
Expectation of early start of debt service under the London Debt Agreement.                 
Expectation of further Sperrmark  liberalization after Adenauer victory in elections.                   
Bill proposed by U.S. Senator Dennis Chavez to return West German property in U.S.    
Early Sperrmark convertibility for hardship cases of Israeli citizens.
Dec 15, 1953 -1.18% Expectation of imminent further relaxation of convertibility restrictions on December 19.
April 25, 1954 3.42% Swiss banks liquidating their speculative Sperrmark  holdings.                                                  
August 20, 1954 -1.82% Rumours of further liberalization "boom" Sperrmark.
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Market participants in Zurich reportedly expected an early start of debt service under the London 
Agreement: “Foreign exchange experts in the service of Swiss commercial banks explain the 
sudden revival of interest in sperrmarks as conviction of many Swiss investors that to accelerate 
the recovery of German creditworthiness the Bonn Government will go to any feasible limit in 
making concessions to creditors. They say the amazing increase in prosperity in Germany is 
destined to enable the German Government to go much further than at first seemed possible.” 
Interesting in this context is the association of the London Agreement, the expectation of imminent 
liberalization of capital controls, and Germany’s renewed prosperity. The Agreement was clearly 
seen as a necessary precondition for liberalization, yet liberalization aided by large currency 
reserves itself drove expectations: “Belief that removal of the last technical hindrances will enable 
the German Government to resume debt service soon, as provided by the London debt agreement 
of Feb. 27, 1953, and possibly allow resumption also of foreign-owned shares […] resulted in a 
sudden large-scale demand for sperrmarks in Zurich last week at sharply rising prices”. Rising 
prices were subsequently sustained by expectations that Konrad Adenauer’s coalition would 
secure an election victory on September 6, while the ruling coalition on the Federal level was seen 
as a guarantor of creditor interest. The New York Times of September 7 reported that Adenauer’s 
victory had already been priced in by the time of the election137. The Chancellor was expected to 
“[…] make re-establishment of Germany’s credit standing his first major aim to accomplish which 
no efforts would be spared to resume the transfer of the earnings of all foreign-owned German 
investments as soon as feasible.” A fourth influence might have come from a simultaneous 
legislative initiative in the United States. U.S. Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico introduced 
a bill that was to restore sequestered property in the U.S. to their West German owners. The 
initiative reportedly caught great attention across Western Europe and was seen as an important 
step towards normalization of relations with Germany, specifically towards Deutschmark 
convertibility138. Then again there is no direct evidence supporting any effect on Sperrmark prices. 
The rise in prices was also noted on the German side139, which reportedly triggered considerable 
profit-taking by foreign investors on German stock exchanges140. The next large-scale decline in 
the Sperrmark discount occurred after December 15, 1953. An estimated 1.18% drop in the mean 
of the differenced series translates into a decline in the discount itself by over a third over the 
following month.  
                                                 
137 The New York Times of Monday September 7, 1953, p. 26: “Sperrmarks soar on Adenauer aims”. 
138 The New York Times of Monday, August 10, 1953, p. 35: „Swiss study bill on War seizures“. 
139 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Monday, August 10, 1953,p. 7: “Wachsendes Interesse für deutsche 
Sperrmark“. 
140 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Thursday, August 13, 1953,p. 8: “Teilweise Gewinnmitnahmen an den Börsen”. 
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Evidence on the reason for this break is much scarcer than for the previous one, but the coincidence 
with the substantial further relaxation by the Bank deutscher Länder of convertibility restrictions 
on current investment returns on December 19 is striking (Kühne 1984, 311). Three weeks later, 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quotes “foreign exchange markets abroad” saying that the 
primary reason for the prolonged rise in prices was indeed the liberalization of Sperrmark 
convertibility. “International speculation” was reportedly buying up Sperrmark in the expectation 
of further liberalization141. Conversely, such speculation could also backfire. April 25, 1954 is the 
estimated date for the only break in the intercept of the differenced series that has a positive sign. 
The discount correspondingly rose by 42% over the following month. This reversal did not go 
unnoticed. The New York Times reported that the sustained drop in Sperrmark prices until August 
was due to Swiss banks largely selling their speculative Sperrmark positions that they had 
accumulated in the expectation of quick steps towards full convertibility by the Bank deutscher 
Länder142. Other reports mentioned conversion operations of standstill debt via Sperrmark, but 
also a certain narrowness of the market as reasons143. The final estimated break date is August 20, 
1954. The mean shift of the differenced series by -1.82% corresponds to a two-thirds reduction in 
the discount within one month. Again there is no direct evidence on what caused this turnaround, 
but it was likely due to renewed speculation about an imminent further relaxation of convertibility 
restrictions. The New York Times noted on September 10 that the recent “Conversion rumour 
booms sperrmark”144. Sperrmark was replaced by the yet more liberalized Libka-Mark on 
September 13. In any case the discount had come down dramatically from about 30% in early 
January to virtual parity with the official exchange rate in September. 
The preceding discussion has shown that the London Debt Agreement certainly played an 
important role in bringing about renewed confidence by foreign investors towards the German 
economy. It was the necessary condition for the rapid relaxation of convertibility restrictions, on 
the political level but also for market participants, if contemporary newspaper reports are to be 
believed. Measured by the development of the Sperrmark market, however, the Agreement in itself 
was not a sufficient condition to restore Germany’s creditworthiness. It is notable that none of the 
dates directly associated with the negotiation, the signing, or the ratification of the Agreement 
appear to have been turning points for Sperrmark prices. 
                                                 
141 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Thursday, January 7, 1954, p. 9: “Ein Vertrauensbeweis”. 
142 The New York Times of Monday, August 23, 1954, p. 23: “Sperrmark drops on Zurich market“. 
143 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Friday, August 20, 1954, p. 9: “Geringere Hoffnungen?”. 
144 The New York Times of Friday, September 10, 1954, p. 34: “Conversion rumour booms Sperrmark”.  
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Outstanding pre-war foreign debt and post-war foreign investment 
The double function of Sperrmark represents a certain caveat to employing Sperrmark price 
developments as an indicator of foreign investor interest in Germany: On the one hand, it served 
as the means of non-residents for purchasing assets within the Federal Republic. On the other hand, 
it represented a speculative asset in itself. Buying Sperrmark in July 1953 and holding it for one 
year would have resulted in a profit of more than 60 percent. Speculating on the strengthening of 
the German currency does represent an expression of confidence in the German economy 
(Kostolany 1961, 236), yet it does not directly imply that long-term foreign investments into 
German assets were forthcoming. After all, Sperrmark positions could have been liquidated 
quickly if the tide had been turning at any point. The same cannot be said, however, of long-term 
foreign investment into the Federal Republic. Fully measuring the impact of the London Debt 
Agreement on Germany’s creditworthiness abroad therefore requires measuring its 
contemporaneous impact on Foreign Direct Investment. Measuring the impact of the debt 
settlement on FDI in turn raises the question of which type of obstacle to creditworthiness, proxied 
by the development of FDI, outstanding pre-war debt represented in the first place. The previous 
theoretical discussion has already suggested the way to test whether pre-war debt represented a 
solvency risk for German debtors. Ideally, the effect of pre-war debt on post-war investment would 
be tested on the basis of the universe of German companies during the early 1950s. Following the 
above line of argumentation, pre-war debt would have represented a solvency risk if companies 
with outstanding pre-war debt had ceteris paribus received less post-war investment than their 
debt-free peers, while convertibility risk was independent of the individual German company 
characteristics. Unfortunately, the investment commission data does not contain systematic 
information on whether a particular German investment destination owed pre-war foreign debt.  
The most highly disaggregated, comprehensive information on pre-war indebtedness which has, 
to my knowledge, survived, is on the level of post-war German districts. In 1950, the Bank 
deutscher Länder commissioned a census of existing pre-war indebtedness in preparation of the 
London negotiations. Questionnaires were sent out to German companies and public jurisdictions 
demanding information on the level of their outstanding pre-war indebtedness as of September 
1950. Aggregated answers on the district level have survived in the Bundesbank Archive145. The 
strength of the data lies with their comprehensive coverage of outstanding pre-war debt across 
Germany, due to their origin as official census data.  
                                                 
145 The records can be found in the Bundesbank Archive under HABB B330.2464. 
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On the other hand, they suffer from a number of problems: First of all, their informational value 
is compromised by the high degree of their aggregation. For each district, they only give three 
aggregate numbers according to the currency in which the debt has been incurred, which are 
Reichsmark, Goldmark and other currencies. The latter category includes all obligations 
denominated in foreign currencies or in Deutschmark. It is thus not possible to distinguish between 
types of indebtedness, which range from publicly issued, bonded debt to dividends payable to non-
resident owners. Nor is it possible to distinguish between different types of debtors. Therefore, the 
data also include inter-company liabilities between German subsidiaries and their foreign parents. 
The sign of the effect of pre-war debt on post-war foreign investment might thus be biased 
upwards, because pre-war investors were likely to also invest in their German subsidiaries after 
the War, rather than in any other German asset, regardless of the amount of outstanding inter-
company balances. Moreover, the fact that the category other currencies was aggregated using 
1950 exchange rates represents a complication regarding data interpretation. The solvency risk 
implied in pre-war debt depends on how pre-war obligations are converted into post-war values, 
or more precisely how potential post-war investors thought they would be converted at the time. 
Most importantly, however, the census data as such were unobservable to the prospective post-
war foreign investor. Beyond the company that she was planning to invest in, she could only have 
had a rough idea about the overall level of foreign indebtedness in any one district.  
To control for these problems, I use an additional measure for outstanding pre-war debt, which 
was both observable to an outsider and distinguishable as to the identity of the debtor. Glasemann 
(1993) provides a comprehensive list of all German external bonds issued during the interwar 
period. Having been issued, they were observable in principle, and their prospectuses allowed for 
identifying the debtor. Glasemann (1993) further indicates whether a particular bond had been 
redeemed completely before the outbreak of the War. Nevertheless, the measure has two 
shortcomings: Similarly to the census data, there is the question of how to value outstanding bonds 
for the post-war period, and to which extent the result conforms with contemporary perceptions, 
all the more so as they were issued in more than one national currency. For the illustrative purpose 
of Table 22, I convert the amounts given in Glasemann (1993) from their respective currency into 
US-$ at the average exchange rate of March 1933, the month before the United States went off the 
interwar gold standard146. However, this is clearly only one of many possible ways. The second 
shortcoming concerns the low number of observations on the sub-national level for which the 
liable debtor is uniquely identifiable on the district level.  
                                                 
146 Exchange rates are taken from the Banking and Monetary Statistics of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (1943,  662). 
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It is true that a large number of local entities borrowed heavily abroad during the 1920s (James 
1985, 45). At the same time, a considerable fraction was represented by public utilities, such as 
the Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke, which were co-owned by a multitude of different 
local governments or were public-private partnerships. Similarly, large corporations such as the 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke that issued external bonds were, at least economically, not attributable to 
one particular local district. The ultimate number of observations therefore reduces to 26 districts 
for the Glasemann (1993) data, consisting only of municipal bonds, that is, bonds issued by city 
or district administrations. 
Despite these shortcomings, it is still worthwhile to examine the influence of pre-war debt on post-
war investment on the district level. Recently reviewed by Nielsen et al. (2017), the large literature 
on the locational choice of Foreign Direct Investment has singled out various factors which 
influence geographical location decisions. Taxation and infrastructure in the host environment are 
among the traditional choices. All else given potential investors will choose the local jurisdiction 
with least taxation (Hines 1999) and best public infrastructure (Fung et al. 2005). A large amount 
of outstanding foreign debt influences both. A number of West German municipalities carried 
outstanding foreign debt themselves. In the event of a particularly burdensome debt settlement 
these municipalities would likely have been forced to raise local taxes and spend less on public 
infrastructure. Since the 1920s local business taxation had been the most important source of local 
government revenue in Germany, providing up to two thirds of total municipal tax revenue during 
the first half of the 1950s (Heni 1991, 297). Foreign investors would therefore have been forced 
to finance foreign debt repayment themselves. The reliance of local public budgets on business 
taxation also provides the indirect channel between outstanding private foreign debt on the one 
hand and local taxation and provision of infrastructure on the other hand. Private companies on 
the verge of insolvency due to harsh settlement terms on their outstanding foreign debt would have 
paid less taxes, putting local public budgets under stress. The empirical findings in the existing 
literature are inconclusive as to whether high taxation independently deters foreign investors, 
especially with respect to locational choice within countries (Nielsen et al. 2017, 73). Other factors 
can mitigate the impact of taxes. Brülhart et al. (2012) shows that local industry agglomeration 
mitigates the effects of local tax differentials on (domestic and foreign) start-up investments in 
Switzerland. Agglomeration effects in general are a frequent topic in the literature and are key to 
understanding the geographical distribution of Foreign Direct Investment within countries, as 
shown for example by Guimaraes and Figueiredo (2000) for the case of Portugal. A specific form 
of local agglomeration comes in the form of the historical concentration of foreign-owned 
companies in particular locations within host countries.  
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Table 22: Geographical distribution of post-war investment and outstanding pre-war debt. 
 
 
Source: Shapefile from MPIDR [Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research] and CGG [Chair for Geodesy and Geoinformatics, University of 
Rostock]; 2011: MPIDR Population History GIS Collection (partly based on Bundesamt für Kartographie und Geodäsie 2011) – Rostock. 
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A number of studies such as Mariotti and Piscitello (1995) or more recently Li & Yao (2010) have 
found that such concentration has a positive effect on subsequent foreign investment. There exists 
thus a theoretical case of how outstanding foreign debt might have influenced foreign investment 
decisions negatively on the local level. By implication, the removal of the accompanying solvency 
risk through a definitive debt settlement should have increased investment in indebted localities 
relative to their debt-free neighbours, if such risk was present in the first place. The size and 
significance of this influence, however, is an open, empirical question, as other factors might have 
mitigated the effects of pre-war indebtedness. 
I address this question for the case of post-war Germany empirically by estimating a series of 
difference-in-differences regressions, in which the treatment group is defined by districts with any 
outstanding pre-war debt in 1950. Thus, I only use the two data sets on local outstanding pre-war 
debt at the extensive margin, for the various reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, Table 22 
compares the geographical distribution of post-war Foreign Direct Investment across German 
districts with the two measures at the intensive margin. At first glance, both post-war investment 
and pre-war debt concentrate in the traditional economic centres of Germany. Hamburg, the lower 
Rhine area, Frankfurt and Munich stand out as important debtors as well as important recipient of 
equity investment and loans from abroad. Otherwise, foreign direct investment is dense in South-
West Germany. Much of the latter originated in Switzerland, pointing to the importance of the 
relative distance of investment locations to the home country. Direct loans are more spread out 
across Germany then equity investments, indicating a possibly more important role of 
agglomeration effects for the latter. As discussed already, the districts with outstanding bonded 
pre-war debt are much fewer than those with any pre-war debt according to the Central Bank 
census. Among all 466 consolidated German districts used for estimation purposes in this paper147 
there are 201 districts with any census pre-war debt and only 26 districts with bonded debt. For 
estimation purposes, I also exclude the largest one percent of investment projects measured by the 
amounts invested. In this way, I control for the fact that the post-war FDI data represent firm-level 
rather than plant-level data, which introduces a potential bias into their geographical distribution. 
The possibility of more than one plant per firm can be ruled out for the large majority of cases, 
given the preponderance of small investment projects. Large multinationals, however, typically 
had more than one plant in West Germany and constitute the few, very large cases in the data.  
                                                 
147 The total number of West German districts was 557 at the time, which comprised both cities that were their own 
district (kreisfreie Städte) and districts containing several municipalities (Landkreise). The surrounding rural areas of 
kreisfreie Städte were often organized as their own Landkreise. To address this problem I merge all kreisfreie Städte 
and Landkreise for which the administrative seat of the Landkreis is the kreisfreie Stadt. The total number of districts 
is thus reduced to 466; For details see Appendix J. 
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The baseline difference-in-differences estimation model is given by  
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑢𝑚_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑢𝑚_𝑛𝑏_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑦_𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝑛𝑦_𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡      (8) 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≥ 2𝑞53 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 < 2𝑞53
 and 𝐴𝑛𝑦_𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖 > 0 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖 = 0
  
give the amount of money invested in district 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡, the period following the conclusion of 
the London Debt Agreement in February 1953 and the districts with any outstanding pre-war debt 
(𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖) respectively. 𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝑛𝑦_𝑝𝑤𝑑𝑖 denotes the interaction term measuring the differential 
impact of the debt settlement on the districts according to the incidence of pre-war debt. Besides 
these basic variables, I control for post-war FDI agglomeration in two ways: 𝐶𝑢𝑚_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 
measures the cumulative sum of FDI invested in district 𝑖 since June 1950, up to the previous 
quarter (𝑡 − 1). The observed local concentration of post-war FDI in Table 22 could reflect chain 
investment in particular districts, in the sense that investors follow the example of earlier post-war 
investors in their locational choices. Similarly, 𝐶𝑢𝑚_𝑛𝑏_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 measures the cumulative sum of 
FDI invested since June 1950 and up to the previous quarter (𝑡 − 1), in all districts bordering on 
district 𝑖, thus controlling for the potential presence of spatial correlation in the FDI data. 
Besides the two distinct measures for outstanding pre-war debt, I distinguish estimated models 
along several dimensions: Specifying panel regressions in terms of amounts invested introduces a 
currency problem to the measurement of post-war FDI. The records of the investment commission 
give amounts invested in Deutschmark. Therefore, the conservative strategy would be to stick with 
the records and measure amounts invested also in Deutschmark in the panel. However, 
Deutschmark clearly became more expensive over time from the point of view of the investor, as 
the Sperrmark discount declined after mid-1953. In this way, an equal amount of foreign currency 
invested results in less Deutschmark along the time dimension of the panel. To control for this 
potential distortion, I estimate all regressions both in Deutschmark and in Swiss Francs. For that 
purpose, I convert Deutschmark values into Swiss Francs by quarterly averages of the  Sperrmark 
and Deutschmark exchange rate respectively, depending on the type of funds employed148. The 
choice of Swiss Francs is motivated by the central role played by Switzerland in the Sperrmark 
market, and by the stable currency parities during the first half of the 1950s that render 
consideration of the actual national currencies of investors unnecessary. In addition, the effect of 
the debt settlement could be different according to whether investment occurred in the form of 
equity capital or lending.  
                                                 
148 For details on the conversion method and the corresponding exchange rates used, see Appendix G. 
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A priori, it is reasonable to expect lending to have been more sensitive to a debt settlement than 
equity investments. Therefore, I estimate all regressions separately for equity investments and 
lending. As discussed above, the observation period is shorter for loans, ending already in 
December 1953, while it extends to the first quarter of 1955 for equity investments. The greater 
sensitivity of lending to the London Agreement should be especially pronounced if the creditor 
was not at the same time also a shareholder in the debtor company, as the distinction between 
equity and lending is fluid in case of loans by foreign parent companies. To control for this 
distinction, I estimate all regressions separately for established pre-war investors and new, post-
war entrants. Even though new entrants might have established a company in Germany after June 
1950 and subsequently lent to it, they chose their investment location during the post-war 
observation period. In contrast, pre-war investors had already made their location decision before 
the War. As they typically invested in their own, existing subsidiaries during the post-war period, 
their geographical pattern of investment should have been less prone to change as a result of the 
London Agreement. Finally, I estimate the baseline model with district-fixed effects. However, I 
additionally estimate an extended model with random effects in order to capture the influence of 
time-invariant covariates. Regression results presented in Tables 23 to 28 are based on all FDI 
projects that were approved by the investment commission and financed with new capital, i.e. 
either acquired Sperrmark or foreign exchange. I exclude reinvested capital in order to restrict the 
estimation sample to projects that required the investment of truly additional foreign capital of the 
non-resident investor. Moreover, Tables B.5 to B.10 of Appendix B give the equivalent regression 
results for the full sample of both approved and rejected projects. 
 
Table 23 and Table 26 give the results for the fixed-effects baseline model for equity investments 
and lending respectively. Regardless of the sample and the pre-war debt measure considered, the 
conclusion of the London Debt Agreement did not have a significant, differential impact on the 
amounts invested across districts according to whether districts contained any outstanding pre-war 
debt. Including rejected projects for the regression results presented in Table B.5 and Table B.8 
does not change this conclusion, as the interaction terms are never significant either. On the other 
hand, Table 23 shows that the amount of earlier post-war investment in the same district did have 
a positive and strongly significant effect on current equity investment. This finding reveals 
important geographical agglomeration effects within post-war equity investment itself. At the 
same time, earlier post-war investment in neighbouring districts does not have any significant 
effect. In fact, prominent investment locations like Hamburg and Munich received large amounts 
of capital, while their surrounding regions hosted virtually no post-war FDI during the period.  
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This likely confounds the impact of regional investment clusters in the Lower Rhine area and in 
South-West Germany. In contrast, Table 26 shows a markedly different picture for lending 
projects. Considering all creditors, previous foreign lending to the same district actually had a 
significantly negative impact on current lending, while this effect vanishes once the sample is 
restricted to new post-war entrants. It also disappears for the sample including all creditors once 
the models are estimated with random effects in Table 27, which points to the influence of 
individual outlier values. At the same time, the significance pattern of the fixed-effects model is 
reproduced by the random-effects model for the case of equity investments in Table 24. The results 
of the random-effects regressions for equity projects also reveal the important role for post-war 
investment played by the historical concentration of foreigners in general, and foreign-owned 
companies specifically. 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 gives the number of companies for each district 𝑖 
which had been foreign-owned since before the War according to Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut 
(1951)149. Similarly, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑑𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖 represents the number of official foreign representations such as 
consulates or commercial attachés for each district 𝑖 as of 1951, according to Berliner Bank (1951).  
In fact, the incidence of such representations in 1951 is highly correlated with the distribution of 
foreign nationals across 36 major West German cities in 1933150. Table 24 reveals the highly 
positive and significant effect of both dimensions of the historical agglomeration of foreigners on 
the amounts of new equity capital invested during the first half of the 1950s, while the same effect 
can be observed somewhat less significantly for lending projects in Table 27. Overall, results 
obtained for the amounts converted into Swiss Francs are identical to the results for Deutschmark 
amounts. Thus, the permanent appreciation of Sperrmark after mid-1953 does not affect the 
observed regional distribution of amounts invested. Moreover, random-effects specifications 
confirm the main result of the fixed-effects models: Outstanding pre-war debt did not represent a 
solvency risk for German debtors. If it had done, its settlement in the London Debt Agreement 
should have given rise to a differential increase of FDI into indebted relative to debt-free districts. 





                                                 
149 For details see Appendix I.  
150 The 1933 population data can be found in Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b). The correlation coefficient lies between 




This paper discusses the benefits of the London Debt Agreement for the German economy during 
the first half of the 1950s, with a focus on its role for German creditworthiness abroad. The 
Agreement is commonly credited with restoring Germany’s access to international capital markets, 
both in terms of short-term commercial credit and long-term investment capital. Available 
aggregate data indeed suggest such positive effects. The successful conclusion of the Debt 
Agreement likely represented an important condition for normalizing Germany’s financial 
relations with the rest of the world economy. At the same time, based on extensive micro-level 
evidence I conclude that its impact on contemporary foreign investment into Germany was much 
more modest than frequently suggested by the literature. A structural break analysis of daily 
Sperrmark prices in Zurich shows that the Agreement did not have an independent effect of its 
own on foreign willingness to invest. Renewed convertibility of current investment returns was 
more directly responsible for the disappearance of the discount on Sperrmark, while the political 
conditionality between the London Agreement and convertibility provides for the intermediate 
influence of the latter. Moreover, a range of difference-in-differences models based on a panel of 
FDI across German districts show that outstanding pre-war debt did not determine foreign 
investment decisions two decades after Germany’s default of the early 1930s. The local presence 
of outstanding debt did not deter investors from any particular investment location in the first 
place, nor did its settlement in the London Debt Agreement give rise to a differential increase of 
FDI into debtor districts. This finding indicates in turn that any potentially negative effect of 
outstanding debt on post-war investment did at least not materialize in the form of solvency risk 
for the indebted German investment destination. The estimations also show that more fundamental 
economic factors than Germany’s default history determined the pattern of foreign investment in 










Table 23: Fixed-effects model – approved equity investment projects, 3q1950-1q1955. 
 
in Deutschmark 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.015*** 0.020*** 0.014** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
846.9 666.4 862.3 -770.5
(1,400) (1,225) (1,433) (1,217)
1,976 -1,585 18,546 17,731
(3,764) (2,760) (20,043) (13,901)
14,831*** 10,469*** 14,899*** 10,554***
(794.4) (924.5) (815.6) (921.0)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.635 0.570 0.635 0.570
Standard errors clustered at the district level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in Swiss Francs 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.030*** 0.044*** 0.029*** 0.042***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
65.24 -249.7 780.5 -955.9
(1,078) (934.1) (1,070) (939.8)
3,395 -248.4 16,090 13,782
(2,618) (2,000) (13,618) (8,905)
9,118*** 5,238*** 9,170*** 5,302***
(839.5) (969.8) (841.7) (960.8)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.623 0.591 0.623 0.591













Table 24: Random-effects model – approved equity investment projects, in Deutschmark. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 1q1955
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
-1,935 -102.4 7,982 5,389
(3,010) (2,599) (14,419) (9,135)
751.2 397.9 -134.0 -1,700
(1,234) (1,099) (1,348) (1,272)
-3,567 -5,558* -15,184 -6,431
(3,282) (2,994) (17,622) (14,336)
5,923*** 1,996* 5,868*** 1,988*
(873.5) (1,036) (877.2) (1,049)
14,922*** 16,132*** 14,781*** 16,098***
(5,486) (6,040) (5,461) (6,041)
-14.27 -5.407 -14.56 -5.520
(11.30) (9.364) (11.41) (9.325)
-1,352 -713.8 -2,465 -1,668
(7,319) (6,339) (6,791) (6,128)
-21,069 -16,760* -22,374 -18,193*
(13,668) (9,642) (14,169) (10,293)
19,434 26,383 18,995 24,899
(34,466) (32,750) (34,642) (32,123)
-3,653 -1,751 -5,056 -2,913
(3,504) (3,000) (3,477) (3,047)
5,766 6,131 4,760 5,385
(5,116) (4,123) (4,433) (3,569)
604.6 -1,279 1,044 -292.3
(3,258) (2,647) (3,219) (2,588)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.604 0.535 0.604 0.535
Standard errors clustered at the district level

















Table 25: Random-effects model – approved equity investment projects, in Swiss Francs. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 1q1955
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.049*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.053***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-2,527 -5.187 6,935 1,960
(2,328) (1,316) (10,022) (5,592)
275.8 -306.2 359.2 -1,331
(879.9) (773.7) (937.8) (915.5)
-764.5 -2,316 -10,294 627.2
(2,415) (2,065) (13,713) (9,114)
2,922*** 234.5 2,876*** 244.6
(709.3) (866.8) (706.7) (863.1)
11,093*** 10,975** 10,972*** 10,990**
(3,914) (4,372) (3,911) (4,391)
-8.065 0.395 -8.131 0.445
(7.318) (6.050) (7.389) (5.997)
766.9 453.5 -240.3 -31.15
(5,284) (3,854) (4,818) (3,875)
-18,254* -12,015** -19,610* -12,930**
(9,894) (6,047) (10,222) (6,458)
33,340 15,792 31,885 14,391
(27,307) (18,170) (27,276) (17,457)
-2,667 -666.6 -3,891 -1,232
(2,446) (1,967) (2,502) (1,996)
6,105 3,289* 5,243 2,979**
(4,369) (1,692) (3,707) (1,498)
-870.7 -1,025 -855.7 -537.2
(2,565) (1,204) (2,524) (1,181)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.595 0.567 0.595 0.567
Standard errors clustered at the district level

















Table 26: Fixed-effects model – approved lending projects, 3q1950-4q1953. 
 
in Deutschmark 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
-0.018** -0.014 -0.020*** -0.014
(0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017)
0.001* 0.001 0.002** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1,154 -3,163 458.9 -1,265
(5,081) (2,245) (4,855) (3,817)
6,248 3,560 70,650 -8,484
(11,337) (8,416) (54,183) (36,202)
49,200*** 34,558*** 49,458*** 34,498***
(2,185) (4,064) (2,197) (4,024)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.607 0.508 0.608 0.508
Standard errors clustered at the district level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in Swiss Francs 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
-0.016** -0.017 -0.018** -0.016
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
553.0 -1,580 1,004 579.1
(3,973) (1,394) (3,545) (2,251)
5,808 3,900 42,216 -10,978
(7,139) (5,163) (28,683) (20,181)
29,305*** 20,769*** 29,434*** 20,700***
(1,492) (1,699) (1,478) (1,691)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.602 0.506 0.603 0.506













Table 27: Random-effects model – approved lending projects, in Deutschmark. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 4q1953
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.024 0.015 0.025 0.0165
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.0177)
-0.0003 0.001 -0.0002 0.000402
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000717)
3,384 11,335** 38,685 32,964*
(8,325) (5,617) (24,207) (17,465)
1,206 -3,725 -3,118 -4,359
(4,957) (2,478) (4,925) (4,022)
-17,248 -12,726 -64,529 -100,245**
(13,154) (9,131) (61,942) (45,970)
8,911** -1,104 8,829** -1,247
(3,806) (3,902) (3,724) (3,807)
57,920* 56,796** 57,439* 55,997**
(30,623) (23,990) (30,493) (23,709)
-32.41 -19.32 -29.81 -16.60
(40.01) (30.32) (40.00) (29.79)
3,799 -6,777 2,008 -4,830
(24,478) (18,531) (23,913) (18,771)
-111,585** -66,117** -116,762** -64,174*
(55,099) (33,566) (57,788) (35,010)
161,062 127,406* 144,242 118,411*
(128,612) (77,448) (123,529) (71,604)
7,866 794.7 5,851 3,203
(13,062) (10,169) (12,497) (10,350)
6,313 10,767 5,770 12,848**
(11,069) (6,577) (9,680) (6,026)
4,121 2,705 5,327 2,806
(8,341) (4,708) (8,327) (4,897)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.527 0.417 0.528 0.418
Standard errors clustered at the district level

















Table 28: Random-effects model – approved lending projects, in Swiss Francs. 
Period 3q1950 - 4q1953
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.021 0.009 0.022 0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-11.84 6,036* 19,726 17,969*
(5,038) (3,392) (14,775) (10,515)
157.7 -1,746 -1,209 -795.3
(3,912) (1,460) (3,502) (2,357)
-6,694 -4,544 -31,955 -60,422**
(8,122) (5,579) (36,532) (27,043)
6,825*** 854.9 6,778*** 756.2
(1,945) (2,084) (1,906) (2,034)
31,840* 32,209** 31,583* 31,720**
(17,290) (13,366) (17,182) (13,156)
-16.45 -13.85 -15.34 -12.49
(24.08) (17.08) (24.10) (16.77)
4,305 -5,805 2,997 -4,527
(14,543) (10,543) (14,126) (10,645)
-62,110* -35,125* -65,198* -33,486
(33,666) (20,135) (35,123) (20,820)
93,187 69,451 84,606 65,428*
(77,468) (43,080) (74,815) (39,651)
5,848 367.7 4,324 1,932
(7,558) (5,519) (7,131) (5,650)
2,057 5,344 1,450 6,633*
(6,588) (3,932) (5,745) (3,560)
2,380 2,261 2,825 1,999
(4,998) (2,758) (5,010) (2,895)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.530 0.425 0.531 0.427
Standard errors clustered at the district level
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Appendix A – Chapter Two 
 
Table A.1: Timing of first investment: Poisson model, equity investment. 
 
Table A.1 is equivalent to Table 12 of Chapter Two. However, Table A.1 is based on both 




Sample  New capital  New and existing capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prewar investor -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.057* -0.064*
(0.044) (0.045) (0.032) (0.033)
German origin -0.055 -0.048 -0.089*** -0.084**
(0.039) (0.041) (0.032) (0.033)
Family -0.019 -0.020 -0.015 -0.016
(0.050) (0.050) (0.041) (0.042)
Trustee -0.020 0.032 -0.018 0.015
(0.059) (0.062) (0.054) (0.056)
No control -0.083** -0.059*
(0.034) (0.031)
WWII neutrals -0.013 0.015
(0.047) (0.041)
Investment size 0.006 0.004
(million DM) (0.007) (0.008)
Switzerland -0.008 -0.028
(0.061) (0.055)
Sector FE YES YES
Constant 2.429*** 2.418*** 2.399*** 2.400***
(0.012) (0.029) (0.012) (0.026)
Observations 2,186 2,186 2,639 2,639
Wald chi2 14.50 83.09 14.30 68.63
Prob>chi2 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Table A.2: Timing of first investment: Poisson model, equity investment and lending. 
 
 
Table A.2 is equivalent to Table 13 of Chapter Two. However, Table A.2 is based on both 





Sample  New capital  New and existing capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prewar investor -0.174*** -0.198*** -0.115*** -0.131***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031)
German origin 0.046 0.031 -0.064** -0.077***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.026) (0.028)
Family 0.006 0.011 0.033 0.034
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Trustee -0.038 0.003 -0.013 0.017
(0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041)
No control -0.037 -0.017
(0.030) (0.028)
WWII neutrals -0.048 0.004
(0.040) (0.038)
Investment size 0.012 0.008
(million DM) (0.009) (0.009)
Switzerland -0.023 -0.059
(0.052) (0.049)
Sector FE YES YES
Constant 2.099*** 2.124*** 2.061*** 2.087***
(0.012) (0.026) (0.012) (0.024)
Observations 2,741 2,741 3,331 3,331
Wald chi2 28.20 85.54 23.52 67.22
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Table A.3: Determinants of recurring investments: Conditional risk set model. 
 
Table A.3 is equivalent to Table 14 of Chapter Two. However, Table A.3 is based on both 




Period  3q1950-1q1955  3q1950 - 4q1953
Sample  Equity investment  Equity investment and lending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prewar investor 0.660*** 0.671*** 0.574*** 0.507***
(0.135) (0.139) (0.092) (0.095)
German emigrant -0.044 0.094 0.123 0.191
(0.202) (0.217) (0.118) (0.128)
Family -0.511* -0.507* -0.267** -0.254**
(0.268) (0.268) (0.110) (0.110)
Trustee 0.202 0.262 0.467*** 0.456***
(0.204) (0.209) (0.121) (0.126)
No control -0.086 -0.298 0.125 0.055
(0.130) (0.210) (0.093) (0.131)
WWII neutrals 0.546*** 0.375* 0.346*** 0.271
(0.131) (0.214) (0.092) (0.165)
Previous investment 0.130 0.122 0.062*** 0.061***
(million DM) (0.083) (0.084) (0.020) (0.021)
Nominal capital of -0.054 -0.055 -0.014 -0.017
destination (million DM) (0.035) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013)
Switzerland 0.340 0.138
(0.313) (0.212)
Sector FE YES YES
Observations 2,399 2,399 3,276 3,276
Subjects 2,052 2,052 2,555 2,555
Failures 378 378 804 804
Wald chi2 62.89 99.42 152.31 197.08
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Table A.4: First location choice of new entrants: Alternative-specific conditional logit model. 
 
Table A.4 is equivalent to Table 16 of Chapter Two. However, Table A.4 is based on both 
ultimately approved and ultimately rejected applications. Table 16 is based on ultimately approved 
applications only. 
Period  3q1950 - 1q1955  3q1950 - 4q1953
Investment sample  Equity investment  Equity investment and lending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sectoral employment share 7.097*** 7.723*** 7.775*** 6.967*** 7.669*** 7.731***
(0.558) (0.334) (0.338) (0.469) (0.296) (0.300)
Distance to border -6.591*** -7.810*** -7.792*** -5.365*** -6.664*** -6.638***
(0.319) (0.312) (0.312) (0.251) (0.237) (0.237)
Own occupation zone 0.621*** 0.643*** 0.639*** 0.754*** 0.920*** 0.910***
(0.097) (0.101) (0.100) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090)
Own consulate 0.499*** 1.464*** 1.513*** 0.306*** 1.063*** 1.120***
(0.105) (0.127) (0.128) (0.099) (0.105) (0.109)
Foreign-owned companies 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
P.c. retail turnover 1950 0.324*** 0.414***
(0.067) (0.046)
P.c. industry turnover 1935 0.041 0.053
(0.036) (0.033)
Population density 1950 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Large city 1950 (>500,000) 1.479*** 1.541*** 1.656*** 1.734***
(0.147) (0.148) (0.119) (0.120)
Seaport -0.125 -0.149 0.289* 0.273
(0.244) (0.250) (0.172) (0.175)
Rhine 0.772*** 0.804*** 0.567*** 0.605***
(0.0751) (0.080) (0.066) (0.070)
Hamburg-Frankfurt 1.048*** 1.127*** 0.820*** 0.924***
(0.135) (0.145) (0.120) (0.129)
District FE YES YES
Observations 929,670 929,670 929,670 1,151,952 1,151,952 1,151,952
Wald chi2 670.5 11,360.69 11,191.25 763.26 13,331.77 13,137.83
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Appendix B – Chapter Three 
Table B.1:  Ratio of short-term, foreign commercial credit lines of German banks to the total value 
of German imports, November 1953 to February 1956. 
 
Table B.2: Number of months of the total value of German imports covered by German currency 





Table B.3: Acquired Sperrmark turnover, total amount traded and as percent of the level of 
acquired Sperrmark at the end of the previous month. 
 
Table B.4: Sales of original Sperrmark as a source of supply for acquired Sperrmark, total amount 
sold and as percent of the level of acquired Sperrmark at the end of the month. 
 
Tables B.5 to B.10 are equivalent to Tables 23 to 28 of Chapter Three. However, they are based 
on both ultimately approved and ultimately rejected applications. Tables 23 to 28 are based on 
ultimately approved applications only. 
month million DM








% of end of 
previous 
month level
Oct 51 144 133,3% Jul 52 161 83,0% Apr 53 174.8 77,8%
Nov 51 111 82,2% Aug 52 152 80,4% May 53 107 41,8%
Dec 51 115 86,5% Sep 52 165 82,1% Jun 53 198.2 75,9%
Jan 52 133 96,1% Oct 52 143 Jul 53 138.7 52,4%
Feb 52 Nov 52 120 65,6% Aug 53 265.6 94,3%
Mar 52 114 69,9% Dec 52 112 60,9% Sep 53 247.1 90,9%
Apr 52 Jan 53 99.4 53,8% Oct 53 210.6 82,0%
May 52 Feb 53 119.3 59,4% Nov 53 214.9 83,7%
Jun 52 124 Mar 53 173.7 78,4%
Source: Bundesbank Archive, Appendices of Minutes of Meetings of the Central Bank Council of the Bank deutscher Länder, various 
meetings between 1952 and 1954. The data is missing for February, April and May 1952.
month million DM
% of end of 
month level
month million DM
% of end of 
month level
month million DM
% of end of 
month level
Oct 51 41 30,4% Jul 52 32 16,9% Apr 53 47.3 18,5%
Nov 51 23 17,3% Aug 52 25 12,4% May 53 22.5 8,6%
Dec 51 24 17,3% Sep 52 30 Jun 53 37.2 14,0%
Jan 52 29 19,6% Oct 52 29 15,8% Jul 53 37.2 13,2%
Feb 52 Nov 52 24 13,0% Aug 53 29.4 10,8%
Mar 52 24 14,3% Dec 52 21 11,4% Sep 53 27.4 10,7%
Apr 52 Jan 53 30.8 15,3% Oct 53 31.8 12,4%
May 52 Feb 53 32.7 14,8% Nov 53 56.1 19,8%
Jun 52 26 13,4% Mar 53 26.6 11,8%
Source: Bundesbank Archive, Appendices of Minutes of Meetings of the Central Bank Council of the Bank deutscher Länder, various 




Table B.5: Fixed-effects model – equity investment projects, 3q1950-1q1955. 
 
in Deutschmark 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.015*** 0.018*** 0.014** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
937.1 727.3 900.0 -708.6
(1,439) (1,276) (1,459) (1,239)
1,453 -2,248 14,772 11,363
(3,689) (2,866) (18,191) (14,506)
15,620*** 11,320*** 15,676*** 11,382***
(817.4) (892.9) (845.8) (894.3)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.655 0.581 0.655 0.581
Standard errors clustered at the district level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in Swiss Francs 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.029*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.039***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
126.6 -213.5 863.8 -867.0
(1,080) (939.9) (1,066) (933.2)
3,224 -557.2 13,982 9,620
(2,569) (2,051) (12,160) (9,101)
9,685*** 5,846*** 9,729*** 5,893***
(763.8) (922.2) (776.0) (917.7)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.644 0.602 0.644 0.602














Table B.6: Random-effects model – equity investment projects, in Deutschmark. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 1q1955
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.032*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
-1,662 271.7 9,664 9,192
(3,090) (2,745) (14,661) (9,998)
807.3 469.0 -142.9 -1,660
(1,276) 1,153) (1,376) (1,303)
-4,172 -6,407** -19,498 -13,895
(3,356) (3,164) (17,240) (15,789)
6,233*** 1,993* 6,161*** 1,954*
(864.5) (1,090) (876.2) (1,108)
15,786*** 17,302*** 15,608*** 17,200***
(5,884) (6,566) (5,838) (6,531)
-15.03 -6.371 -15.30 -6.370
(11.63) (9.904) (11.75) (9.844)
-2,072 -622.7 -3,144 -1,578
(7,643) (6,760) (7,085) (6,493)
-23,224 -19,523* -24,405 -20,992*
(14,999) (10,783) (15,453) (11,422)
21,128 33,413 20,823 31,635
(36,394) (34,373) (36,392) (33,576)
-3,822 -1,787 -5,201 -2,973
(3,682) (3,224) (3,636) (3,248)
5,729 6,701 4,723 5,937
(5,329) (4,439) (4,599) (3,815)
802.2 -1,371 1,266 -368.5
(3,389) (2,833) (3,356) (2,765)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.624 0.543 0.624 0.543
Standard errors clustered at the district level


















Table B.7: Random-effects model – equity investment projects, in Swiss Francs. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 1q1955
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.047*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.050***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-2,453 152.4 8,008 4,753
(2,406) (1,411) (10,070) (6,081)
297.8 -274.8 384.5 -1,288
(888.7) (786.6) (944.6) (924.5)
-1,049 -2,863 -13,076 -4,913
(2,451) (2,152) (13,068) (9,617)
3,114*** 194.1 3,058*** 181.7
(700.7) (895.6) (704.5) (896.9)
11,834*** 11,900** 11,686*** 11,863**
(4,262) (4,822) (4,245) (4,815)
-8.613 -0.234 -8.676 -0.108
(7.570) (6.425) (7.641) (6.361)
415.3 703.2 -578.7 193.5
(5,551) (4,178) (5,065) (4,163)
-19,745* -13,836** -21,024* -14,787**
(10,812) (6,776) (11,110) (7,199)
34,393 20,534 33,014 18,869
(28,776) (19,647) (28,597) (18,795)
-2,850 -755.4 -4,076 -1,361
(2,579) (2,130) (2,629) (2,149)
6,169 3,806** 5,290 3,451**
(4,541) (1,932) (3,846) (1,683)
-732.6 -1,110 -720.6 -622.8
(2,673) (1,349) (2,632) (1,308)
Observations 8,388 8,388 8,388 8,388
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.616 0.575 0.616 0.575
Standard errors clustered at the district level


















Table B.8: Fixed-effects model – lending projects, 3q1950-4q1953. 
 
in Deutschmark 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
-0.018*** -0.017 -0.019*** -0.016
(0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014)
0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1,583 -2,680 815.2 -984.2
(5,282) (2,654) (4,916) (3,837)
1,488 38.55 29,654 -35,628
(10,704) (8,751) (45,184) (44,088)
55,478*** 40,865*** 55,594*** 40,716***
(2,004) (3,848) (1,996) (3,787)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.627 0.544 0.627 0.544
Standard errors clustered at the district level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in Swiss Francs 
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
-0.015** -0.019* -0.016** -0.017*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
795.8 -1,208 1,264 802.5
(4,127) (1,679) (3,644) (2,309)
2,877 1,605 15,831 -28,189
(7,041) (5,586) (25,442) (27,351)
32,923*** 24,458*** 32,969*** 24,341***
(1,562) (1,607) (1,555) (1,589)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of districts 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.623 0.545 0.623 0.545














Table B.9: Random-effects model – lending projects, in Deutschmark. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 4q1953
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.018 0.009 0.019 0.011
(0.014) (0.0170) (0.015) (0.017)
-0.0003 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
6,469 14,411** 55,863** 50,174**
(9,525) (7,100) (27,279) (23,644)
1,753 -3,187 -2,505 -4,075
(5,183) (2,842) (5,052) (4,165)
-21,524* -16,941* -104,935* -133,440**
(12,668) (9,949) (60,657) (58,022)
12,075*** 1,538 11,913*** 1,314
(3,815) (3,996) (3,705) (3,875)
64,400** 63,609** 63,582** 62,524**
(32,005) (26,070) (31,669) (25,621)
-54.50 -38.87 -50.44 -34.49
(43.28) (34.99) (42.99) (33.95)
-5,864 -16,001 -7,445 -13,922
(25,890) (20,443) (25,230) (20,558)
-125,173** -79,963** -130,905** -79,096**
(60,229) (37,158) (62,440) (38,866)
157,351 130,375 134,678 114,640
(133,875) (97,372) (128,258) (89,842)
2,995 -3,697 1,214 -1,160
(13,259) (11,555) (12,949) (11,475)
4,119 8,757 4,036 11,289
(12,893) (8,044) (11,148) (7,165)
10,427 8,586 11,589 8,725
(9,000) (6,049) (8,951) (6,110)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.555 0.456 0.556 0.458
Standard errors clustered at the district level


















Table B.10: Random-effects model – lending projects, in Swiss Francs. 
 
Period 3q1950 - 4q1953
Pre-war debt measure  Bank deutscher Länder  Glasemann (1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investor sample All New entrants All New entrants
0.016 0.004 0.018 0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1,918 7,952* 30,275* 28,446**
(5,708) (4,281) (16,453) (14,136)
446.8 -1,391 -840.8 -644.3
(4,042) (1,716) (3,578) (2,448)
-9,315 -7,236 -57,454 -80,706**
(7,874) (6,079) (35,770) (34,783)
8,722*** 2,468 8,623*** 2,317
(1,926) (2,109) (1,870) (2,047)
35,363** 35,997** 34,901** 35,340**
(17,853) (14,406) (17,620) (14,097)
-29.95 -25.99 -27.98 -23.64
(25.79) (19.83) (25.66) (19.23)
-1,658 -11,601 -2,819 -10,232
(15,253) (11,660) (14,775) (11,679)
-69,503* -42,836* -72,886* -41,856*
(36,661) (22,150) (37,824) (23,005)
89,791 69,965 77,761 61,901
(80,065) (55,454) (77,135) (51,130)
2,819 -2,499 1,463 -848.9
(7,571) (6,375) (7,343) (6,337)
624.9 3,973 320.3 5,550
(7,640) (4,844) (6,589) (4,273)
6,250 5,965* 6,662 5,740
(5,389) (3,602) (5,384) (3,666)
Observations 6,058 6,058 6,058 6,058
Number of iddistrict 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.559 0.466 0.560 0.468
Standard errors clustered at the district level


















Appendix C – Investment applications excluded from the estimation 
The purpose underlying the collection of this data set is to measure foreign willingness to invest 
capital in the Federal Republic of Germany during an early period after the end of the Second 
World War. The particular regulatory environment in place between June 1950 and June 1955 
allows for a comprehensive measure: The records of the governmental investment commission 
reveal the universe of projects in which a non-resident investor decides to involve herself directly 
and invest any of her capital into a company located within the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. 
West Germany excluding West Berlin. The raw data retrieved from the records, however, contain 
a number of applications which, if retained, would violate the consistency of the measure. Such 
applications need to be excluded from the sample before empirical results can be produced. 
The following paragraphs list all excluded applications by reason for their exclusion. Individual 
applications are uniquely identified by their earliest appearance in the records of the investment 
commission. Records under the shelf marks BArch B102.6735 to BArch B102.6740 contain the 
minutes of the commission meetings. The minutes for each individual meeting consist of actual 
written minutes (“Vermerk”) and a list of all applications reviewed during the meeting 
(“Besprechungspunkte”). Starting with the 20th meeting, this overall list is in turn subdivided into 
several lists 1, 2, etc., or respectively A, B, etc. (e.g. “Besprechungspunkte Liste A”). In practice, 
individual applications are thus uniquely identified by the combination of meeting number, list 
number and case number on the particular list (e.g. meeting 34, list D, case 17). The precise 
location of individual minutes in the Federal Archives (Koblenz) are as follows:  
BArch B102.6735: 1st meeting (October 6, 1950) – 21st meeting (July 6, 1951) 
BArch B102.6736: 22nd meeting (July 20, 1951) – 49th meeting (July 18, 1952) 
BArch B102.6737: 50th meeting (August 1, 1952) – 69th meeting (May 8, 1953) 
BArch B102.6738: 70th meeting (May 22, 1953) – 85th meeting (December 18, 1953) 
BArch B102.6739: 86th meeting (January 8, 1954) – 110th meeting (December 17, 1954) 
BArch B102.6740: 111th meeting (January 14, 1955) – 122nd meeting (September 30, 1955)  
In addition, I assign a unique identification number to each investor, in order to be able to track 
individual investors over time across consecutive applications. In the tables below, the column 




Excluded applications can be distinguished according to whether they are excluded categorically 
or on a discretionary basis. 
C.1. Categorically excluded applications 
Categorically excluded applications may constitute perfectly serious investment projects. They are 
excluded nevertheless, because their retention would violate the consistency of the final data set. 
In fact, they belong to certain categories of applications either not fully observable through the 
records of the investment commission, or miscellaneous in the sense of falling outside the scope 
of foreign direct investment. Therefore such applications are subject to an arbitrary process of self-
selection into the data, over and above the systematic self-selection from which all applications 
suffer in general. For example, a small number of destination companies based in West Berlin 
ended up in the commission records, even though in theory they fell under the jurisdiction of the 
separate regulatory regime for West Berlin. Their observability through the Federal German 
regulatory body is thus arbitrary, that is, its reason is untraceable. In contrast, observability of 
destination companies based in Lower Saxony is systematic, as long as the individual approval 
requirement existed.  
Categorically excluded categories of applications are: all applications filed later than the first 
quarter of 1955, all loan applications filed later than the fourth quarter of 1953, applications 
involving residents of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, applications in which the 
investment destination is located in West Berlin, applications for transactions with purely non-
corporate entities, and miscellaneous applications. 
C.1.1 Applications filed later than the first quarter of 1955 
The individual licencing requirement was dropped on June 15, 1955, for direct investment projects 
of all types below an investment amount of 500,000 DM 151. All applications below that threshold 
which were still being processed at the time were summarily approved152. As a result, the universe 
of equity investment projects is observable through the commission records only up to the first 
quarter of 1955, given the average processing delay between the filing of the application and the 
time of its first mention in the commission records. I therefore drop all applications filed during 
the second or third quarter of 1955 from the sample. 
                                                 
151 BArch B102.57662, Gemeinsame Pressenotiz des Bundesministers für Wirtschaft und der Bank deutscher Länder 
vom 15. Juni 1955. 




Table C.1.1 – Applications filed later than the first quarter of 1955. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
565 122 A 6 3rd quarter 1955 
904 120 B 18 2nd quarter 1955 
1098 122 A 2 3rd quarter 1955 
2371 121 A 3 2nd quarter 1955 
3405 122 A 7 3rd quarter 1955 
4376 121 B 9 2nd quarter 1955 
4490 120 A 2 2nd quarter 1955 
4496 120 A 10 2nd quarter 1955 
4514 120 B 8 2nd quarter 1955 
4524 120 B 17 2nd quarter 1955 
4536 121 A 5 2nd quarter 1955 
4537 121 A 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4538 121 A 7 2nd quarter 1955 
4539 121 A 7 2nd quarter 1955 
4540 121 A 8 2nd quarter 1955 
4541 121 A 9 2nd quarter 1955 
4542 121 A 9 2nd quarter 1955 
 121 A 9a 2nd quarter 1955 
4544 121 A 11 2nd quarter 1955 
4547 121 B 1 2nd quarter 1955 
4552 121 B 5 2nd quarter 1955 
4553 121 B 5 2nd quarter 1955 
4554 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4555 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4556 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4557 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4558 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4559 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4560 121 B 6 2nd quarter 1955 
4563 121 B 10 2nd quarter 1955 
4564 121 B 11 2nd quarter 1955 
4565 121 B 11 2nd quarter 1955 
4566 121 B 11 2nd quarter 1955 
4567 121 B 12 2nd quarter 1955 
4568 122 A 3 3rd quarter 1955 
4569 122 A 4 3rd quarter 1955 






C.1.2 Loan applications filed later than the fourth quarter of 1953 
On February 2, 1954, the individual licencing requirement for loans to domestic debtors was 
essentially decentralised153. Henceforth, Land Central Banks were authorized to approve future 
applications for most types of transactions on their own authority. The Investment Commission on 
the Federal level retained authority over all equity investments and only certain types of direct 
lending between non-resident investors and domestic debtors. As a result, the universe of foreign 
lending is observable only up to the fourth quarter of 1953. I therefore drop all loan applications 
from the sample that were filed later than the fourth quarter of 1953. 
Table C.1.2 – Loan applications filed later than the fourth quarter of 1953. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
24 96 D 19 2nd quarter 1954 
122 98 Dev. 102 1st quarter 1954 
219 96 D 17 1st quarter 1954 
234 93 Dev. 104 1st quarter 1954 
236 103 D 16 2nd quarter 1954 
307 121 B 13b 1st quarter 1955 
374 104 B 7 2nd quarter 1954 
381 94 D 7 1st quarter 1954 
384 106 D 7 3rd quarter 1954 
390 98 B 5 1st quarter 1954 
404 98 D 16 1st quarter 1954 
512 100 Dev. 108 2nd quarter 1954 
563 107 B 12 3rd quarter 1954 
571 102 B 5 2nd quarter 1954 
600 96 B 11 1st quarter 1954 
629 105 Dev. 101 3rd quarter 1954 
 111 D 45 4th quarter 1954 
642 93 B 18 1st quarter 1954 
646 96 B 1 1st quarter 1954 
652 93 B 12 1st quarter 1954 
653 98 D 2 1st quarter 1954 
662 95 B 12 1st quarter 1954 
664 98 B 4 1st quarter 1954 
707 99 B 1 2nd quarter 1954 
708 103 D 8 2nd quarter 1954 
708 98 D 7 1st quarter 1954 
                                                 
153 BArch B102.57662, Rundschreiben A20/54 der Bank deutscher Länder an die Vorstände der Landeszentralbanken 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
711 100 D 2 2nd quarter 1954 
720 94 D 8 1st quarter 1954 
753 110 D 20 3rd quarter 1954 
828 98 D 24 1st quarter 1954 
829 95 B 4 1st quarter 1954 
844 96 D 27 1st quarter 1954 
849 101 D 9 1st quarter 1954 
942 96 D 13 1st quarter 1954 
971 91 D 43 1st quarter 1954 
1018 103 D 22 3rd quarter 1954 
1095 102 D 9 2nd quarter 1954 
1114 95 D 12 1st quarter 1954 
1167 103 D 6 3rd quarter 1954 
1185 99 D 19 2nd quarter 1954 
1189 104 Dev. 106 3rd quarter 1954 
1264 98 D 23 1st quarter 1954 
 100 B 1 2nd quarter 1954 
 100 B 2 2nd quarter 1954 
1378 88 D 12 1st quarter 1954 
 111 D 5 3rd quarter 1954 
1485 119 B 9 1st quarter 1955 
1509 100 Dev. 103 2nd quarter 1954 
1530 102 D 8 2nd quarter 1954 
1535 95 Dev. 101 1st quarter 1954 
1617 93 B 5 1st quarter 1954 
1676 99 D 9 2nd quarter 1954 
1782 94 D 11 1st quarter 1954 
2051 95 D 10 1st quarter 1954 
2114 102 B 1 2nd quarter 1954 
2151 94 B 10 1st quarter 1954 
2186 100 D 5 2nd quarter 1954 
2260 93 B 6 1st quarter 1954 
2278 91 B 12 1st quarter 1954 
2351 96 B 10 1st quarter 1954 
2378 95 B 3 1st quarter 1954 
2406 93 B 4a 1st quarter 1954 
2407 93 B 4b 1st quarter 1954 
2466 97 B 6 1st quarter 1954 
2516 102 D 10 2nd quarter 1954 
2517 97 B 7 1st quarter 1954 
2548 117 B 10 4th quarter 1954 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
2555 90 A 1 1st quarter 1954 
2593 104 B 5 3rd quarter 1954 
2724 103 D 9 2nd quarter 1954 
2740 97 D 12 2nd quarter 1954 
2794 96 D 12 1st quarter 1954 
2873 100 Dev. 112 2nd quarter 1954 
2944 103 D 14 2nd quarter 1954 
2950 102 Dev. 106 2nd quarter 1954 
2956 93 D 7 1st quarter 1954 
3001 96 D 22 2nd quarter 1954 
3101 99 Dev. 103 2nd quarter 1954 
3176 101 Dev. 102 2nd quarter 1954 
3187 92 B 17 1st quarter 1954 
3204 97 D 11 1st quarter 1954 
3228 118 B 15 1st quarter 1955 
3274 91 D 17 1st quarter 1954 
3280 94 D 5 1st quarter 1954 
3381 95 B 7 1st quarter 1954 
3399 95 B 8 1st quarter 1954 
3405 93 B 9 1st quarter 1954 
3405 104 B 6 2nd quarter 1954 
3405 122 A 7 3rd quarter 1955 
3454 97 B 8 1st quarter 1954 
3482 104 B 3 2nd quarter 1954 
3500 90 B 7 1st quarter 1954 
3513 90 Dev. 102 1st quarter 1954 
3516 90 C 1 1st quarter 1954 
3566 91 D 13 1st quarter 1954 
3579 91 D 42 1st quarter 1954 
3605 92 B 13 1st quarter 1954 
3606 92 B 14 1st quarter 1954 
3610 92 D 6 1st quarter 1954 
3615 92 D 17 1st quarter 1954 
3627 92 Dev. 108 1st quarter 1954 
3629 93 B 8 1st quarter 1954 
3639 93 B 17 1st quarter 1954 
3642 93 D 1 1st quarter 1954 
3643 93 D 2 1st quarter 1954 
3645 93 D 6 1st quarter 1954 
3652 93 Dev. 108 1st quarter 1954 
3654 94 B 3 1st quarter 1954 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
3670 94 D 9 1st quarter 1954 
3673 94 D 12 1st quarter 1954 
3674 94 D 13 1st quarter 1954 
3682 94 Dev. 111 1st quarter 1954 
3685 95 B 6 1st quarter 1954 
3694 95 D 13 1st quarter 1954 
3695 95 D 14 1st quarter 1954 
3700 95 D 17 1st quarter 1954 
 95 D 18 1st quarter 1954 
3702 95 D 20 1st quarter 1954 
3704 95 Dev. 102 1st quarter 1954 
3712 95 Dev. 108 1st quarter 1954 
3722 96 B 9 1st quarter 1954 
3723 96 B 12 1st quarter 1954 
3731 96 D 10 1st quarter 1954 
3732 96 D 11 1st quarter 1954 
3733 96 D 11 1st quarter 1954 
3734 96 D 14 1st quarter 1954 
3735 96 D 15 1st quarter 1954 
3736 96 D 16 1st quarter 1954 
 112 D 2 4th quarter 1954 
3737 96 D 18 1st quarter 1954 
3739 96 D 26 2nd quarter 1954 
3741 96 D 29 1st quarter 1954 
3743 96 Dev. 102 2nd quarter 1954 
3752 97 B 5 1st quarter 1954 
3753 97 B 9 1st quarter 1954 
3754 97 B 10 1st quarter 1954 
3759 97 D 1 2nd quarter 1954 
3760 97 D 2 1st quarter 1954 
3761 97 D 3 1st quarter 1954 
3762 97 D 4 2nd quarter 1954 
3771 97 D 13 1st quarter 1954 
3772 97 D 14 2nd quarter 1954 
3790 98 B 11 1st quarter 1954 
3794 98 D 4 2nd quarter 1954 
3804 98 D 15 1st quarter 1954 
3805 98 D 17 2nd quarter 1954 
3806 98 D 18 2nd quarter 1954 
3811 98 D 22 1st quarter 1954 
3826 99 B 8 2nd quarter 1954 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
3832 99 D 8 2nd quarter 1954 
3833 99 D 13 2nd quarter 1954 
3841 99 Dev. 101 2nd quarter 1954 
3845 99 Dev. 106 2nd quarter 1954 
3846 100 B 3 2nd quarter 1954 
3851 100 D 1 2nd quarter 1954 
3852 100 D 3 2nd quarter 1954 
3854 100 D 7 1st quarter 1954 
3855 100 D 8 2nd quarter 1954 
3856 100 Dev. 102 2nd quarter 1954 
3859 100 Dev. 107 2nd quarter 1954 
3865 100 Dev. 116 2nd quarter 1954 
3873 101 B 6 1st quarter 1954 
3876 101 D 4 2nd quarter 1954 
3881 101 D 10 2nd quarter 1954 
3882 101 D 11 2nd quarter 1954 
3883 101 D 14 2nd quarter 1954 
3885 101 D 16 2nd quarter 1954 
3909 102 D 11 3rd quarter 1954 
3910 102 D 12 3rd quarter 1954 
3918 102 Dev. 101 3rd quarter 1954 
3920 102 Dev. 103 2nd quarter 1954 
3921 102 Dev. 104 2nd quarter 1954 
3922 102 Dev. 105 2nd quarter 1954 
3924 102 Dev. 108 2nd quarter 1954 
3931 103 B 7 2nd quarter 1954 
3934 109 B 1 3rd quarter 1954 
3939 103 D 11 2nd quarter 1954 
3950 103 D 15 3rd quarter 1954 
3951 103 D 17 3rd quarter 1954 
3954 103 D 19 2nd quarter 1954 
3960 103 Dev. 102 3rd quarter 1954 
3961 103 Dev. 103 2nd quarter 1954 
3962 103 Dev. 104 2nd quarter 1954 
3963 103 Dev. 105 3rd quarter 1954 
3964 103 Dev. 106 2nd quarter 1954 
3973 104 B 1 3rd quarter 1954 
3974 104 B 4 3rd quarter 1954 
3987 104 Dev. 109 2nd quarter 1954 
4029 106 B 9 3rd quarter 1954 
4035 106 Dev. 102 3rd quarter 1954 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Application filed 
4071 108 B 4 3rd quarter 1954 
4077 108 B 9 3rd quarter 1954 
4120 110 B 4 3rd quarter 1954 
4126 110 B 9 3rd quarter 1954 
4144 111 B 6 4th quarter 1954 
4145 111 B 8 1st quarter 1954 
4210 111 D 56 4th quarter 1954 
4218 112 B 9 3rd quarter 1954 
4239 112 D 8 4th quarter 1954 
4284 113 D 19 4th quarter 1954 
4300 114 B 10 2nd quarter 1954 
4339 115 D 11 4th quarter 1954 
4341 115 D 14 1st quarter 1955 
4350 115 D 19 3rd quarter 1954 
4353 115 D 23 4th quarter 1954 
4376 121 B 9 2nd quarter 1955 
4398 116 D 21 1st quarter 1955 
4412 117 D 5 1st quarter 1955 
4445 118 B 2 1st quarter 1955 
4475 119 A 16 1st quarter 1955 
4489 120 A 1 1st quarter 1955 
4501 120 A 16 1st quarter 1955 
4568 122 A 3 3rd quarter 1955 
4587 103 B 6 3rd quarter 1954 
4598 103 B 8 3rd quarter 1954 
4605 95 D 11 1st quarter 1954 
4606 103 D 7 2nd quarter 1954 
 
 
C.1.3 Applications involving residents of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany 
The investment commission records contain a small number of applications for which the non-
resident investor is a resident of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. East German applicants 
attempted to prepare their emigration to the West by granting loans to or purchasing shares in West 
German companies. I drop these applications from the sample for two reasons: Firstly, the non-
resident investor was not a foreigner and was likely to immigrate soon. Secondly, individuals or 
corporations from Communist countries were otherwise not authorized to invest in West Germany 




Table C.1.3 – Applications involving residents of the Soviet occupation zone. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Stated location of non-resident applicant 
126 8 --- 5   Freiberg, Saxony 
1534 40 D 10   Unknown identity, trustee located in Dortmund 
 40 D 11  
1752 46 B 3   Lindenthal bei Leipzig 
2428 61 D 24   Gogolin, Upper Silesia (Polish administration) 
2663 68 B 1   Leipzig 
2723 69 C 3   Oberfrohna, Saxony 
 69 C 4    
3061 78 D 17   Radebeul, Saxony 
3359 85 D 31   Hirschfeld, Saxony 
3405 86 D 31   Muldenhammer (Erzgebirge), Saxony, trustee 
 93 B 9   located in West Berlin. 
 104 B 6  
 122 A 7  
3553 91 B 16   Borsdorf, Saxony 
3689 95 D 6   Unspecified location in Soviet Occupation Zone 
4139 110 D 16   Unknown identity, trustee located in Bielefeld 
4218 112 B 9   Berlin-Treptow 
4475 119 A 15   Halle (Saale), trustee located in Frankfurt. 
 119 A 16    
4569 122 A 4   Oberlungwitz, Saxony, at the moment political    
  prisoner [sic!] in Strafanstalt Bautzen, Saxony,    
  trustee located in Würzburg. 
 
C.1.4 Applications in which the investment destination is located in West Berlin 
Due to its peculiar legal position, West Berlin had its own licencing regime for foreign investments 
coming into the city154. I therefore drop all five applications involving destination companies 
located in West Berlin, which nevertheless appeared in the commission records for some reason. 
Table C.1.4 – Applications with investment destinations located in West Berlin. 







  Berlin-Friedenau 
356 15 --- 12   Berlin-Dahlem 
 19 --- 4a   Berlin-Dahlem 
765 24 1 13   Berlin-Spandau (plants in Schleswig-Holstein) 
1004 30 2 43   Berlin-Charlottenburg 
                                                 




C.1.5 Applications for transactions with purely non-corporate entities 
From the time of the lifting of the Allied investment embargo, certain financial transactions 
between non-resident and residents of West Germany which required individual approval had been 
under the sole authority of the Bank deutscher Länder, without consultation of the investment 
commission (Direktgenehmigung). These transactions were essentially limited to mere real estate 
investments, i.e. the payment of building costs, as well as loans to private individuals and charities 
for the payment of building costs155. Moreover, support payments to private residents of West 
Germany below a certain monthly threshold did not require any administrative approval at all 
(Kühne 1984). At the same time, the investment commission did adjudicate on a number of 
applications which were very similar to those falling under Direktgenehmigung or a general 
licence. I drop these from the sample in order to safeguard the universality of the foreign direct 
investment measure, which is therefore meant only to include all transactions involving a German 
company as the resident partner. 
Table C.1.5 – Applications for transactions with purely non-corporate entities. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of investment destination and transaction 
15 2 --- 17   Private individual – construction loan and present 
23 3 --- 9   Private individual – construction loan 
28 3 --- 16   Private individual – construction loan 
66 5 --- 13   Private individual – construction loan 
67 5 --- 14   Private individual – construction loan 
95 6 --- 18   Private individual – construction loan 
96 6 --- 19   Private individual – construction loan 
118 7 --- 17   Private individual – loan to financial trustee 
119 7 --- 18   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
146 8 --- 28   Private individual – construction loan 
149 8 --- 34   Private individual – construction loan 
212 10 --- 31   Private individual – construction loan 
262 12 --- 13   Private individual – construction loan 
270 12 --- 21   Private individual – construction loan 
277 12 --- 29   Private individual – construction loan 
293 13 --- 16   Private individual – construction loan 
294 13 --- 17   Private individual – loan to financial trustee 
299 13 --- 23   Private individual – construction loan 
303 13 --- 28   Private individual – construction loan 
313 14 --- 14   Charity (religious order) – construction loan 
                                                 
155 See the list of Direktgenehmigung applications attached to the files of some of the commission meetings, for 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of investment destination and transaction 
316 14 --- 17   Private individual – construction loan 
317 14 --- 18   Private individual – construction loan 
334 14 --- 37   Private individual – construction loan 
340 14 --- 45   Charity (church) – construction loan 
342 14 --- 47   Private individual – construction loan 
344 14 --- 52   Private individual – construction loan 
356 15 --- 12   Charity (religious order) – charitable donation 
 19 --- 4a   Charity (religious order) – construction loan 
379 15 --- 43   Private individual – Real estate investment 
384 49 B 27   Private individual – loan for sundry investments 
393 16 --- 7   Private individual – construction loan 
400 16 --- 14   Private individual – construction loan 
403 16 --- 18   Charity (church) – subsidy in form of loan 
412 16 --- 28   Charity (religious order) – construction loan 
437 17 --- 16   Charity (church) – construction loan 
438 17 --- 17   Charity (church) – construction loan 
439 17 --- 18   Political organization – construction loan 
452 19 --- 6   Private individual – construction loan 
 22 1 30   Private individual – debt restructuring 
493 29 2 30   Private individual – construction loan 
541 19 --- 49   Charity (religious order) – construction loan 
735 39 D 15   Private individual – loan supporting relative 
761 33 C 21   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
870 26 2 43   Charity (church) – construction loan 
877 26 2 57   Private individual – loan to financial trustee 
882 26 2 63   Private individual – Private offsetting of claims 
951 29 1 15   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
1036 30 2 83   Private individual – remuneration in form of loan 
1064 31 2 21   Private individual – debt restructuring 
1118 51 B 7   Private individual – construction loan 
1137 117 D 12   Private individual – construction loan 
1176 33 D 17   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
1197 34 B 2   Charity (church) – subsidy in form of loan 
1221 35 A 4   Charity (church) – subsidy in form of loan 
1223 35 A 7   Charity (church) – subsidy in form of loan 
1228 35 A 14   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
1290 36 A 8   Charity (church) – subsidy in form of loan 
 61 B 2   Charity (church) – subsidy in form of loan 
1345 36 D 17   Private individual – construction loan 
1444 38 D 18   Private individual – loan to financial trustee 
1584 41 D 12   Charity (welfare) – charitable donation 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of investment destination and transaction 
1968 77 D 26   Charity (welfare) – construction loan 
2158 54 D 1   Political organization – subsidy payment 
2177 59 B 2   Fraternal organization – construction loan 
2516 64 D 21   Private individual – construction loan 
2614 67 B 1   Charity (welfare) – subsidy in form of loan 
3035 78 A 1   Private individual – construction loan 
3053 78 D 4   Private individual – construction loan 
3086 79 D 23   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
3177 81 D 25   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
3464 89 B 10   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
3670 94 D 9   Private individual – debt restructuring 
3731 96 D 10   Charity (religious order) – subsidy in form of loan 
3747 96 Dev. 106   Private individual – construction loan 
3778 97 Dev. 101   Private individual – construction loan 
3919 102 Dev. 102   Private individual – construction loan 
4035 106 Dev. 102   Private individual – debt restructuring 
4213 112 B 6   Private individual – construction loan 
4339 115 D 11   Private individual – personal aid in form of loan 
4412 117 D 5   Private individual – debt restructuring 
4490 120 A 2   Private individual – construction loan 
 
C.1.6 Miscellaneous applications 
The records of the investment commission contain a range of transaction types which cannot be 
classified as foreign direct investment without violating the universality of the measure, as pointed 
out above in Appendix C.1.5. Beyond the categories already mentioned, the records also contain 
applications which did not involve any financial investment at all. In this context, the most 
prominent example are changes of legal form to existing subsidiaries of foreign companies. The 
foreign parent would “invest” the value of the existing subsidiary into a new company with 
changed legal form. Financially, however, such transactions involved no additional investment of 
any kind. Another prominent example are applications for retrospective approval of embargo 
violations. Using foreign exchange in cash or accounts receivable, a limited number of non-
resident investors had acquired shares in small German companies even before June 1950. If they 
subsequently sought commission approval for other projects after the lifting of the embargo, or if 
they were caught by the authorities, they were forced to seek retrospective approval or otherwise 
shut down their illegal subsidiary. I remove these cases from the sample, because the 




Table C.1.6 – Miscellaneous applications. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of transaction - Reason for application 
15 2 --- 17   Present or subsidy payment 
89 47 D 14   Sale of German assets among non-residents 
130 86 D 29   Disinvestment 
296 108 B 3b   Debt cancellation by foreign parent company 
356 15 --- 12   Present or subsidy payment 
 41 A 1   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
375 84 B 14a   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
379 15 --- 43   Real estate investment 
387 15 --- 54   Asset revaluation during RM to DM conversion 
407 116 D 20   Shareholder pay-out with subsidiary assets 
437 17 --- 16   Charitable donation 
438 17 --- 17   Charitable donation 
439 17 --- 18   Charitable donation 
452 120 A 17   Participation in consortium (without capital call) 
557 111 D 49   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
573 54 D 3   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
882 26 2 63   Private offsetting of claims 
936 58 D 39   Real estate investment 
1313 73 D 13   Change of non-resident creditor 
1412 50 B 14   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1500 111 D 49   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1576 41 D 2   Change of legal form of subsidiary  
 41 D 3   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1585 41 D 14   Subsidy in form of loan. 
1596 42 B 5a   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
 42 B 5b   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1599 42 B 10a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
1618 42 D 4   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1619 42 D 5   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
 42 D 6   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1682 44 B 5   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
1702 44 D 15   Present or subsidy payment 
1724 45 B 18   Disinvestment 
1770 59 B 11   Present or subsidy payment 
1838 48 B 2   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
1878 48 D 6b   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1892 48 D 24   Lending among non-residents. 
1943 50 A 1   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
1952 50 B 4a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
1953 50 B 4b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of transaction - Reason for application 
2076 52 D 1   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2078 52 D 6   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2141 54 B 10   Present or subsidy payment 
2158 54 D 1   Real estate investment 
2204 55 D 4   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2233 56 D 1b   Present or subsidy payment 
2280 58 B 8   Corporate succession involving recent emigrant 
2362 60 C 7   Change of legal form of company share 
2380 111 D 18   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2398 112 B 1   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2419 61 D 12a   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
 61 D 12b   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2465 45 D 33   Advance payment for shipbuilding contract 
2587 66 D 8   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2643 67 D 11   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2702 68 D 31   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2789 72 B 7b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2814 72 D 8   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2831 72 D 40   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2838 72 D 50   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2842 72 D 58   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
2902 74 D 4b   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
2977 76 B 22   Present or subsidy payment 
3005 77 B 8   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
3112 80 D 1a   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
3166 81 D 10   Payment of cost overrun by foreign customer 
3173 81 D 19   Change of legal form of company share 
3181 82 A 2   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
3225 82 D 21a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3226 82 D 21b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3259 83 D 7   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
3273 83 D 25   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
 96 D 21   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3280 112 D 7   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
3335 85 D 10   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
 85 D 11   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3340 85 D 15a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3341 85 D 15b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3342 85 D 15c   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3350 85 D 22a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3351 85 D 22b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of transaction - Reason for application 
3366 85 D 41   Change of legal form of company share 
3521 90 D 3   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
3526 90 D 8   Participation in settlement of an estate 
3550 120 B 2   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
 120 B 3   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3552 91 B 13   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3553 91 B 16   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3611 92 D 9   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
 113 B 1   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3660 94 B 7   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3689 95 D 6   Gratuitous acquisition of company share 
3697 95 D 16a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3698 95 D 16b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3699 95 D 16c   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3701 95 D 19   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3728 96 D 6   Change of legal form of company share   
3737 114 B 1   Disinvestment 
3840 99 D 18   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3886 101 D 17a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3887 101 D 17b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3978 104 D 2a   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
3979 104 D 2b   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
4085 108 D 9   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
 108 D 10   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
4087 108 D 12   Gratuitous acquisition of company share 
4104 109 D 6   Change of legal form of subsidiary 
4139 110 D 16   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
4145 111 B 9   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
4178 111 D 26   Retroactive approval of embargo-era investment 
4193 111 D 41a   Change of legal form of company share   
4193 111 D 42a   Change of legal form of company share   
4194 111 D 41b   Change of legal form of company share   
4194 111 D 42b   Change of legal form of company share   
4195 111 D 41c   Change of legal form of company share   
4195 111 D 42c   Change of legal form of company share   
4196 111 D 41d   Change of legal form of company share   
4196 111 D 42d   Change of legal form of company share   
4197 111 D 41e   Change of legal form of company share   
4197 111 D 42e   Change of legal form of company share   
4198 111 D 41f   Change of legal form of company share   
4198 111 D 42f   Change of legal form of company share   




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type of transaction - Reason for application 
4260 113 B 12   Change of legal form of company share   
4640 72 D 50f   Change of legal form of company share   
 
 
C.2. Applications excluded on a discretionary basis 
Applications are excluded on a discretionary basis if they do not represent serious foreign direct 
investment projects. There is verifiable evidence that at the time the investment commission 
rendered its final verdict on the application, the non-resident applicant did not - or did no longer - 
intend to commit her capital to a West-German asset on a long-term basis. Based on this definition, 
I distinguish three types of applications excluded on a discretionary basis: 
-  Bogus investment applications: Judging by the application papers, these are ostensibly 
serious investment projects. They are, however, in reality either meant to camouflage activities 
illegal under contemporary German law, or they involve a foreign applicant defrauding capital-
hungry domestic companies. While the reason for excluding applications falling under the second 
condition is straightforward, the first condition needs to be elaborated on further. I only exclude 
applications in conflict with German law, if there is evidence that the foreign applicant did not 
intend to invest capital in Germany on a long-term basis, or if any of the participants is clearly 
identified as a go-between for such activities in archival sources. Therefore, I do not exclude illegal 
activities if a long-term investment motive can nevertheless not be excluded. Transfer pricing, for 
example, was illegal under contemporary German law. Applying transfer pricing, however, does 
not necessarily exclude serious, long-term investment motives. Applications of such companies 
are therefore retained in the final data set, even though they involve illegal activities.  
- Redundant applications: Individual investment projects may be redundant for two reasons: 
Firstly, the application was withdrawn before the investment commission reached its final verdict. 
At the time of withdrawal, the non-resident applicant clearly no longer intended to purchase the 
West German assets under consideration. The investment project thus ceased to exist before it 
could potentially materialise following approval by the investment commission. Secondly, a 
permit was denied at some point in time by the commission, and the non-resident applicant 
subsequently filed another application to replace the denied first one. In such a case, I code the 
first, original application as redundant. Retaining it in the final sample would result in double-




Excluding the first, rather than the second application is motivated by the consideration that the 
investment project could eventually have materialized in case the second application had been 
approved, while the first application never had a chance of materializing in the first place. Even 
though a willingness to invest capital in Germany is observable since the time of filing the first 
application, the investor had the opportunity to adjust the project in between the denial of the first 
and the filing of the second application. This is true even if she chose not to make any adjustments 
in the end.  
In contrast to these two reasons, I do not exclude investment projects for which the applications 
were approved, yet which I know not to have materialized eventually. Such projects and the 
corresponding applications are economically redundant. Knowledge of their eventual redundancy 
is incidental, however, as the final realization of approved investment projects is not systematically 
observable in any case through the records of the investment commission. Note that this rationale 
is essentially different from the first reason cited above for coding applications as redundant. In 
the latter case, the respective applications never passed the administrative procedure established 
through the investment commission, which provides the observational window for the present 
study. In the former case, applications did gain commission approval. The resulting permits, 
however, were never utilized, which I am aware of only by chance. 
- Applications filed by actual or prospective immigrants: The concept of foreign investment 
is contingent on the ability to distinguish foreign from domestic investors. This distinction is 
blurred in case the foreign investor is a prospective immigrant to the destination country, or in case 
her identification as a foreign rather than a domestic individual is spurious. In the first case, the 
foreign investment is made with a view of turning it into domestic investment. In the second case, 
the supposed foreign investment actually is domestic. The definition of foreignness implied by 
contemporary exchange controls in general, and the records of the investment commission in 
particular, was based on residence, not nationality. Specifically, it was defined by residing 
permanently outside the territory in which the Deutschmark is legal tender (“Devisenausländer”). 
Thus, a German national could be a non-resident applicant, i.e. a foreign investor. Equally, foreign 
nationals could serve as resident, i.e. domestic, participants in a foreign investment project. 
Whether or not an individual staying in Germany was considered a domestic resident for the 
purposes of exchange control and taxation (“Deviseninländer-Eigenschaft”) was determined by 
the competent Land Central Bank upon individual application. Thus, actual immigrants could still 




C.2.1 Bogus investment applications 
I exclude three types of transactions which I term bogus or fraudulent investment applications. 
Please refer to Chapter One for details on the reason for their existence, as well as on how they 
worked in practice. 
- Type 1: Camouflaging capital flight or Sperrmark arbitrage. In such cases, the participants 
did not intend to invest capital in the German economy on a long-term basis. The aim of underlying 
financial transactions was rather to accumulate the profits from Sperrmark arbitrage outside of 
Germany. The domestic destination company is merely an accessory to unblocking Sperrmark. 
- Type 2: Repatriating German capital. In such cases, the domestic destination company did 
in fact receive the capital involved on a long-term basis. The supposedly foreign capital, however, 
was owned by the destination company itself through foreign straw men.  
- Type 3: Fraudulent foreign intermediaries. In this case, the domestic destination company 
was a bone fide applicant that was being defrauded by a foreign entity claiming to possess ready 
capital for investment in the capital-hungry destination company. The latter had typically paid a 
variety of fees and expenses to German accomplices of the foreign fraudster before contact was 
broken off permanently. 
 
Table C.2.1.1: List of bogus investment applications. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
140 8 --- 21 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 104. 
149 8 --- 34 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 93. 
163 9 --- 14 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 90. 
 11 --- 24   
165 9 --- 16 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 57. 
169 9 --- 20 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 613. 
 11 --- 13   
226 11 --- 11 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 66. 
 19 --- 28   
251 11 --- 42 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 480. 
261 12 --- 12 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 472. 
     BArch B126.1561, Blatt 396. 
270 12 --- 21 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 93. 
280 12 --- 32 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 90. 
326 14 --- 28a 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 99. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 606. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
330 14 --- 32 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 699. 
333 14 --- 35 2 BArch B102.6760, 56. Sitzung (24.10.1952), 
Liste W, Nr. 21, Stellungnahme des LWM.  14 --- 36  
376 76 D 18 2 BArch B102.6788, 94. Sitzung (7.5.1954), 
Liste W, Nr. 26, Begleitbericht der 
Oberfinanz-direktion Freiburg vom 
29.10.1953. 
384 21 1 18 1/2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 90. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 94. 
BArch B102.6757, 49. Sitzung (18.7.1952), 
Liste B, Nr. 27, Vertraulicher Anhang zum 
Devisenprüfungsbericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Düsseldorf vom 2.2.1955. 
BArch B102.1560, Blatt 36. 
 21 2 43  
 24 2 62  
 49 B 27  
393 16 --- 7 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 56. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 93. 
BArch B.102.6785, 91. Sitzung (19.3.1954), 
Liste W. Nr. 30, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
 17 --- 46  
 18 --- 5  
 29 2 32  
398 16 --- 12 2 BArch B102.6744, 16. Sitzung (20.4.1951), 
Nr. 12, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
413 22 1 13 1 BArch B102.6760, 57. Sitzung (7.11.1952), 
Liste W. Nr. 28, Stellungnahme der LZB.  22 1 14  
424 16 --- 44 1 BArch B102.6758, 51. Sitzung (15.8.1952), 
Liste W., Nr. 11, Bericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Stuttgart vom 11.8.1952. 
426 17 --- 1 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 655. 
430 17 --- 6 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 650. 
BArch B102.6735, 17. Sitzung (7.5.1951), 
Besprechungspunkte Nr. 6. 
BArch B102.6737, 69. Sitzung (8.5.1953), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste C, Nr. 5. 
452 19 -- 6 1/2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 100. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 449 ff.  
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 174 ff. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Mittwoch, 2. 
Oktober 1957, S. 16. „Worum geht es in dem 
bevorstehenden Phrix-Prozeß?“. 
BArch B102.6738, Vermerk zur 80. Sitzung 
(9.10.1953), Liste abgelehnter Anträge, Nr. 5. 
 22 1 30  
 22 2 52  
 32 2 2  
 80 D 44  
461 17 --- 44 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 515. 
Die Zeit, Nr. 43, 22. Oktober 1965, „Fini, die 
Sperrmark-Gräfin“. 
466 18 --- 4 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 35. 
 20 2 26  BArch B126.1560, Blatt 37. 





Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
468 18 --- 7 1 BArch B102.6757, 49. Sitzung (18.7.1952), 
Liste B, Nr. 27, Vertraulicher Anhang zum 
Devisenprüfungsbericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Düsseldorf vom 2.2.1955. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 36. 
486 18 --- 28 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 535. 
493 29 2 30 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 93. 
 34 B 5  BArch B126.1560, Blatt 605. 
 33 C 12   
 36 C 40   
 36 D 10   
 90 B 13   
498 18 --- 46 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 508. 
 26 2 58   
 35 C 29   
506 19 -- 1 1 BArch B102.6737, 52. Sitzung (29.8.1952), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste D, Nr. 21.  28 1 20  
 52 D 21  
508 19 --- 7 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 99. 
509 19 --- 9 1 BArch B102.6745, 19. Sitzung (8.6.1951),  
Nr. 9, Vermerk Bundesfinanzministerium  
(Dr. Heinrichs) vom 13.12.1951. 
 19 --- 21  
527 19 --- 29 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 727. 
528 19 --- 30 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 737. 
550 19 --- 58 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 100. 
 22 2 62   
563 26 2 44 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 98. 
575 20 1 21 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 5. 
576 20 2 1 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 654. 
BArch B102.6761, 58. Sitzung (21.11.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 5, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
595 20 2 29 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 585. 
634 21 2 45 1 B126.1560, Blatt 558. 
 32 1 14   
666 28 1 22 1 B126.1560, Blatt 102. 
686 22 2 60 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 212. 
Der Spiegel, Nr. 39, 24. September 1952, 
„…setzte auf Deutschland“. 
 44 D 28  
 45 D 7  
725 23 2 43 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 103. 
 50 C 1   
 53 B 8   
 55 B 14   
 76 D 7   
734 23 2 54 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 512. 
735 23 2 55 1 BArch B102.6736, 46. Sitzung (6.6.1952), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste C, Nr. 16. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 66. 
 39 D 15  




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
735 50 B 24 1 See above. 
 110 B 8  
736 23 2 56 2 BArch B102.6736, Vermerk zur 34. Sitzung 
(7.12.1951), Seite 2 der Anlage, Liste II Nr. 8. 
754 23 2 78 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 57. 
757 24 1 3 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 91. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 97.  24 1 4  
 45 B 8  
776 24 1 26 1 BArch 102.6767, 70. Sitzung (22.5.1953), 
Liste B, Nr. 2, Stellungnahme der LZB.  24 1 27 1 
787 24 2 42 1/2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 94. 
 52 B 3   
803 24 2 64 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 96. 
804 24 2 65 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 99. 
827 24 2 92 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 350. 
Die Zeit, Nr. 50, 11. Dezember 1952, 
„Unternehmungen“. 
841 26 1 10 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 193. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 316 ff. 
 
 26 2 61  
 30 1 15  
 32 1 21  
 55 A 2  
 70 B 16  
 77 D 36  
 84 D 6  
854 26 2 24 1 BArch B102.6747, 26. Sitzung (31.8.1951), 
Liste 2, Nr. 24, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
869 26 2 42 1 BArch B102.6747, 26. Sitzung (31.8.1951), 
Liste 2, Nr. 45, Ermittlungsbericht der 
Oberfinanzdirektion Stuttgart vom 9.5.1952. 
BArch B.102.6785, 91. Sitzung (19.3.1954), 
Liste W. Nr. 30, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
 26 2 45  
 28 2 64  
 37 D 10  
 39 B 5  
 40 B 6  
872 26 2 46 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 66. 
874 48 B 40 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 105. 
 48 B 41   
909 28 2 39 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 87. 
931 28 2 67 1/2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 739. 
BArch B102.6767, 71. Sitzung (5.6.1953), 
Liste W.II, Nr. 19, Prüfungs- und Begleit-
bericht der Oberfinanzdirektion Nürnberg vom 
21.5.1953. 
 49 B 15  
 49 D 18  
 68 A 8  
945 29 1 7 1 BArch B102.1561, Blatt 512. 
953 29 1 17 1 BArch B102.6753, 43. Sitzung (25.4.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 23, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
964 29 2 33 2 BArch B102.6747, 29. Sitzung (28.9.1951), 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
979 30 1 8 1 BArch B102.6785, 91. Sitzung (19.3.1954), 
Liste W. Nr. 30, Stellungnahme der LZB.  43 D 23  
986 39 C 15 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 648. 
1006 30 2 46 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 545. 
 48 D 34   
 56 A 2   
1011 30 2 51 2 Gemeinde Ruggell (2012). Nordwind – 
Information der Gemeinde Ruggell Nr. 138, 
Dezember 2012, S. 18-19. 
 36 C 38  
 48 D 31  
 69 D 23  
1027 30 2 72 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 727. 
 63 D 13   
1064 31 2 20 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 99. 
 31 2 21  BArch B126.1561, Blatt 623. 
 40 C 2   
 40 C 3   
1071 31 2 14 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 56. 
 34 C 12   
1073 32 1 1 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 514. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 542. 
BArch B.102.6785, 91. Sitzung (19.3.1954), 
Liste W. Nr. 30, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
 38 B 10  
 43 D 22  
 46 B 7  
1118 32 D 5 1/3 BArch B102.6748, 32. Sitzung (9.11.1951), 
Liste D, Nr. 5, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
BArch B102.6736, 49. Sitzung (18.7.1952), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste D, Nr. 5. 
BArch B102.6760, 55. Sitzung (10.10.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 10, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
BArch B102.6764, 64. Sitzung (20.2.1953), 
Liste B, Nr. 15, Stellungnahme der LZB.  
BArch B102.6738, 70. Sitzung (22.5.1953), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste W, Nr. 43. 
 40 B 9  
 49 D 5  
 51 B 7  
 55 D 10  
 55 D 11  
 64 B 15  
 67 B 7  
1122 32 D 10 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 100. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 449 ff.  
1133 48 D 28 1 Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 48/1955 vom 
23.11.1955, S.21 „Ich verstehe schlecht“. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Samstag, 15. 
März 1958, S. 17 „Sparkasse Kempten auf der 
Anklagebank“. 
1166 33 D 7 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 66. 
 39 D 12   
1171 33 D 12 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 172. 
1172 33 D 13 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 94. 
1176 33 D 17 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 451. 
1187 34 A 11 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 727-728. 
1189 34 A 14 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 535. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
1228 35 A 14 2 Bonhage B. (2001). Schweizerische Boden-
kreditanstalt, Chronos Verlag, p. 75ff. 
1244 35 C 7 1 Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 48/1955 vom 
23.11.1955, S.21 „Ich verstehe schlecht“. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Samstag, 15. 
März 1958, S. 17 „Sparkasse Kempten auf der 
Anklagebank“. 
1248 35 C 14 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 556. 
 82 C 3   
1299 36 B 5 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 212. 
BArch B102.6765, 66. Sitzung (20.3.1953), 
Liste B, Nr. 10, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
 37 D 8  
 66 B 10  
1343 36 D 15 1 BArch B102.6736, Vermerk zur 37. Sitzung 
(25.1.1952), Seite 1 der Anlage, Liste I Nr. 7. 
1344 36 D 16 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 585. 
1366 37 B 4 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 93. 
1377 37 C 9 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 172. 
1398 38 A 5 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 57. 
 38 A 6  BArch B126.1560, Blatt 51. 
1401 38 A 9 1 BArch B102.6760, 57. Sitzung (7.11.1952), 
Liste W. Nr. 28, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
1436 38 D 9 1 BArch B102.6753, 43. Sitzung (25.4.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 11, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
BArch B102.6747, 26. Sitzung (31.8.1951), 
Liste 2, Nr. 45, Ermittlungsbericht der 
Oberfinanzdirektion Stuttgart vom 9.5.1952. 
BArch B102.6751, 38. Sitzung (8.2.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 9, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
 42 D 10  
 43 D 11  
 44 D 13  
1437 38 D 10 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 559. 
1453 39 A 13 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 546. 
 77 B 3   
1474 39 C 18 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 91. 
1488 39 D 16 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 541. 
 45 C 5   
 52 B 18   
1497 40 A 10 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 172. 
1541 40 D 26 1 Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 48/1955 vom 
23.11.1955, S.21 „Ich verstehe schlecht“. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Samstag, 15. 
März 1958, S. 17 „Sparkasse Kempten auf der 
Anklagebank“. 
1622 56 B 1 1 BArch B102.6760, 57. Sitzung (7.11.1952), 
Liste W. Nr. 28, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
1690 44 D 1a 1/2 BArch B102.6754, 44. Sitzung (9.5.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 1, Ermittlungsbericht der 
Oberfinanzdirektion Köln vom 14.7.1952. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 96. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
1691 44 D 1b 1/2 BArch B102.6754, 44. Sitzung (9.5.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 1, Ermittlungsbericht der 
Oberfinanzdirektion Köln vom 14.7.1952. 
1706 44 D 23 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 236. 
1708 44 D 25 2 Pont (2010), p. 14. 
1720 45 B 13 2 National Archives of the United States, Federal 
Register, Volume 19, No. 80, Saturday, April 
24, 1954, p.  2433. 
1723 45 B 17 2 BArch B102.6754, 45. Sitzung (23.5.1952), 
Liste B, Nr. 17, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
1741 45 D 23 1 BArch B102/6762, 59. Sitzung (5.12.1952), 
Liste D Nr. 6, Stellungnahme der Oberfinanz-
direktion Nürnberg vom 9.10.1952. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 66. 
 59 D 6  
 59 D 7  
1801 47 B 11 1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dienstag, 4. 
November 1952, S. 4: „Jeder konnte 
Millionenbeträge aus der Kasse nehmen“. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Donnerstag, 
13. November 1952, S. 4: „Marrien: Zehn 
Millionen Mark illegal ins Ausland gebracht“.  
1858 48 B 30 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 58. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 97. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 200. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 472. 
BArch B102.6769, 73. Sitzung (3.7.1953), 
Liste W, Nr.48, Stellungnahme der LZB.  
 48 D 17  
 50 D 14  
 50 D 15  
 52 D 12  
 53 D 18  
 56 D 11  
 67 D 22  
1907 49 B 8 3 BArch B102.6757, 49. Sitzung (18.7.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 27, Ermittlungsbericht der 
Oberfinanzdirektion München vom 10.6.1953. 
 49 D 27  
 51 D 15  
1937 49 D 20 1 BArch B102.6764, 65. Sitzung (6.3.1953), 
Liste B, Nr. 14, Bericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Hamburg vom 5.12.1952. 
 65 B 14  
1971 50 B 23 1 BArch B102.6737, Vermerk zur 51. Sitzung 
(15.8.1952), Liste abgelehnter Anträge, Nr. 8. 













1 BArch B102.6758, 51. Sitzung (15.8.1952), 
Liste W, Nr. 15, Fernschreiben Bauditz an 
Bundesfinanzministerium vom 23.9.1953. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 99. 




2031 51 B 8 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 92. 
2079 52 D 7 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 194. 
 72 D 1  BArch B126.1560, Blatt 170. 
 86 B 1   




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
2170 54 D 21 2 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 101. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 720. 
2175 54 D 29 2 BArch B102.6760, 56. Sitzung (24.10.1952), 
Liste W, Nr. 21, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
2176 54 D 30 2 BArch B102.6760, 56. Sitzung (24.10.1952), 
Liste W, Nr. 21, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
2177 54 D 31 3 BArch B102.57662, all documents following 
Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg 
an Bundeswirtschaftsministerium Hauptabt. V 
betr. Ausländische Kapitalinvestitionen im 
Bundesgebiet, 16.10.1952. 
 
BArch B102.6737, Vermerk zur 58. Sitzung 
(21.11.1952), S. 3. 
 
BArch B102.6762, 61. Sitzung (9.1.1953), 
Liste B, Nr. 6, Bericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Bremen vom 12.12.1952. 
 55 D 12  
 55 D 13  
 56 D 9  
 57 B 1  
 57 B 2  
 57 B 3  
 57 D 17  
 58 B 16  
 58 D 36  
 58 D 37  
 58 D 38  
 59 B 1  
 59 B 2  
 62 B 3  
 63 D 10  
 64 B 13  
 64 D 19  
 70 D 1  
 83 D 31  
2293 58 B 21 2 Pont (2010), p. 14.  
2301 58 D 5 1/2 BArch B102.6761, 58. Sitzung (21.11.1952), 
Liste D, Nr. 5, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 654. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 10. 
2319 61 B 8 1 Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 48/1955 vom 
23.11.1955, S.21 „Ich verstehe schlecht“. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Samstag, 15. 
März 1958, S. 17 „Sparkasse Kempten auf der 
Anklagebank“. 
2400 61 B 6 3 BArch B102.6738, Vermerk zur 76. Sitzung 
(14.8.1953), p. 3. 
 
BArch B102.6737, 61. Sitzung (9.1.1953), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste B, Nr. 6. 
 
BArch B102.6762, 61. Sitzung (9.1.1953), 
Liste B, Nr. 6, Bericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Bremen vom 15.1.1953. 
 67 C 8  
 71 D 8  
 71 D 9  
 72 D 21  
 72 D 49  
 73 D 33  
 74 B 2  
 74 B 3  
 75 D 5  




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
2424 61 D 18 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 184. 
2429 61 D 26 2 BArch B102.6766, 69. Sitzung (8.5.1953), 
Liste W.III, Nr. 28, Ermittlungsbericht der 
Oberfinanzdirektion Hannover vom 7.3.1953. 
2445 62 D 17 2 BArch B102.6763, 62. Sitzung (23.1.1953), 
Liste D, Nr. 17, Stellungnahme des AHK. 
2474 63 B 14 1 BArch B102.6737, Vermerk zur 63. Sitzung 
(6.2.1953), Liste abgelehnter Anträge, Nr. 2. 
2510 64 D 10 1 BArch B102.6764, 64. Sitzung (20.2.1953), 
Liste D, Nr. 10, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
2566 66 B 14 2 BArch B102.6799. 108. Sitzung (19.11.1954), 
Liste B, Nr. 2, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
 
 72 D 55  
 85 B 1  
 85 B 2  
2608 66 D 35 2 BArch B102.6765, 66. Sitzung (20.3.1953), 
Liste D, Nr. 35, Stellungnahme der LZB. 2609 66 D 36 2 
2610 66 D 37 2 
2666 77 B 1 2 BArch B102.6799. 108. Sitzung (19.11.1954), 
Liste B, Nr. 2, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
Ibidem, Brief Gardinenweberei Otto Riedel an 
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium vom 21.9.1954. 
 108 B 2  
2724 69 C 5 1 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 650. 
 103 D 9   
2837 72 D 48 2 BArch B102.6768, 72. Sitzung (19.6.1953), 
Liste D, Nr. 48, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
2963 76 A 2 2 BArch B102.6773, 80. Sitzung (9.10.1953), 
Liste W, Nr. 38, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
2965 76 B 4 2 BArch B102.6780, 87. Sitzung (22.1.1954), 
Liste W, Nr. 25, Bericht der Oberfinanz-
direktion Freiburg vom 19.1.1954. 
3001 77 B 4 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 546. 
 96 D 22   
3179 81 D 28 1 BArch B102.6738, 81. Sitzung (23.10.1953), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste D, Nr. 28. 
Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 40/1950 vom 4.10.1950, 
S. 6. „Das Geld ist weg“. 
 81 D 29  
3235 83 B 4 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 190. 
 83 B 5   
3420 87 B 10 1 BArch B.102.6785, 91. Sitzung (19.3.1954), 
Liste W. Nr. 30, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
3664 94 B 12 1 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 190. 
BArch B126.1560, Blatt 237. 
3752 97 B 5 2 Pont (2010), p. 14. 
3790 98 B 10 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 585. 
 98 B 11  




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Type Reference for exclusion decision 
4038 107 B 5a 2 BArch B102.6739, 107. Sitzung (5.11.1954), 
Besprechungspunkte Liste B, Nr. 5.  
BArch B126.1561, Blatt 212. 
4039 107 B 5b 2 
4089 108 B 101a 2 Schulz, Werner, "Heinkel, Ernst" in: Neue 
Deutsche Biographie 8 (1969), S. 305-306 
[Online-Version]; URL: https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/pnd11854814X.html#ndbcontent 
4090 108 B 101b 2 
4233 112 D 5 2 BArch B102.6801, 112. Sitzung (28.1.1955), 
Liste D, Nr. 5, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
4457 118 B 9 2 BArch B102.6807, 118. Sitzung (29.4.1955), 
Liste B, Nr. 9, Stellungnahme der LZB. 
Uhlig et al. (2001). Tarnung, Transfer, Transit, 
S. 413ff. 
4584 14 --- 28b 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 606. 
4585 14 --- 28c 2 BArch B126.1561, Blatt 606. 
 40 D 20   
 40 D 22   
 77 B 2a   
 
Table C.2.1.2 – Targets for fraudulent foreign intermediaries (Type 3): Advertisements by 
German companies in Swiss newspaper, looking for investors.  
 




C.2.2 Redundant applications 
Table C.2.2 – Redundant applications. 
Inv.-ID 
Redundant 
application Reason for redundancy 
Subsequent, refiled 
applications 
Meeting List Case Meeting List Case 
5 2 --- 6  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled  16 --- 41 
57 5 --- 4  Approved, adjusted and refiled 14 --- 8 
 52 D 20  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
72 5 --- 19  Actual double-counting 7 --- 15 
116 7 --- 14  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 13 --- 24 
132 8 --- 11  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 70 B 9 
141 52 D 11  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
159 9 --- 10  Approved, adjusted and refiled 20 2 17 
171 9 --- 23  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
172 9 --- 24  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
206 15 --- 50  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 22 1 6 
     22 1 24 
     22 1 25 
226 11 --- 11  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 19 --- 28 
233 11 --- 21  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 14 --- 43 
234 11 --- 22  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 30 1 3 
281 13 --- 1  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 14 --- 41 
332 14 --- 34  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 24 2 68 
334 14 --- 37  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
337 14 --- 40  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 16 --- 6 
349 46 C 36  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 49 D 24 
     49 D 25 
354 15 --- 10  Approved, adjusted and refiled 72 D 13 
356 15 --- 12  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 19 --- 4 
374 17 --- 41  Actual double-counting 15 --- 35 
440 17 --- 19  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 72 D 56 
447 17 --- 28  Approved, adjusted and refiled 19 --- 63 
451 17 --- 32  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 28 2 63 
488 18 --- 30  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
634 21 2 45  Approved, adjusted and refiled 34 B 5 
652 42 D 11  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
663 22 1 31  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
780 24 2 33  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 55 D 25 
781 36 D 13  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 40 D 24 
     40 D 25 
788 24 2 43  Approved, adjusted and refiled 37 C 5 






application Reason for redundancy 
Subsequent, refiled 
applications 
Meeting List Case Meeting List Case 
837 69 D 3  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
862 26 2 33  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
922 28 2 53  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
945 29 1 7  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
990 62 D 16  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
1014 30 2 56  Withdrawn, and later refiled 54 C 9 
1074 32 1 2  Approved, adjusted and refiled 44 D 27 
1119 32 D 6  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 44 B 12 
1140 33 B 4  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 36 C 6 
1217 34 D 16  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
1285 36 A 3  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 43 D 5 
1316 40 D 36  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 46 C 38 
1333 36 D 1  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
 36 D 2  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
1347 36 D 19  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 45 B 12 
 45 B 12  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
1480 39 D 5  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 82 D 30 
1554 55 D 7  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
1679 44 B 1  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
1698 44 D 8  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 52 D 29 
1758 46 B 13  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 51 D 24 
1782 53 D 12b  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 
62 D 21 
 53 D 13b  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 
1800 57 B 8  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 86 Dev. 53 
1858 56 D 11  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 67 D 22 
1862 48 B 38  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 62 B 2 
1928 49 D 3  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 82 D 4 
1989 50 C 3  Withdrawn, and later refiled 69 A 4 
1994 50 D 2  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
2018 50 D 33  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 56 D 21 
2077 52 D 2  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 
73 D 17 
 52 D 3  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 
2113 53 D 12a  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 
62 D 22 
 53 D 13a  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 
2159 54 D 6  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
2174 54 D 28  Withdrawn, and later refiled 73 D 5 
2177 54 D 31  Approved, adjusted and refiled 61 B 6 
 64 B 13  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 70 D 1 
2469 63 B 7  Approved, adjusted and refiled 101 Dev. 113 
2475 63 B 15  Approved, adjusted and refiled 81 D 1-2 






application Reason for redundancy 
Subsequent, refiled 
applications 
Meeting List Case Meeting List Case 
2599 66 D 26  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
2600 66 D 27  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
2664 68 B 2  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
 68 B 3  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
2699 68 D 29  Approved, adjusted and refiled 81 B 8 
2731 69 D 4a  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 82 B 9a 
2732 69 D 4b  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 82 B 9b 





74 D 10-11  Approved, adjusted and refiled 83 D 22b 
2909 74 D 12  Approved, adjusted and refiled 83 D 22c 
2910 74 D 13  Approved, adjusted and refiled 83 D 22d 
2947 75 B 22  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 89 D 8 
2948 75 B 23  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 89 D 9 
2968 76 B 7  Approved, adjusted and refiled 88 D 19 
2992 76 D 21  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 99 B 9 
3015 77 D 4  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3029 77 D 27  Withdrawn, adjusted and refiled 82 B 13 
3059 78 D 14  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3092 80 B 3  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 92 B 1 
3144 80 D 34  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3149 81 B 3  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3306 84 D 20a  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 113 B 7a 
3307 84 D 20b  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 113 B 7b 
3384 86 D 5a  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 110 D 13a 
3385 86 D 5b  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 110 D 13b 
3397 86 D 19  Approved, adjusted and refiled 107 D 16 
3464 89 B 10  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3507 90 B 11  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3521 90 D 3  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
 90 D 4  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3580 91 D 45  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
3597 92 B 3  Withdrawn, adjusted and refiled 106 Dev. 101 
3616 92 D 18  Approved, adjusted and refiled 100 Dev. 111 
3780 97 Dev. 103  Withdrawn, adjusted and refiled 104 Dev. 103 
 97 Dev. 104  Withdrawn, adjusted and refiled 104 Dev. 104 
3968 103 Dev. 110  Withdrawn, adjusted and refiled 109 D 10 
4004 105 D 6  Dismissed, (adjusted) and refiled 113 B 8 
4163 111 D 13  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
4223 112 B 12  Withdrawn --- --- --- 
 112 B 13  Withdrawn --- --- --- 




C.2.3 Applications filed by actual or prospective immigrants 
Table C.2.3 – Applications filed by actual or prospective immigrants. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Immigrant status (at time of commission decision) 
101 6 --- 24  Iranian national, living in Hamburg. 
 8 --- 29  
 20 2 9  
111 7 --- 9  Iranian national, living in Hamburg. 
 19 --- 59  
112 7 --- 10  US national, living in Munich. 
133 8 --- 12  French national, living in Baden-Baden. 
 18 --- 23  
162 9 --- 13  Swiss resident, planning to move to Germany. 
170 9 --- 21  German emigrant, had already returned to Germany by  
 1953.  33 C 14 
 78 B 9 
288 13 --- 9  Iranian national, living in Hamburg. 
293 13 --- 16  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
327 14 --- 29  German emigrant, had already returned in 1949.  
 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Eichberg 
 last accessed on January 19, 2019, 6.38pm. 
388 16 --- 1  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
492 18 --- 38  Had become Deviseninländer by October 1951 
 BArch B102.6736, 30. Sitzung (12.10.1951),   
 Vermerk p. 2. 
 18 --- 39 















 Already lived in Bremen and had applied for becoming  
 Deviseninländer in November 1951. 
 BArch B102.6753, 43. Sitzung (25.4.1952), Liste D,  
 Nr. 6, Ermittlungsbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion  




587 20 2 16  German emigrant, had already returned to Germany. 
606 21 1 7  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
 24 2 41  
883 28 1 1  Dutch national, planning to move to Duisburg. 
1135 33 A 12  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
1320 36 C 33  German refugee planning to immigrate to West Germany. 
1524 40 C 15  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
 91 D 5  
1616 42 D 3a  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
 46 C 27a 
 54 C 2 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Immigrant status (at time of commission decision) 
1703 44 D 16  Iranian national, living in Hamburg. 
 51 B 3  
1737 45 D 17  German emigrant, had returned to Germany in June 1952. 
1800 47 B 10  US national, living in Starnberg, married to German  
 national.  57 B 8 
 86 Dev. 53 
1866 48 C 1  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany 
 55 B 6  
1925 49 D 1  German emigrant, “currently in Munich”, husband had  
 lived there since 1947. 
1978 50 B 31  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
1979 50 B 32  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
2054 52 B 6  Swiss national, living in Tuttlingen since May 1952,  







 German emigrant, had returned to Germany by 1952. 
 Wümme-Zeitung, Dienstag, 13. Dezember 2011, “Ein  
 Pfarrwitwenhaus als Kunst-Insel”. 
 Stadt Staufen (2004), Staufen Kulturwoche 2004, p.15. 
2142 54 B 12  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
2282 58 B 10a  Resident of Austria, in fact already living in Germany.  
2283 58 B 10b  Resident of Austria, in fact already living in Germany. 
2300 58 D 4  German emigrant, had already returned to Germany. 
2387 60 D 31  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
 71 B 17  
2627 67 C 9  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
2634 67 D 1  German emigrant, had returned to Germany by 1954. 
 92 B 7  
 94 D 15  
2765 71 B 1  German emigrant, had returned to Germany by 1949. 
 Möller H. (2003).  
2824 72 D 27  German emigrant, returned to Germany in January 1954. 
 BArch B102.6768, 72. Sitzung (19.6.1953), Liste D,  
 Nr. 27, Ermittlungsbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion  
 Koblenz vom 15.6.1954. 
2828 72 D 32  Resident of Iraq, not living there since 1952, planning to  
 become Deviseninländer. 
2974 76 B 15  German emigrant, returned to Germany immediately after  
 approval of application in June 1953. 
 BArch B102.6771, 76. Sitzung (14.8.1953), Liste B,  
 Nr. 15, Ermittlungsbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion Ulm  
 vom 23.9.1954. 
3110 80 B 18  German emigrant, returned to Germany in April 1953. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Immigrant status (at time of commission decision) 
3267 83 D 20  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3286 84 C 7a  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3287 84 C 7b  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3288 84 C 7c  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3369 86 B 3  German emigrant, returned to Germany, had just become  
 Deviseninländer. 
3439 88 Dev. 104  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3522 90 D 6a  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3523 90 D 6b  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3598 92 B 5  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3712 95 Dev. 108  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3817 98 Dev. 106  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3883 101 D 14  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
3950 103 D 15  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
4016 105 Dev. 107a  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
4017 105 Dev. 107b  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
4018 105 Dev. 107c  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
4021 106 B 3a  Already lived in Nuremberg, planning to apply for  
 becoming Deviseninländer. 
4076 108 B 8  Spanish national, already living in Frankfurt am Main. 
4126 110 B 9  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
4337 115 D 10a  US national, already living in Munich. 
4338 115 D 10b  US national, already living in Munich. 
4414 117 D 7  US national, already living in Kaiserslautern. 
4435 118 A 11  US national, already living in Frankfurt am Main. 
4487 119 B 10  German emigrant, planning to return to Germany. 
4570 122 A 5  Ethnic German refugee from Romania, planning to  












Appendix D – German emigrants 
I identify investors of German origin by two methods: Either the commission records themselves 
contain sufficient information to the effect that I am able to plausibly assume the investor under 
consideration to be of German origin; or I am able to verify through other sources that the investor 
has been a German citizen at some point in time. 
To determine the national origins of investors under the circumstances of the early 1950s imposes 
a number of non-trivial coding choices. The objective of the “German emigrant (origin)” indicator 
variable is to identify “Auslandsdeutsche”, i.e. the group of individuals who came from Germany 
or had at some point been German nationals, but lived permanently abroad during the first half of 
the 1950s. On the background of such research objective, I identify investors with a stated location 
in the Saarland as exclusively French, and do not assign “Germanness” to them. The same is true 
for investors located in formerly German regions of Belgium (Eupen and Malmedy). Investors 
living in those areas never left Germany, but Germany rather left them, so to speak. The Saarland 
joined the Federal Republic in 1957, making the identity of its investors even more ambiguous. 
Moreover, Austria had been integrated into Germany between 1938 and 1945. Assigning 
“Germanness” to the inhabitants of the Saarland could justify doing the same to all Austrian 
investors, introducing collinearity into the data and rendering the indicator variable meaningless. 
It is therefore important to note that the variable necessarily indicates only a lower bound for the 
group of investors of German origin. 
D.1. German emigrants identifiable through the commission records 
The records of the investment commission indicate the German origin of a non-resident investor 
principally in three ways: Firstly, the investor is directly reported to be a German national, or to 
have emigrated at some point in time from Germany. Secondly, the application under 
consideration involves the investment of restituted funds. This could take the form of spending the 
balance of a designated restitution account with a German bank. It could also involve reinvesting 
the sale proceeds of previously restituted property. Thirdly, the non-resident investor herself is the 
restituted owner of the German destination company. Using restitution as an identifier for the 
German origin of the investor is a matter of plausibility, as I cannot systematically exclude the 
possibility that Jewish citizens of other countries with property inside Germany were expropriated 




However, I expect the fraction of thus wrongfully identified investors to be very low, especially 
with restituted owners of German destination companies. Otherwise, there is a small number of 
cases in which the information provided in the records makes it extremely likely that the investor 
under consideration is of German origin, even if this is not explicitly stated. For example, the 
investor and the owner of the destination company can hardly have been in the War together 
(“Kriegskameraden”) if the investors had not served as a German in the German army. 
Table D.1.1 – German emigrants identifiable through the commission records. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
2 2 --- 3  Company owned by German emigrants   
   10 --- 32 
7 2 --- 8  Investment from restitution account 
16 2 --- 18  Investment from restitution account 
26 3 --- 13  Investment from restitution account 
28 3 --- 16  Investment from restitution account 
     
54 5 --- 1  German emigrant 
 46 B 11  
 53 B 9  
 72 D 22  
 87 D 2  
66 5 --- 13  German emigrant 
  13 --- 13 
 67 C 5 
68 5 --- 15  Investment of the sale proceeds of a  
 restituted plot of land. 
72 5 --- 19  Investment from restitution account 
 7 --- 15  
76 5 --- 25a  Investment from restitution account 
77 5 --- 25b  Investment from restitution account 
81 6 --- 3  Investment from restitution account 
87 6 --- 11  Investment from restitution account 
94 6 --- 17  Investment from restitution account 
95 6 --- 18  Investment from restitution account 
 52 B 16  
96 6 --- 19  Investment from restitution account 
104 7 --- 2  Investment from restitution account 
107 7 --- 5  German emigrant 
 64 C 7 
127 8 --- 6  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
138 8 --- 19  Investment from restitution account 
141 8 --- 23  German emigrant, restituted owner of investment  
 destination.  39 A 9 
 52 D 11 
143 8 --- 25  Investment of the sale proceeds of a  
 restituted plot of land. 
145 8 --- 27  Director of Elektrizitäts-AG, vorm. W. Lahmeyer,  
 until 1935, currently member of supervisory board. 
147 8 --- 30  Investment from restitution account 
148 8 --- 32  Investment from restitution account 
149 8 --- 34  Investment from restitution account 
163 9 --- 14  Investment from restitution account 
 11 --- 24  
165 9 --- 16  Investment from restitution account 
167 9 --- 18  Investment from restitution account 
169 9 --- 20  Investment from restitution account 
 11 --- 13  
170 9 --- 21  German emigrant, has already returned to Germany  
 by 1953.  33 C 14 
 78 B 9 
171 9 --- 23  German emigrant 
172 9 --- 24  German emigrant 
177 9 --- 29  Investment from restitution account 
 17 --- 42  Investment from restitution account 
178 9 --- 30  Investment from restitution account 
180 9 --- 33  Investment from restitution account 
189 10 --- 5  Investment from restitution account 
190 10 --- 6  German emigrant 
203 10 --- 19  Investment from restitution account 
205 10 --- 22  Investment from restitution account 
212 10 --- 31  Investment from restitution account 
213 10 --- 33  Investment from restitution account 
214 10 --- 34  Investment from restitution account 
215 10 --- 35  Investment from restitution account 
216 11 --- 1  Investment from restitution account 
219 11 --- 4  Investment from restitution account 
 13 --- 5  
 29 1 4b  
 65 D 30b  
 65 D 31  
 96 D 17b  
220 11 --- 5  Investment from restitution account 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
220 13 --- 11  Investment from restitution account 
226 11 --- 11  Investment from restitution account 
 19 --- 28  
235 11 --- 23  Investment from restitution account 
239 11 --- 28  German merchant from Darmstadt. 
 23 2 63  
241 11 --- 30  German emigrant 
 20 2 19  
245 11 --- 36  Investment from restitution account 
246 11 --- 37  Investment from restitution account 
247 11 --- 38  Investment from restitution account 
248 11 --- 39  Investment from restitution account 
 59 D 11  
 77 C 1  
 98 D 8  
249 11 --- 40  Investment from restitution account 
250 11 --- 41  Investment from restitution account 
251 11 --- 42  Investment from restitution account 
253 12 --- 4  Investment from restitution account 
254 12 --- 5  Investment from restitution account 
 15 --- 16  
256 12 --- 7a  Investment from restitution account 
257 12 --- 8  Investment from restitution account 
258 12 --- 9  Investment from restitution account 
261 12 --- 12  Investment from restitution account 
262 12 --- 13  Investment from restitution account 
263 12 --- 14  German emigrant 
269 12 --- 20  Investment of the sale proceeds of a  
 restituted plot of land. 
270 12 --- 21  Investment from restitution account 
272 12 --- 24  Investment from restitution account 
273 12 --- 25  Investment from restitution account 
274 12 --- 26  Investment from restitution account 
275 12 --- 27  Investment from restitution account 
276 12 --- 28  Investment from restitution account 
280 12 --- 32  Investment from restitution account 
282 13 --- 2  German emigrant 
 13 --- 12  
289 13 --- 10  Investment from restitution account 
292 13 --- 15  Investment from restitution account 
293 13 --- 16  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
299 13 --- 23  Investment from restitution account 
310 14 --- 7  Investment from restitution account 
313 14 --- 14  Investment from restitution account 
316 14 --- 17  Investment from restitution account 
317 14 --- 18  Investment from restitution account 
 23 2 65  
320 14 --- 21  Investment from restitution account 
321 14 --- 22  Investment from restitution account 
323 14 --- 24  Investment from restitution account 
326 14 --- 28a  Investment from restitution account 
329 14 --- 31  Investment from restitution account 
330 14 --- 32  Investment from restitution account 
331 14 --- 33  Investment from restitution account 
 21 2 42  
332 14 --- 34  Investment from restitution account 
335 14 --- 38  Investment from restitution account 







 Company is owned by company under German    
 ownership (Inv.-ID 1782) 
348 15 --- 4  German emigrant 
350 15 --- 6  Investment from restitution account 
358 15 --- 15  Investment from restitution account 
361 15 --- 19  Investment from restitution account 
 17 --- 25  
362 15 --- 20  Investment from restitution account 
363 15 --- 21  Investment from restitution account 
364 15 --- 22  Investment from restitution account 
372 15 --- 32  Investment from restitution account 
 44 D 5  
 61 D 7  
 97 B 11  
385 15 --- 51  Investment from restitution account 
388 16 --- 1  German emigrant 
399 16 --- 13  Investment from restitution account 
 16 --- 15  
 57 B 16  
400 16 --- 14  Investment from restitution account 
406 16 --- 21  Investment from restitution account 
423 16 --- 43  Investment from restitution account 
424 16 --- 44  Investment from restitution account 
428 17 --- 3  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
446 17 --- 26  Investment from restitution account 
448 17 --- 29  Investment from restitution account 
457 17 --- 38  Investment from restitution account 
472 18 --- 11  German emigrant 
 33 B 3  
 42 B 14  
483 18 --- 25  Investment from restitution account 
484 18 --- 26  Investment from restitution account 
485 18 --- 27  Investment from restitution account 
486 18 --- 28  Investment from restitution account 
521 19 --- 22  Investment from restitution account 
525 19 --- 26  German emigrant 
 70 C 1  
527 19 --- 29  Investment from restitution account 
528 19 --- 30  Investment from restitution account 
530 19 --- 33  Investment of the sale proceeds of a restituted  
 plot of land. 
554 19 --- 64  Investment from restitution account 
555 19 --- 65  Investment from restitution account 
556 19 --- 66  Investment from restitution account 
572 20 1 18  Investment from restitution account 
573 20 1 19  Investment from restitution account 
 54 D 3  
587 20 2 16  German emigrant 
603 21 1 3  German emigrant 
 21 1 4  
606 21 1 7  German emigrant 
 24 2 41  
676 22 2 46  German emigrant 
685 22 2 59  Investment from restitution account 
716 23 1 34  Investment from restitution account 
757 24 1 3  German emigrant 
 24 1 4  
 45 B 8  
760 24 1 6  German emigrant, restituted owner of investment  
 destination. 
766 24 1 14  German emigrant 
 24 2 82  
819 24 2 83  German emigrant 
862 26 2 33  Investment from restitution account 
 61 C 6  




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
887 28 1 9  German emigrant 
 93 D 4  
893 28 1 18  German emigrant 
 85 B 22  
898 28 1 26  German emigrant 
 65 D 20  
903 28 1 32  Investment from restitution account 
919 28 2 50  Investment from restitution account 
921 28 2 52  Investment from restitution account 
923 28 2 54  German emigrant 
 28 2 55  
925 28 2 59  German emigrant 
970 29 2 39  Restituted owner of destination company 
 37 D 7  
972 29 2 41  German emigrant 
 60 D 3  
 60 D 4  
 116 D 22  
974 30 1 1  Company is owned by company under German    
 ownership (Inv.-ID 1782) 
975 30 1 2  German emigrant 
 50 B 39  
981 30 1 10  German emigrant 
 38 D 4  
 38 D 5  
 49 B 18  
 49 B 19  
982 30 1 11  German emigrant 
 55 C 9  
984 30 1 14  German emigrant 
992 30 2 25  German emigrant 
1000 30 2 37  German emigrant 
1002 30 2 39  German emigrant 
1003 30 2 40  German emigrant 
 30 2 41  
1009 30 2 49  German emigrant 
1055 31 1 8  German emigrant 
 31 1 9  
1068 31 2 8  Restituted owner of destination company  
 31 2 9  
1076 32 1 4  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
1145 33 C 4  German emigrant 
1188 34 A 13  German emigrant 
 85 B 23  
1251 35 C 17  German emigrant 
1257 35 C 22  
1284 36 A 2  German emigrant 
 39 A 1  
1289 36 A 7  German emigrant 
1306 36 C 16  German emigrant 
 51 D 18  
1313 36 C 23  German merchant 
 55 B 17  
 73 D 13  
 73 D 14  
 73 D 15  
 73 D 16  
1320 36 C 33  German refugee, temporarily resident of Austria.  
     
1358 37 A 10  German emigrant 
 61 D 25  
1361 37 A 14  Investment from restitution account 
1376 37 C 8  Investment from restitution account 
 56 A 1  
1383 37 D 1  Investment from restitution account 
 42 A 7  
1404 38 A 12  German emigrant 
1416 38 C 1  German merchant 
 54 C 3  
 87 D 8  
 95 Dev. 104  
1421 38 C 5  Investment from restitution account 
 45 D 29  
1447 39 A 3  German emigrant 
1453 39 A 13  German emigrant 
 77 B 3  
1464 39 C 3  Investment from restitution account 
1471 39 C 14  Investment from restitution account 
1524 40 C 15  German emigrant 
 91 D 5  
1525 40 C 17  German emigrant 
 65 D 10b  




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
1539 40 D 21  Investment from restitution account 
 77 B 2b  
1540 40 D 23  Investment from restitution account 
1542 40 D 27  German emigrant 
 72 D 38  
1555 41 B 5  German emigrant 
1576 41 D 2  Restituted owner of destination company. 
 41 D 3  
1580 41 D 10  German emigrant 
1596 42 B 5  Restituted owner of destination company. 
1601 42 B 15  German emigrant 
1607 42 C 4  German emigrant 
1616 42 D 3a  German emigrant 
 46 C 27a  
 54 C 2  
1618 42 D 4  Children of restituted owner of destination 
company. 1619 42 D 5  Restituted owner of destination company. 
 42 D 6  
1636 43 A 9  German emigrant 
 43 A 10  
1651 43 B 6  German emigrant 
1669 43 D 16  German emigrant 
1697 44 D 7  German emigrant 
1709 45 A 2  German emigrant 
1726 45 C 2  Investment from restitution account 
1737 45 D 17  German emigrant 
1745 45 D 30  German merchant 
1760 46 C 3  Investment from restitution account 
 77 A 2  
1812 47 D 4  German emigrant 
 107 D 12  
 113 D 27  
1828 47 D 28  German emigrant 
1830 47 D 31  Investment from restitution account 
1833 48 A 3  German emigrant 
 119 A 5  
1850 48 B 19  German emigrant 
1858 48 D 17  German emigrant 
 53 D 18  
1861 48 B 36  German emigrant 
 48 B 37  




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
1861 92 B 16  German emigrant 
1866 48 C 1  German emigrant 
 55 B 6  
1892 48 D 24  Investment from restitution account 
1897 48 D 37  Restituted owner of destination company. 
1912 49 B 16  German emigrant 
 87 B 5  
1925 49 D 1  German emigrant 
1926 49 D 2a  Restituted owner of destination company. 
1940 49 D 31  German emigrant 
1944 50 A 2  German emigrant 
 112 D 18  
1974 50 B 27  Investment from restitution account 
1978 50 B 31  German emigrant. 
1979 50 B 32  German emigrant. 
1981 50 B 35  Investment from restitution account 
1993 50 D 1  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2001 50 D 6  German emigrant owner of investing company. 
2077 52 D 2  German emigrant 
 52 D 3  
 73 D 17  
2127 54 A 2  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2142 54 B 12  German emigrant 
2191 55 B 9  German emigrant 
2192 55 B 10  Investment from restitution account 
 55 B 11  
 60 C 3a  
2224 56 C 1  German emigrant 
2238 56 D 13  Investment from restitution account 
2241 56 D 16  Investment from restitution account 
2253 57 B 18  Investment from restitution account 
2254 57 B 19  German merchant 
2263 57 D 9  Investment from restitution account 
2272 57 D 23  German emigrant 
 87 C 1  
2277 58 B 4a  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2280 58 B 8  German emigrant 
2284 58 B 11a  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2285 58 B 11b  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2286 58 B 11c  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2288 58 B 15  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
2322 58 D 35  German emigrant 
2327 59 B 8  German emigrant 
2329 59 B 15  German emigrant 
2335 59 D 1  Investment of restitution claims. 
2358 60 B 16  German emigrant 
2360 60 C 3b  Restituted owner of German companies. 
2362 60 C 7  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2385 60 D 29  Company of restituted owners of destination  
 company. 
2387 60 D 31  German emigrant 
 71 B 17  
2389 60 D 33  German emigrant 
2426 61 D 22  German emigrant 
2439 62 D 8  German emigrant 
2480 63 C 6a  Investment from restitution account 
2481 63 D 3  German emigrant 
2510 64 D 10  Investment from restitution account 
2537 65 D 10a  German emigrant 
2554 65 D 33  German emigrant 
2580 66 D 2  Investment from restitution account 
2582 66 D 4  Investment from restitution account 
 66 D 5  
 73 D 18  
 76 B 3  
 82 D 26  
2627 67 C 9  German emigrant 
2634 67 D 1  German emigrant 
 92 B 7  
 94 D 15  
2639 67 D 6  German emigrant 
2676 68 C 9  Investment from restitution account 
2677 68 C 10  Investment from restitution account 
2680 68 D 6a  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2696 68 D 24  Restituted owner of destination company. 
2697 68 D 26  German emigrant 
2721 69 B 7a  German emigrant 
2736 69 D 14  Investment from restitution account 
 110 B 6  
 112 D 4  
2764 71 A 6  German emigrant 
2780 71 D 6  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
2912 74 D 15  German emigrant 
2917 74 D 21  Investment from restitution account 
2919 74 D 23  German emigrant 
2923 74 D 30  German emigrant 
 85 B 5  
2945 75 B 18  German emigrant 
 75 B 19  
2946 75 B 20  German emigrant 
2952 75 D 4  German emigrant 
2964 76 B 1  German emigrant 
 76 B 2   
2974 76 B 15  German emigrant 
2984 76 D 10  German emigrant 
3000 77 A 1  Investment of the sale proceeds of a restituted  
 plot of land. 
3007 77 B 12  German emigrant 
3048 78 B 14  German emigrant 
 81 B 18  
3097 80 B 6  German emigrant 
3110 80 B 18  German emigrant 
3115 80 D 3  German emigrant 
 93 B 10  
3174 81 D 21  German emigrant 
3181 82 A 2  Restituted owner of destination company 
3205 82 B 26  German emigrant 
3246 83 B 23  German emigrant 
3252 83 C 2  Investment from restitution account 
3259 83 D 7  German emigrants 
3265 83 D 15  German merchant 
3267 83 D 20  German emigrant 
3284 84 C 4  Investment of the sale proceeds of a restituted  
 plot of land. 
3286 84 C 7a  German emigrant 
3287 84 C 7b  German emigrant 
3288 84 C 7c  German emigrant 
3329 85 B 26  Investment from restitution account 
3346 85 D 18a  Investing company owned by restituted individuals.  
3347 85 D 18b  Investment from restitution account 
3365 85 D 40  German emigrant 
3366 85 D 41  German emigrant 
3369 86 B 3  German emigrant 
3375 86 B 14  Restituted owners of destination company. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
3419 87 B 9  German emigrant 
3424 87 D 7a  Restituted owner of destination company 
3425 87 D 7b  Restituted owner of destination company 
3431 87 D 18  German emigrant 
3439 88 Dev. 104  German emigrant 
3478 89 D 10a  German emigrant 
3479 89 D 10b  German emigrant 
3509 90 B 14  German emigrant 
3522 90 D 6a  German emigrant 
3523 90 D 6b  German emigrant 
3524 90 D 6c  German emigrant 
3542 91 B 1a  German emigrant 
3543 91 B 1b  German emigrant 
3598 92 B 5  German emigrant 
3615 92 D 17  Investor and owner of destination company are  
 “wartime comrades”. 
3660 94 B 7  Restituted owner of destination company. 
3666 94 B 14  German emigrant 
3712 95 Dev. 108  German emigrant 
3776 97 D 18a  Investment from restitution account  
3777 97 D 18b  Investment from restitution account 
3791 98 B 12  German emigrant 
3817 98 Dev. 106  German emigrant 
3829 99 D 4  Restituted owner of German company 
3863 100 Dev. 114  German emigrant 
3874 101 B 7b  German emigrant 
3883 101 D 14  German emigrant 
3911 102 D 13  German emigrant 
3915 102 D 16a  Investment from restitution account 
3916 102 D 16b  Investment from restitution account 
3917 102 D 16c  Investment from restitution account 
3950 103 D 15  German emigrant 
3956 103 D 21a  Reinvestment of restitution claim by former owner. 
3978 104 D 2a  German emigrant 
3979 104 D 2b  German emigrant 
3980 104 D 3  German emigrant 
3981 104 D 4  German emigrant 
3994 105 B 3a  German emigrant 
3995 105 B 3b  German emigrant 
3996 105 B 3c  German emigrant 
4016 105 Dev. 107a  German emigrant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
4018 105 Dev. 107c  German emigrant 
4037 107 B 4  German emigrant 
 111 D 21  
4047 107 D 2a  Restituted owner of destination company 
4048 107 D 2b  Restituted owner of destination company 
4049 107 D 2c  Restituted owner of destination company 
4050 107 D 2d  Restituted owner of destination company 
4058 107 D 5  German emigrant 
4065 107 D 13  German emigrant 
4072 108 B 5  Restituted owner of destination company 
4081 108 D 5  German emigrant 
4089 108 Dev. 101a  German resident of Liechtenstein since 1953 
4090 108 Dev. 101b  German resident of Liechtenstein since 1953 
4126 110 B 9  German emigrant 
4156 111 D 9a  Restituted owner of destination company 
4157 111 D 9b  Restituted owner of destination company 
4158 111 D 9c  Restituted owner of destination company 
4159 111 D 9d  Restituted owner of destination company 
4160 111 D 9e  Restituted owner of destination company 
4193 111 D 41a  Restituted owner of destination company 
 111 D 42a  
4194 111 D 41b  Restituted owner of destination company 
 111 D 42b   
4195 111 D 41c  Restituted owner of destination company 
 111 D 42c   
4196 111 D 41d  Restituted owner of destination company 
 111 D 42d   
4197 111 D 41e  Restituted owner of destination company 
 111 D 42e   
4198 111 D 41f  Restituted owner of destination company 
 111 D 42f   
4202 111 D 48a  German emigrant 
4230 112 D 1a  German emigrant 
4231 112 D 1b  German emigrant 
4246 112 D 16  Investment from restitution account 
4282 113 D 16  German emigrant 
 113 D 17  
4313 114 D 6  German emigrant 
4318 114 D 14  German emigrant 
 114 D 15   
4321 114 D 17b  German merchant 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Identification of emigrant status 
 4364 116 B 7  Investment of restitution claim. 
4368 116 B 11a  German emigrant 
4369 116 B 11b  German emigrant 
4391 116 D 13  German emigrant 
4395 116 D 16  German emigrant 
4427 118 A 1  German emigrant 
4456 118 B 8  German merchant 
4474 119 A 14  German emigrant 
4481 119 B 4  Restituted owner of destination company. 
4487 119 B 10  German emigrant 
4554 121 B 6a  German emigrant 
4555 121 B 6b  German emigrant 
4556 121 B 6c  German emigrant 
4557 121 B 6d  German emigrant 
4558 121 B 6e  German emigrant 
4559 121 B 6f  German emigrant 
4560 121 B 6g  German emigrant 
4573 13 --- 5  Investment from restitution account 
4574 13 --- 5  Investment from restitution account 
4584 14 --- 28b  Investment from restitution account 
4585 14 --- 28c  Investment from restitution account 
 40 D 20  
 40 D 22  
 77 B 2a  
4592 17 --- 20b  German emigrant 
4614 49 D 2b  Restituted owner of destination company 
4621 60 C 3c  Restituted owner of German company. 
4627 68 D 6b  Restituted owner of destination company 
4628 68 D 6c  Restituted owner of destination company 
4629 68 D 6d  Restituted owner of destination company 
4630 68 D 6e  Restituted owner of destination company 
4631 69 B 7b  German emigrant 
4632 69 B 7c  German emigrant 
4643 12 --- 7b  Investment from restitution account 








D.2. German emigrants identifiable through other sources 
More often than not, the commission records reveal little about the personal identity of the non-
resident investor, beyond her prior relationship with the destination company or its owners. In this 
context, family relations between the investor and the German destination are ceteris paribus 
insufficient to establish the origin of the investor from Germany. For example, an American cousin 
of the owner of the destination company could have been born already, so to speak, in the United 
States, rendering her “Germanness” ambiguous. I therefore apply two independently sufficient 
conditions for identifying German origin through sources outside of the commission records: 
Either I can establish that the non-resident investor had been a German citizen at any point in her 
life; or I can establish that she was born in Germany. For example, members of merchant families 
from Bremen might have been born in South America, but were German merchants retaining the 
country’s citizenship. Similarly, I assume that a US investor, for whom I can establish that she was 
born in the United States, had always been a US citizen and therefore never German, regardless of 
whether she might have self-identified as an ethnic German due to her family background.  
For determining whether the investor under consideration was of German origin according to my 
definition, I relied on a variety of sources, which I reference in full in Table D.2.1. Archival 
material which does not come from the German Federal Archives (BArch) is taken from two 
family research website: www.ancestry.com and www.fold3.com. These websites provide scans 
of the archival material, which I have copied and which I am able to provide to interested readers 
upon request. Each document referenced in Table D.2.1 is cited in the way suggested by 
ancestry.com and fold3.com respectively. Every other online source used has been printed out and 
can equally be provided to interested readers upon request. For reasons of space, I use the 
following abbreviations in Table D.2.1: M for Meeting (number); L for List; C for Case on List. 
Table D.2.1 – German emigrants identifiable through other sources. 







Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1939; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 6281; Line: 2; Page Number: 192 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Washington, DC; Name 
Index of Jews Whose German Nationality Was Annulled by the Nazi Regime (Berlin 
Documents Center); Record Group: 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign 
Records Seized, 1675 - 1958; Record Group ARC ID: 569; Publication Number: 
T355; Roll: 7, Mosbacher, Eduard – Schafranek, Bruno 





Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
15 2 --- 17 Oberlin College Archives, Wolfgang and Ursula Stechow Papers, 1894-1998 
http://oberlinarchives.libraryhost.com/?p=collections/ 
controlcard&id=323 Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 10.57am. 
20 3 --- 6 http://www.eyearbook.com/yearbooks/Wagner_College_Kallista_Yearbook/1965/Pag
e_10.html Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 11.03am. 
 23 3 --- 9 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Illinois, Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906-1991; NAI Number: 593882; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21 
The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Manifests of Alien 
Arrivals at Buffalo, Lewiston, Niagara Falls, and Rochester, New York, 1902-1954; 
Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787 - 

















Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 11.15am. 
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_J._Leir 
Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 11.15am.  
 
41 4 --- 10 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1912; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 1896; Line: 2; Page Number: 9. 
 
Staatsarchiv Hamburg; Hamburg, Deutschland; Hamburger Passagierlisten; 
Microfilm No.: K_1859. 
 
Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
 
Welt am Sonntag, Sonntag, 28. November 2004, „Eine Villa, wie es in Hamburg 
keine zweite gibt“. 
46 4 --- 17 https://www.carlkammerling.com/about_us/company_history/ 
Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 1.46pm. 
60 5 --- 7a https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Goverts 
Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 2.02pm. 
 34 D 8a 
 34 D 10 
 49 B 22 
 54 B 15 
 54 D 25 
 73 B 5a 
73 5 --- 20 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_Pielstick 







Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1931; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5031; Line: 5; Page Number: 14 
 
New York City Municipal Archives; New York, New York; Borough: Manhattan; 
Volume Number: 2, Index to Marriages, New York City Clerk's Office, New York, 
New York. 
129 8 --- 8 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1930. T626, 2,667 rolls. - Year: 1930; Census Place: Manhattan, New York, New 
York; Page: 27B; Enumeration District: 1230; FHL microfilm: 2341316 
Ancestry.com. U.S. City Directories, 1822-1995 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: 











United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Elizabeth, Union, New Jersey; 
Roll: m-t0627-02400; Page: 6B; Enumeration District: 23-90 
144 8 --- 26 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Sch%C3%BClein 
Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 3.47pm. 
155 9 --- 6 NARA M1928. Records of the German External Assets Branch of the U.S. Allied 
Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Roll 0030. 
175 9 --- 27 Hamburger Abendblatt, Freitag, 11. Januar 2008. „Ein Hausmeister schreibt 
Geschichte”. 
 26 2 40 
176 9 --- 28 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_Dornier 
Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 5.09pm. 
193 10 --- 10 https://andina.bayer.com/es/acerca-de-bayer/nuestra-region/colombia/ 
Last accessed on January 18, 2019, 5.21pm. 
199 10 --- 15 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Illinois, Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906-1991; NAI Number: 593882; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
211 10 --- 30 The National Archives at Seattle; Seattle, Washington; Petitions for Naturalization; 
Record Group Number: 21. 
217 11 --- 2 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Title of Series: 
Passenger and Crew Manifests of Airplanes Arriving at Miami, Florida.; NAI-
Number: 2788541; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1787 – 2004; Record Group Number: 85. 
222 11 --- 7 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Adlm%C3%BCller 
last accessed on January 18, 2019, 10.08pm. 
224 11 --- 9 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_AG 
last accessed on January 18, 2019, 10.15pm. 
 14 --- 27 
 109 D 2a 
 111 B 12a 
277 12 --- 29 http://www.plbg.de/haeuserbuch/paulmann.htm 
Last accessed on January 19, 2019, 5.50pm. 
 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1939; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 6282; Line: 1; Page Number: 16. 
287 13 --- 8 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Eulenburg_(Musikverlag) 
last accessed on January 19, 2019, 5.55pm. 
https://de.schott-music.com/eulenburg/ueber-eulenburg 
last accessed on January 19, 2019, 5.55pm. 
307 14 --- 3 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_Stinnes 
last accessed on January 19, 2019, 6.03pm. 
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NARA Record Group 260, M1946, Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points 
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Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1936; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5829; Line: 2; Page Number: 191. 
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last accessed on January 19, 2019, 6.38pm. 
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last accessed on January 19, 2019, 7.18pm. 
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of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 88. 
449 17 --- 30 Mehring (2009), p. 659 [Footnote 46]. 
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the United States, 1930. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records 
Administration, 1930. T626, 2,667 rolls. - Year: 1930; Census Place: Queens, 
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559 20 1 2 http://www.industrie.lu/rother.html 






















The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
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City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 










BArch B126.1561, Blatt 212. 
Der Spiegel, Nr. 39, 24. September 1952, „…setzte auf Deutschland“. 
688 22 2 63 www.ticinarte.ch/index.php/emden-max.html?file=tl_files/Bereiche/Personen/Emden-
Wuerstchen.pdf 
last accessed on January 20, 2019, 1.05pm. 
https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/kultur/buecher/Der-Sonnenkoenig-des-Lago-
Maggiore/story/28546286 
last accessed on January 20, 2019, 1.06pm. 
 728 23 2 46 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
 
731 23 2 49 https://de.schott-music.com/about/history 
last accessed on January 20, 2019, 1.09pm. 
 734 23 2 54 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 512. 














The National Archives of the UK; Kew, Surrey, England; Board of Trade: 
Commercial and Statistical Department and successors: Inwards Passenger Lists.; 
Class: BT26; Piece: 1342. 
789 24 2 45 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Gerling 
last accessed on January 20, 2019, 2.13pm. 























last accessed on January 20, 2019, 2.26pm. 
804 24 2 65 BArch B126.1560, Blatt 99. 
812 24 2 75 Schweizerisches Auswanderungsamt und Auswanderungsbüro. Überseeische 
Auswanderungen aus der Schweiz, 1910-1953. Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, E 
2175-2, Band 56. 
 
815 24 2 79 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
 
Social Security Administration. Social Security Death Index, Master File. Social 
Security Administration. Number: 090-28-0813; Issue State: New York; Issue Date: 
1951-1953. 
838 26 1 6 National Archives at San Francisco; San Bruno, California; NAI Number: 605504; 
Record Group Title: RG 21; Record Group Number: Records of District Courts of the 
United States, 1685-2009. 
842 26 1 11 NARA, Publication Number M1933, Safehaven Reports of the War Crimes Branch, 
1944-1945, Record Group No. 153; Roll 0003, Folder 24. 
865 26 2 
2 
36 Der Spiegel, Nr. 8, 17. Februar 1997, „Diamanten für den Reichsmarschall“. 
 26  37 
 42 D 17 
876 26 2 53 North Carolina State Board of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics. North Carolina 
Death Certificates. Microfilm S.123. Rolls 19-242, 280, 313-682, 1040-1297. North 
Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, North Carolina. 
889 28 1 11 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. – Year: 1940; Census Place: Ventura, Ventura, California; 
Roll: m-t0627-00365; Page: 63A; Enumeration District: 56-56. 
890 28 1 13 Memorial des Großherzogtums Luxemburg, Samstag, 24. Juli 1909, No. 40, p. 572. 
932 28 2 69 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 










United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: New York, New York, New York; 
Roll: m-t0627-02658; Page: 11B; Enumeration District: 31-1461. 
955 29 1 19 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
962 29 2 29 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lohmann-Aff%C3%A4re_(Weimarer_Republik) 















Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
 
993 30 2 26 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1004 30 2 43 NARA Publication Number M1928. Records of the German External Assets Branch 
of the U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Record 











Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4662; Line: 5; Page Number: 186. 
1021 30 2 63 http://www.auswandereroldenburg.de/-
getperson.php?personID=I5219&tree=Auswanderer 







National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1037 30 2 84 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 










The National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, D.C.; Petitions for 
Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
1897-1944; NARA Microfilm Publication M1972; Roll: 1341, Record Group 21. 
1057 31 1 11 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 














last accessed on January 21, 2019, 10.28am. 
1061 31 1 16 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Helmut_Landshoff 















Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1949-1950 kamerstuknummer 1609 ondernummer 1, 
Naturalisatie van Jozsef Burkovszki en 20 anderen. 
Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1949-1950 kamerstuknummer 1694 ondernummer 1, 
Naturalisatie van Martin Cohen en 21 anderen. 
Accessible via https://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/ 
Last accessed on January 21, 2019, 11.13am. 
1085 32 1 13 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: Petitions 
for Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey at 
Newark, New Jersey, 1924-1945; Series Number: M2123; Record Group Title: 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group 













Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1947; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 7475; Line: 2; Page Number: 2. 










NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 







Königseder (2016), p. 135. 















last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.10pm. 
https://werner-mertz.de/Ueber-W-und-M/Historie/Firmenchronik/ 
last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.10pm. 
Der Spiegel, Nr. 33, 10. August 1987, „Hoch gepokert“. 
1153 33 C 18 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolta_Werke 
last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.19pm. 
1186 34 A 10 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
1192 34 A 17 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Manifests of Alien 
Arrivals at Buffalo, Lewiston, Niagara Falls, and Rochester, New York, 1902-1954; 
Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787 - 
2004; Record Group Number: 85; Series Number: M1480; Roll Number: 064. 
1221 35 A 4 Wischnath (1986), p. 145. 
1224 35 A 8 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Haas_(Industrieller) 
last accessed on January 22, 2019, 8.14am. 
1228 35 A 14 Bonhage B. (2001). p. 75ff. 
1242 35 C 5 https://www.deutsche-digitale-
bibliothek.de/item/5JPSYUW5TQUTHQIYRHDWUJQQCGXXANGU 










NARA. Records of the External Assets Investigation Section of the Property Division, 
OMGUS, 1945-1949, Record Group 260, Roll M1922_0031. 
1266 35 C 32 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Regendanz 
last accessed on January 22, 2019, 9.16am. 
1272 35 D 5 http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11825068 
last accessed on January 22, 2019, 9.18am. 
1294 36 A 13 Ancestry.com. Pennsylvania, Veteran Compensation Application Files, WWII, 1950-
1966 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2015. 
1315 36 C 26 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willy_Dreyfus 
last accessed on January 22, 2019, 10.03am. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Dreyfus_%26_Co. 
last accessed on January 22, 2019, 10.04am. 
1327 36 C 42 Ancestry.com. Hamburg, Germany, Births, 1874-1901 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, 
USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2015. 
 
The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 72. 
1337 36 D 7 NARA, Records Concerning the Central Collecting Points ("Ardelia Hall 
Collection"): Wiesbaden Central Collecting Point, 1945-1952, Record Group 260, 
Roll M1947_0080. 
1350 36 D 22 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; ARC Title: 
Naturalization Petition and Record Books for the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Cleveland, 1907–1946; NAI: M1995; Record 

































National Archives at College Park; College Park, Maryland, U.S.A.; NAI Number: 
613857; Record Group Title: General Records of the Department of State; Record 
Group Number: Record Group 59; Series Number: Publication A1 5166; Box 
Number: 42; Box Description: 1967 FA – GZ. 
1375 37 C 7 http://www.record.com.pe/es/empresa.html#tab_historia 







The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 296. 
1385 37 D 3 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1391 37 D 14 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 86. 
1428 38 C 17 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: Petitions 
for Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey at 
Newark, New Jersey, 1924-1945; Series Number: M2123; Record Group Title: 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group 







Der Spiegel, Nr. 6, 4. Februar 1953, „Die kleinen Faruks“. 
1462 39 B 12 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Max_Littauer 
last accessed on January 22, 2019, 1.27pm. 
1463 39 C 1 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: Petitions 
for Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey at 
Newark, New Jersey, 1924-1945; Series Number: M2123; Record Group Title: 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group 
Number: 85; NARA Microfilm Number: 105. 
1467 39 C 7 National Archives at Fort Worth; Fort Worth, Texas.; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States; Record Group Number: 21. 
1470 39 C 12 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: West Benson, Douglas, 







Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
1484 39 D 9 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1908; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 1104; Line: 5; Page Number: 83. 
1495 40 A 8 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 198. 
1497 40 A 10 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Cincinnati, Hamilton, Ohio; 
Roll: m-t0627-03196; Page: 14B; Enumeration District: 91-259. 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
1499 40 A 12 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; Record Group Title: Records 









last accessed on January 22, 2.39pm. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Freitag, 11. April 2003, S. 17, „Ein Frankfurter 
Traditionskonzern“. 
1519 40 C 8 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 







Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1940; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 6441; Line: 1; Page Number: 2. 
1528 40 C 20 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1545 40 D 32 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147. 
1547 41 A 2 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1549 41 A 4 The National Archives and Records Administration; Washington D.C.; Manifests of 
Aliens Granted Temporary Admission at Laredo, Texas, December 1, 1929 - April 8, 
1955; NAI: 2843448; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1787-2004.; Record Group Number: 85; Microfilm Roll 
Number: 17. 





1571 41 C 8 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 






1582 41 D 11b Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1947; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 


































last accessed on January 22, 2019, 5.46pm. 
1625 42 D 16 The London Gazette, September 20, 1946, p. 4757. 
 60 C 12  
1627 42 D 19 National Archives at Riverside; Riverside, California; NAI Number: 618171; Record 
Group Title: 21; Record Group Number: Records of District Courts of the United 
States, 1685-2009. 











National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 







Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
Ancestry.com. UK, Outward Passenger Lists, 1890-1960 [database on-line]. Provo, 
UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2012. 
1643 43 B 6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Pommer 







Das Ostpreußenblatt, Samstag, 28. Juni 1958, p. 15. 
Heinrich (1958), p. 124. 
1655 43 C 11 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Sichel 










The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 







National Archives at Boston; Waltham, Massachusetts; ARC Title: Petitions and 
Records of Naturalization, 2/1842 - ca. 1991; NAI Number: 3432872; Record Group 
Title: Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group 







Der Spiegel, Nr. 6, 4. Februar 1953, „Die kleinen Faruks“. 
Wolfert (2015), p. 74. 
1684 44 B 14 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: New York, Queens, New York; 
Roll: m-t0627-02721; Page: 8B; Enumeration District: 41-100. 
1687 44 C 4 http://212.227.236.244/passagierlisten/listen.php?ArchivIdent=AIII15-
11.10.1928_N&pass=Cronauer&ID=326349&ankunftshafen=New%20York&lang=d
e 
last accessed January 22, 2019, 8.42pm. 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1952; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 8171; Line: 6; Page Number: 79. 
1700 44 D 11 Ancestry.com. England & Wales, National Probate Calendar (Index of Wills and 
Administrations), 1858-1966, 1973-1995 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: 
Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2010. 
https://www.ilkleygazette.co.uk/news/4838523.Evacuee_recalls_glory_/ last accessed 
on January 22, 2019, 8.56pm. 
The National Archives; Kew, Surrey, England; Duplicate Certificates of 
Naturalisation, Declarations of British Nationality, and Declarations of Alienage; 








last accessed on January 22, 2019, 7.15pm. 
1748 46 A 3 Lussy et al. (2001), p. 108. 
 48 B 1  
 104 B 2  
1753 46 B 4 NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 
Number M1928, Roll 0105-0106. 
1762 46 C 5 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
1771 46 C 15 Exprúa & Sanz (2001). 
1772 46 C 17 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1950; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 






















NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 








last accessed January 23, 2019, 10.47am. 
The National Archives of the UK; Kew, Surrey, England; Board of Trade: 
Commercial and Statistical Department and successors: Inwards Passenger Lists.; 
Class: BT26; Piece: 1450. 
1789 46 C 43 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
1790 47 A 1 https://www.ancestry.com/family-tree/person/tree/113238398/ per 
son/140114724088/facts?_phsrc=teD3298&_phstart=successSource 
last accessed January 23, 2019, 10.59am. 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Washington, D.C.; Index to 
Naturalization Petitions of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, 1865-1957; Microfilm Serial: M1164; Microfilm Roll: 110. 
1792 47 A 3 National Archives at College Park; College Park, Maryland, U.S.A.; NAI Number: 
613857; Record Group Title: General Records of the Department of State; Record 
Group Number: Record Group 59; Series Number: Publication A1 5166; Box 







NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 
Number M1928, Roll 0105-0106. 
1797 47 B 7 NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 
Number M1928, Roll 0105-0106. 
1802 47 B 12 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Manifests of Airplanes Arriving at Miami, Florida.; NAI 
Number: 2788541; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1787 - 2004; Record Group Number: 85. 
1803 47 B 14 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Mandel 
last accessed on January 23, 2019, 11.18am. 








last accessed on January 23, 2019, 11.36am. 
https://www.deutsche-digitale- 
bibliothek.de/item/EN43ZNKCB7CMOWMCOR645SOWM2ZWNC6M 
last accessed on January 23, 2019, 11.42am. 
1831 47 D 32 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Declarations of 
Intention, 1856 - 1989; NAI Number: 1137682; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
Ancestry.com. U.S., Social Security Death Index, 1935-2014 [database on-line]. 
Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2014. Number: 374-09-3631; Issue 
State: Michigan; Issue Date: Before 1951. 
1842 48 B 4c https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_de_Goldschmidt 
last accessed on January 23, 2019, 11.50am. 















itte  last accessed on January 23, 2019, 11.57am. 
NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the External Assets Investigation Section of 







The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 27. 
1865 48 B 42 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
1869 48 C 5 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Irvington, Essex, New Jersey; 
Roll: m-t0627-02334; Page: 1B; Enumeration District: 7-172. 
1875  48 C 12 Ancestry.com. Baden, Germany, Lutheran Baptisms, Marriages, and Burials, 1502-
1985 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
1893 48 D 27 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruno_W%FCstenberg 







NARA, Record Group 153, Safehaven Reports of the War Crimes Branch, 1944-
1945, Publication Number: M1933, Roll: 0004, Folder: 26. 
1899 48 D 41 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieckmann_&_Hansen 
last accessed January 23, 2019, 5.36pm. 
1928 82 D 4 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147. 
1931 49 D 7 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1924; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 3588; Line: 7; Page Number: 2. 







Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4747; Line: 3; Page Number: 190. 
1947 50 A 5 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 
Mikrofilmrollen K 1701 - K 2008, S 17363 - S 17383, 13116 - 13183. Staatsarchiv 
Hamburg; Hamburg, Deutschland; Hamburger Passagierlisten; Microfilm No.: 
K_1864. 
1964 50 B 11 The New York Times, Thursday, May 22, 1941, “Bergolte not agent; Does 
not represent company here in Bolivia, says president”. 
National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1988 50 C 2 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
1991 50 C 5 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
(Fourth Registration) for the State of New York; Record Group Title: Records of the 
Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147; Box or Roll 
Number: 323. 
2017 50 D 31 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Islip, Suffolk, New York; Roll: 
m-t0627-02787; Page: 34B; Enumeration District: 52-128. 












last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.10pm. 
https://werner-mertz.de/Ueber-W-und-M/Historie/Firmenchronik/ 
last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.10pm. 
Der Spiegel, Nr. 33, 10. August 1987, „Hoch gepokert“. 
2037 51 C 5 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1940; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 6510; Line: 13; Page Number: 53. 
2044 51 D 17 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1938; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 6241; Line: 18; Page Number: 27. 
2049 51 D 25 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2069 52 C 5 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
(Fourth Registration) for the State of New Jersey; Record Group Title: Records of the 
Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147; Series Number: 
M1986. 
2071 52 C 7 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guilleaume_(Unternehmerfamilie) 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 10.31am. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_von_Guilleaume 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 10.32 am. 
2073 52 C 9 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 
Mikrofilmrollen K 1701 - K 2008, S 17363 - S 17383, 13116 - 13183. Hamburger 
Passagierlisten; Microfilm No.: K_1840. 
2074 52 C 10 National Archives at Boston; Waltham, Massachusetts; ARC Title: Naturalization 
Record Books, 12/1893 - 9/1906; NAI Number: 2838938; Record Group Title: 
Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: 
RG 21. 
2103 53 B 11 The National Archives at Kansas City; Kansas City, Missouri; Naturalization Index 
for the Western District of Missouri, compiled 1930 - 1950, documenting the period 
ca. 1848 - ca. 1950; Record Group Title: Records of the District Courts of the United 










NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 
Number M1928, Roll 0105-0106. 
 
2122 53 D 27 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016.. 
2130 54 A 5 Ancestry.com. Baden, Germany, Lutheran Baptisms, Marriages, and Burials, 1502-
1985 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
Ancestry.com. U.S., Social Security Death Index, 1935-2014 [database on-line]. 
Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2014. Number: 129-26-1884; Issue 








Wümme-Zeitung, Dienstag, 13. Dezember 2011, “Ein 
Pfarrwitwenhaus als Kunst-Insel”. 
Stadt Staufen (2004), Staufen Kulturwoche 2004, p.15. 
2148 54 B 21 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147. 
2153 54 C 6 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
(Fourth Registration), for The State of Illinois; Record Group Title: Records of the 
Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147; Series Number: 
M2097. 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
2154 54 C 8 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1947; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 7282; Line: 1; Page Number: 328. 
2171 54 D 22 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 159. 
2181 55 A 4 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claire_Dux 





















last accessed on January 24, 2019, 11.24am. 
https://www.wp.de/staedte/siegerland/siegenerin-betreibt-campingplatz-am-lago-
maggiore-id11869872.html 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 11.25am. 
2212 55 D 21 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
2213 55 D 24 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brillux 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 11.50am. 
https://www.brillux.de/unternehmen/ueber-uns/#historie 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 11.51am. 
2226 56 C 3 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Declarations of 
Intention, 1856 - 1989; NAI Number: 1137682; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2240 56 D 15 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
2245 56 D 23 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1930. T626, 2,667 rolls. - Year: 1930; Census Place: Scarsdale, Westchester, New 
York; Page: 5B; Enumeration District: 0402; FHL microfilm: 2341399. 
2252 57 B 14 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
(Fourth Registration), for The State of Illinois; Record Group Title: Records of the 
Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147; Series Number: 
M2097. 
2256 57 D 3 ABC de Madrid, Tuesday, August 13, 1935, p. 62, “Proclama”. 
 
2271 57 D 22 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1930. T626, 2,667 rolls. - Year: 1930; Census Place: Queens, Queens, New York; 
Page: 1A; Enumeration District: 0252; FHL microfilm: 2341328. 
2291 58 B 19 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
Social Security Administration. Social Security Death Index, Master File. Social 
Security Administration. Number: 568-20-9950; Issue State: California; Issue Date: 
Before 1951. 
2316 58 D 25 Marine Crew Chronik. Year: 1912, Microfilm, 31 rolls, MIM620/CREW P 159. 
Marineschule Mürwik, Flensburg, Deutschland. 
2328 59 B 14 Ancestry.com. Cape Town, South Africa, Maitland Cemetery Records, 1888-1959 
[database on-line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
2334 59 C 7 Staatsarchiv Hamburg; Hamburg, Deutschland; Hamburger Passagierlisten; Bestand: 
373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). Mikrofilmrollen K 1701 - K 2008, S 17363 - S 
17383, 13116 – 13183, Microfilm No.: k_1852 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
2336 59 D 2 NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German External Assets Branch of the 
U.S. Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication 








last accessed on January 24, 2019, 7.14pm. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flottmann-Werke 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 7.14pm. 
2353 60 B 11 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
2359 60 B 17 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Manifests of Airplanes Arriving at Miami, Florida.; NAI 
Number: 2788541; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1787 - 2004; Record Group Number: 85. 
2366 60 C 10b A. Weibel, Heiman, Eric, in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), Version vom 
03.11.2005, URL: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D45987.php 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 7.24pm. 
2386 60 D 30 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Kade 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 7.32pm. 
http://maxkadefoundation.org/history.html 
last accessed on January 24, 2019, 7.32pm. 
2390 60 D 34 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2396 61 A 1 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: New Haven, New Haven, 
Connecticut; Roll: m-t0627-00542; Page: 4A; Enumeration District: 11-154A. 
2446 62 D 18 JewishGen. Jewish Holocaust Survivor List from the files of World Jewish Congress, 
1918-1982 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc., 2008. 
2451 62 D 27 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Illinois, Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906-1991; NAI Number: 593882; Record Group Title: Records of 







Ancestry.com. U.S., Social Security Applications and Claims Index, 1936-2007 
[database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2015. 
2461 63 A 1 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, D.C.; Index to Aliens, 
Not Including Filipinos, East Indians, and Chinese, Arriving by Vessel or at the Land 
Border at Seattle, Washington; NAI Number: 2945984; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A3691; Roll Number: 13. 
2462 63 A 2 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-










Regele (2007), “Der deutsche Widerstand und Südtirol”. 
2485 63 D 12 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1946; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 7128; Line: 1; Page Number: 249. 
2490 64 A 2 https://ka.stadtwiki.net/Julie_Bauer 
last accessed on January 25, 2019, 10.29am. 
2491 64 A 3 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Illinois, Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906-1991; NAI Number: 593882; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2501 64 C 6 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Naturalization Orders, 
5/23/1927 - 4/5/1994; NAI Number: 5889455; Record Group Title: Records of 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
2533 65 D 4 https://www.mahle.com/de/about-mahle/mahle_chronicle_/ 
last accessed on January 25, 2019, 10.38am. 
2540 65 D 12b The National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, D.C.; Petitions for 
Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
1897-1944; Series: M1972; Roll: 1199. 
2549 65 D 25 Ancestry.com. German Phone Directories, 1915-1981 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, 
USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2015. 
2568 66 B 18 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at Galveston, Texas, 1896-1951; Record Group 
Title: Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004. 
2571 66 C 3 The National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, D.C.; Petitions for 
Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
1897-1944; Series: M1972; Roll: 1033. 
2573 66 C 5 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1911; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 1638; Line: 13; Page Number: 14. 




last accessed on January 25, 2019, 3.50pm. 
2597 66 D 23 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Uebele 
last accessed on January 25, 2019, 3.52pm. 
2613 67 A 3 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucy_Borchard 
last accessed on January 25, 2019, 3.55pm. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairplay_Reederei 
last accessed on January 25, 2019, 3.55pm. 
 2627 67 C 9 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2655 67 D 25 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1930. T626, 2,667 rolls. - Year: 1930; Census Place: San Diego, San Diego, 








last accessed on January 25, 2019, 4.28pm. 
United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Los Angeles, Los Angeles, 
California; Roll: m-t0627-00398; Page: 25A; Enumeration District: 60-130. 
2672 68 C 6 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
(Fourth Registration) for the State of Connecticut; Record Group Title: Records of the 
Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147; Series Number: 
M1962. 
2682 68 D 9 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: New York, Queens, New York; 
Roll: m-t0627-02738; Page: 5A; Enumeration District: 41-997. 
2707 69 A 3 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2728 69 C 9 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: New York, New York, New York; 
Roll: m-t0627-02658; Page: 7A; Enumeration District: 31-1442. 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
2760 71 A 2 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4724; Line: 2; Page Number: 166. 
2761 71 A 3 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 154. 
2762 71 A 4 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 41. 










Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1948; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 7541; Line: 17; Page Number: 276. 
2772 71 B 15 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 108. 
2773 71 B 16 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 
Mikrofilmrollen K 1701 - K 2008, S 17363 - S 17383, 13116 - 13183. Hamburger 
Passagierlisten; Microfilm No.: K_1857. 
2781 71 D 7 United States, Selective Service System. World War I Selective Service System Draft 
Registration Cards, 1917-1918. Washington D.C.: National Archives and Records 
Administration. M1509, 4582 rolls. Imaged from Family History Library microfilm. 
Registration State: New York; Registration County: New York; Roll: 1766390; Draft 
Board: 136. 
2783 71 D 12 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2784 71 D 14 NARA, Records of the External Assets Investigation Section of the Property Division, 
OMGUS, 1945-1949, Record Group Number 260, Publication Number M1922, Roll 
0052. 
2785 71 D 15 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Washington, D.C.; Index to 
Naturalization Petitions and Records of the U.S. District Court, 1906-1966, and the 
U.S. Circuit Court, 1906-1911, for the District of Massachusetts; Microfilm Serial: 
M1545; Microfilm Roll: 72. 
2801 72 C 2 https://www.welt.de/incoming/article140431631/Der-geheime-Reichtum-des-
Reichs.html;  last accessed on January 25, 2019, 5.55pm. 
2804 72 C 5 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1929; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4615; Line: 1; Page Number: 33. 
2809 72 D 2 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; World War II Draft Cards 
(Fourth Registration) for the State of New York; Record Group Title: Records of the 
Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147; Box or Roll 
Number: 430. 
2826 72 D 30 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_D._Lucas 












Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
2847 73 B 7 NARA, Safehaven Reports of the War Crimes Branch, 1944-1945, Record Group 
153, Publication Number M1933, Roll Number 0006, Folder 46. 
2848 73 B 8 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Amherst, Erie, New York; Roll: 
m-t0627-02526; Page: 1A; Enumeration District: 15-16. 
2855 73 B 21 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1930. T626, 2,667 rolls. - Year: 1930; Census Place: Bronxville, Westchester, New 
York; Page: 4B; Enumeration District: 0119; FHL microfilm: 2341393. 
2861 73 C 6 United States, Selective Service System. World War I Selective Service System Draft 
Registration Cards, 1917-1918. Washington D.C.: National Archives and Records 
Administration. M1509, 4582 rolls. Imaged from Family History Library microfilm. 
Registration State: Pennsylvania; Registration County: Philadelphia; Roll: 1907616; 
Draft Board: 13. 
2880 73 D 25 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Illinois, Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906-1991; NAI Number: 593882; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
2882 73 D 27 Iowa Department of Public Health; Des Moines, Iowa; Series Title: Iowa Marriage 







Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 








accessed on January 27, 2019, 11.41am. 
The National Archives at Seattle; Seattle, Washington; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1890 - 1991; NAI Number: 592779; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685 - 2009; Record Group Number: 21. 
2920 74 D 24 Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920. (NARA microfilm publication T625, 
2076 rolls). Records of the Bureau of the Census, Record Group 29. National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. - Year: 1920; Census Place: Brooklyn Assembly District 
9, Kings, New York; Roll: T625_1158; Page: 15A; Enumeration District: 523. 
2936 75 B 11 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1936; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5808; Line: 3; Page Number: 63. 
2942 75 B 16 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
2955 75 D 10 National Archives at San Francisco; San Bruno, California; NAI Number: 605504; 
Record Group Title: RG 21; Record Group Number: Records of District Courts of the 
United States, 1685-2009. 
2962 76 A 1 NARA, Safehaven Reports of the War Crimes Branch, 1944-1945, Publication 
Number M1933, Record Group Number 153, Roll 0005, Folder 39. 
2987 76 D 13 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1948; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 7583; Line: 25; Page Number: 273. 
2989 76 D 17 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 
Mikrofilmrollen K 1701 - K 2008, S 17363 - S 17383, 13116 - 13183. - Hamburger 
Passagierlisten; Microfilm No.: K_1869. 
3013 77 C 8 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
3030 77 D 31 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1929; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4492; Line: 3; Page Number: 231. 
3032 77 D 33 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4755; Line: 11; Page Number: 16. 
3036 78 A 2 The National Archives at Atlanta; Morrow, Georgia, USA; Record Group Title: 
Records of District Courts of the United States; Record Group Number: 21; South 
Carolina Naturalization Records, 1868-1991. 
3040 78 B 4 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3054 78 D 5 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3060 78 D 16 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1935; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5722; Line: 12; Page Number: 12. 
3076 79 C 1 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger Manifests of Airplanes Arriving at San Juan, Puerto Rico; NAI Number: 
2945908; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 85. 
3077 79 C 4 National Archives; Washington, D.C.; ARC Title: Naturalization Petitions for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1795-1930; NAI Number: 158; Record Group Title: 
M1522. 
3090 80 B 1 United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Beatrice, Gage, Nebraska; Roll: 
m-t0627-02247; Page: 20A; Enumeration District: 34-11. 
3105 80 B 13 http://groundwork.megawork.de/le-chol-isch-jesch-schem-4/ 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.09pm. 
3112 80 D 1a https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togal-Werk 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.12pm. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%FCnther_J._Schmidt 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.12pm. 
3113 80 D 1b https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Togal-Werk 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.12pm. 
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%FCnther_J._Schmidt 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.12pm. 
3114 80 D 1c https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%FCnther_J._Schmidt 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.12pm. 
3123 80 D 11 Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920. (NARA microfilm publication T625, 
2076 rolls). Records of the Bureau of the Census, Record Group 29. National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. - Year: 1920; Census Place: Oakland, Alameda, 
California; Roll: T625_91; Page: 13A; Enumeration District: 132. 
3133 80 D 23 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1932; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5232; Line: 8; Page Number: 75. 
3145 80 D 37 De Volkskrant, Monday, December 29, 1997, “Joodse broers redden velen uit handen 
van nazi’s”. 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
3160 81 C 2 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels and Airplanes Departing from New York, New 
York, 07/01/1948-12/31/1956; NAI Number: 3335533; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group Number: 
85; Series Number: A4169; NARA Roll Number: 154. 
3161 81 D 4 Chambre des Représentants, Session 1954-1955 (192/1). Commission des 
Naturalisations (1), Rapports sur des demandes de naturalisation, p. 59. 
www.dekamer.be/digidoc/OCR/K3157/K31571829/K31571829.PDF 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 1.42pm. 
3189 82 B 4 www.stolpersteine-bielefeld.de/das-projekt.../Goldmann%20Kurzbiographien_1.pdf 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 4.10pm. 
https://www.gold-mann.de/ueber-uns/ 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 4.11pm. 
3197 82 B 16 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Manifests of Airplanes Arriving at Miami, Florida.; NAI 
Number: 2788541; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1787 - 2004; Record Group Number: 85. 
3208 82 D 1 National Archives at Boston; Waltham, Massachusetts; ARC Title: Index to 
Naturalization Records, 10/22/1844 - 10/28/1955; NAI Number: 4515406; Record 
Group Title: Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record 
Group Number: RG 21. 
3221 82 D 14 NARA, OSS Washington Secret Intelligence/Special Funds Records, 1942-1946, 
Record Group Number 226, Publication Number M1934, Roll 0003. 
3230 82 D 25 The National Archives at Seattle; Seattle, Washington; Idaho, Oregon, and 
Washington Petitions for Naturalization, 1932–1991. Records of the District Courts of 
the United States; Record Group Number: 21 
3239 83 B 14a National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Declarations of 
Intention, 1856 - 1989; NAI Number: 1137682; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3240 83 B 14b United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: Detroit, Wayne, Michigan; Roll: 
m-t0627-01866; Page: 19A; Enumeration District: 84-889. 
3249 83 B 26b https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_Reinhardt_(Produzent) 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 5.34pm. 
3260 83 D 9 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Declarations of Intention 
for Citizenship, 1903 - 1981; NAI Number: 6756420; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3279 84 B 11 NARA, OSS Washington Secret Intelligence/Special Funds Records, 1942-1946, 
Record Group Number 226, Publication Number M1934, Roll 0008. 
3289 84 C 9 The National Archives at St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri; Record Group Title: Records 
of the Selective Service System, 1926-1975; Record Group Number: 147. 
3309 84 D 24a Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1932; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5165; Line: 21; Page Number: 167. 
3322 85 B 10 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blendax 
last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.10pm. 
https://werner-mertz.de/Ueber-W-und-M/Historie/Firmenchronik/ 
last accessed on January 21, 2019, 5.10pm. 







National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906 - 1991; NAI Number: 6756404; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3350 85 D 22a http://familienbuch-euregio.eu/genius/?person=337970 
last accessed on January 27, 2019, 6.13pm. 
3353 85 D 23 http://familienbuch-euregio.eu/genius/?person=337970 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
3368 86 A 1 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1938; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 







NARA, Records of the External Assets Investigation Section of the Property Division, 
OMGUS, 1945-1949., Publication Number M1922, Record Group 260, Roll 0077. 
3374 86 B 13 Census Returns of England and Wales, 1911. Kew, Surrey, England: The National 







National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); Washington, D.C.; NAI 
Number: 117; Record Group Title: M1524; Record Group Number: Naturalization 
Records of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, Central 
Division (Los Angeles), 1887-1940. 
3393 86 D 15 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1925; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 3703; Line: 16; Page Number: 117. 
3394 86 D 16 Diario de Noticias, Saturday, March 29, 1941, p. 4, “Atos do Presidente da 
República”. 
3404 86 D 28 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Otto 
last accessed on January 28, 2019, 9.42am. 
United States of America, Bureau of the Census. Sixteenth Census of the United 
States, 1940. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 
1940. T627, 4,643 rolls. - Year: 1940; Census Place: New York, New York, New York; 
Roll: m-t0627-02675; Page: 5A; Enumeration District: 31-2072B. 
3412 87 A 1 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3423 87 D 3 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; NAI Number: 
2848504; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 1787 - 2004; Record Group Number: 85; Series Number: A3998; NARA Roll 
Number: 25. 
3427 87 D 10 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
3453 88 D 16 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: Petitions 
for Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey at 
Newark, New Jersey, 1924-1945; Series Number: M2123; Record Group Title: 
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1787-2004; Record Group 
Number: 85; NARA Microfilm Number: 088. 
3465 89 B 12 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1933; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 5294; Line: 1; Page Number: 103. 
3476 89 D 5 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 
3497 90 B 4b http://www.aka-
verlag.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=237&lang=
de last accessed on January 28, 2019, 3.43pm. 
Königseder (2016), p. 135. 
3508 90 B 12 https://www.teko.se/aktuellt/nyheter/artiklar/textila-bandtillverkaren-fran-kumla-gar-
battre-nagonsin/ last accessed on January 28, 2019, 4.09pm. 
3511 90 B 18 Ancestry.com. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Immigration Cards, 1900-1965 [database on-
line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. 




Inv.-ID M L C Identification of emigrant status 
3526 90 D 8 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1930; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 4874; Line: 7; Page Number: 65. 
3533 90 D 22 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3549 91 B 8 https://www.eroica-klassikforum.de/forum/index.php?thread/3579-07-stammtafeln-














last accessed on January 28, 2019, 4.30pm. 
3555 91 D 4 The National Archives at Washington, D.C.; Washington, D.C.; Series Title: 
Passenger and Crew Manifests of Airplanes Arriving at Miami, Florida.; NAI 
Number: 2788541; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 1787 - 2004; Record Group Number: 85. 
3603 92 B 12a http://www.rheinische-geschichte.lvr.de/Persoenlichkeiten/familie-zuntz/DE-
2086/lido/57c82bf67c60f1.32195538 last accessed on January 28, 2019, 5.02pm. 
3604 92 B 12b http://www.rheinische-geschichte.lvr.de/Persoenlichkeiten/familie-zuntz/DE-
















last accessed on January 28, 2019, 6.48pm. 
3641 93 B 21 NARA, Records of the External Assets Investigation Section of the Property Division, 
OMGUS, 1945-1949, Record Group Number 260, Publication Number M1922, Roll 
0061. 
3656 94 B 4a The National Archives at Fort Worth; Fort Worth, Texas; Record Group Title: 
Records of District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: 
21. 
3657 94 B 4b Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1820-1897. Microfilm 
Publication M237, 675 rolls. NAI: 6256867. Records of the U.S. Customs Service, 
Record Group 36. National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1947; Arrival: New 
York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: Roll 7448; 
Line: 11; Page Number: 294. 
3658 94 B 5 Passenger and Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York, 1897-1957. 
Microfilm Publication T715, 8892 rolls. NAI: 300346. Records of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service; National Archives at Washington, D.C. - Year: 1925; 
Arrival: New York, New York; Microfilm Serial: T715, 1897-1957; Microfilm Roll: 
Roll 3769; Line: 25; Page Number: 63. 
3665 94 B 13 National Archives at Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; ARC Title: Illinois, Petitions for 
Naturalization, 1906-1991; NAI Number: 593882; Record Group Title: Records of 
District Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3688 95 D 4 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand: 373-7 I, VIII (Auswanderungsamt I). 
Mikrofilmrollen K 1701 - K 2008, S 17363 - S 17383, 13116 - 13183. - Hamburger 











gmbh/3732 last accessed on January 28, 2019, 7.48pm. 
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3694 95 D 13 National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, DC; ARC Title: Index to 
Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local Courts in New York 
City, 1792-1906; NAI Number: 5700802; Record Group Title: Records of District 
Courts of the United States, 1685-2009; Record Group Number: RG 21. 
3714 96 B 2b https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Reinhold 
last accessed on January 28, 2019, 7.54pm. 
 3722 96 B 9 NARA, Safehaven Reports of the War Crimes Branch, 1944-1945, Record Group 
Number 153, Publication Number M1933, Roll 0007, Folder 48. 
3728 96 D 6 The National Archives at Atlanta, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; ARC Title: Petitions for 
Naturalization, compiled 1880 - 1975; NAI Number: 2111793; Record Group Title: 
Records of District Courts of the United States; Record Group Number: 21. 
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Appendix E – Pre-war investors in the investment commission records 
I identify investors that had already been active in Germany during the interwar period (otherwise 
referred to as “pre-war investors”) by combining information given in the records of the investment 
commission. On the one hand, the records state the relationship between the non-resident investor 
and the German destination company prior to the particular project under consideration. This 
information is specified in condensed form in the minutes of the commission meetings, and in 
more detail under item B.3 of the actual application forms (B. Beteiligte, 3. Beziehungen zwischen 
den Beteiligten). Importantly, the records distinguish the case in which the non-resident investor 
already owned an equity share in the destination company at the time of the application. On the 
other hand, the records also provide the year in which the destination company had been 
established. 
Given these two pieces of information, I generally identify those non-resident investors as pre-war 
investors who already owned an equity share in any one of their destination companies at the time 
they initially appear in the commission records as investors into that particular destination 
company, if that particular destination company had existed already before the War. Put 
differently, applicants who invest in their existing subsidiary in Germany are automatically 
considered as pre-war investors, as long as they had not established that subsidiary since the lifting 
of the post-war investment moratorium in June 1950. By implication of both the embargo and the 
fact that the records contain the universe of FDI after the lifting of the embargo, the investor must 
therefore have been a pre-war investor, assuming that it was impossible to invest during the War. 
Information on the age of the destination company serves as a robustness check in that respect. 
For a non-resident applicant to qualify as a pre-war investor, it is sufficient that any one of her 
destination companies was under her pre-war (partial) ownership. In particular, that one 
destination does not have to be her initial post-war destination company. Conversely, pre-war 
investor status can thus be denied only after having considered the entire investment history of a 
particular applicant in the commission records. 
Evidently, non-resident investors that had been active in Germany already during the interwar 
period were under no obligation during the early 1950s to invest only into their existing 
participations. Instead, they could have invested only into other, unrelated German companies, or 
they could have lost or liquidated their pre-war participations in Germany before June 1950, 
starting anew thereafter. Such pre-war investors would not be captured by relying exclusively on 




To address this shortcoming, I take into consideration additional pieces of information that allow 
inferring pre-war investor status. Table E.1 below lists all pre-war investors identified in this way, 
and gives the individual reason for doing so. Three main reasons can be distinguished: Firstly, the 
investor appearing in the commission records is identified by the records as a sister company of 
the destination company, which implies a common parent outside of Germany, given the 
expropriation or at least freezing abroad of German external assets during and after the War. By 
the reasoning given above, the common parent must therefore have been a pre-war investor. 
Because sister companies did, as a rule, not directly own any equity shares of their German sister, 
they are not captured by the general identification mechanism for pre-war investors. The implicit 
assumption behind nevertheless assigning that status is that sister companies did not take 
independent decisions, but invested only under the direction of the common parent. This 
assumption is supported by available evidence on the investment activity of multinationals at the 
time, given in great detail by the multitude of audit reports of regional tax offices charged with the 
enforcement of exchange controls (Devisenüberwachung) which are contained in the commission 
records156. Secondly, the investor appearing in the commission records did not legally hold any 
ownership share in the destination company at the time of application, but was the effective non-
resident owner, while the shares of the destination company were held by domestic trustees. Using 
senior managers or lawyers as German trustees was a feasible method of achieving the coveted 
status of a “German” company during the National Socialist regime. Inversely, stating in the 
investment application after June 1950 that one was merely (re-)acquiring legal rights was used as 
justification for paying less than the intrinsic value of the shares, as was otherwise stipulated by 
investment regulations. However, determining the degree of effective control over a company in 
the absence of legal rights is a non-trivial problem, introducing potential ambiguity into the 
indicator variable for pre-war investors. Therefore, I only assign that status in case the application 
papers explicitly identify the non-resident applicant as the effective foreign owner of the 
destination company. Thirdly, the investor appearing in the commission records is known either 
to be at present a shareholder in a German company other than the stated destination companies; 
or to have been a shareholder of a German company during the interwar period, whether that was 
a post-war destination itself or any other German company. In that case, the investor had liquidated 
her share in the meantime, but still qualifies as a pre-war investor, given her former activity. 
                                                 
156 For one extensive example, see BArch B102.6811, 121. Sitzung (16.6.1955), Liste A, Nr. 13, documents following 
letter of March 12, 1956, by Bundesminister der Finanzen Dr. Laumann to Bank deutscher Länder Dr. Rietz and 




Considering the various ways of identifying pre-war investors in the commission records, the 
corresponding indicator variable constructed for estimation purposes represents the lower bound 
of pre-war investors in the data. 
Table E.1 Pre-war investors not identifiable by direct equity share in a destination company. 
Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Reason for identification as pre-war investor 
38 4 --- 7  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common British parent.  







 Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swiss owner. 
75 5 --- 22  Ruch et al. (2001), p. 125. 
132 8 --- 11  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 
 70 B 9  
 70 B 10  
 70 B 11  
141 8 --- 23  Investor had already been owner of destination company 
 39 A 9  before the War. 
 52 D 11  
175 9 --- 27  Investor had already been owner of destination company 










 BArch B102.6793, 98. Sitzung (2.7.1954), Liste B,  
 Nr. 14, Prüfungsbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion Stuttgart    
 vom 9.2.1955, p. 4.  
281 13 --- 1  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 German owners had always acted as trustees for Swiss  
 parent company. 
 BArch B102.6743, 14. Sitzung (16.3.1951), Nr. 41,  
 Stellungnahme des AHK. 
 14 --- 41 
 15 --- 34 
 24 1 11 
 40 D 35 
 56 B 11 







 At time of investment, investor was already shareholder  
 in a German company that had existed since before the War. 
 https://www.terrot.de/de/unternehmen/historie.aspx 
 last accessed on February 26, 2019, 11.34am. 
342 14 --- 47  Investor already has subsidiary in Munich at time of  
 initial post-war investment.  61 D 19 
377 15 --- 41  Investor has been the owner of one destination company  
 since before the War, indirectly through Austrian  
 subsidiary. 
 BArch B102.6811, 121. Sitzung (16.6.1955), Liste A, 
 Nr. 13, Prüfungsbericht der Oberfinanzdirektion  
 Hamburg vom 15.11.1955, p. 3. 
 17 --- 5 
 28 1 6 
 28 1 7 
 69 D 30 
 74 D 29 














 Destination company had existed since before the War, 
 German owners have acted as trustees for Swedish  
 parent company. Swedish parent owns all patents and  
 special-purpose machines of the destination company. 
519 19 --- 19  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 
 32 C 18 
 62 D 2 
 78 B 2 
 88 B 3 
521 19 --- 22  Investor already held share in destination company  







 Destination company had existed since before the War, 
 with German owners but as agent of British investor, AHK: 
“practically a subsidiary of London firm”. BArch B102.6745, 










 Investor was indirect pre-war investor through her partial  
 ownership of other US company with German subsidiary,  

















































 Hug (2002), p. 285. 
711 23 1 29  One destination company had existed since before the   
 War, German owners acted as trustees for Swiss  
 parent company. 
 http://www.test.swiss- ships.ch/rheinschiffahrt/rheinreeder/lloyd-ag-
basel/lloyd-ag-flottenlisten/lloyd-ag-basel-liste.html 
 last accessed on February 26, 2019, 3.29pm. 
 28 2 58 
 40 D 14 
 44 D 14 
 55 D 19 
 55 D 26 
 64 B 10 
 64 B 11 
 64 B 12 
 81 D 
A 
14 
 85  3 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Reason for identification as pre-war investor 
711 100 D 2  See above 
748 23 2 71  Unclear age of destination company, but investor was  













 Owners of foreign investor had been shareholders in  
 destination company already before the War. 
 BArch B102.6794, 100. Sitzung (30.7.1954), Liste W, 
 Nr. 11, Bericht des AHK, Devisenüberwachung, vom 
 17.12.1952. 
935 28 2 72  Destination company had existed since before the War,  







 Investor had been the owner of a German company since  
 before the War. 
1009 30 2 49  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common US owner. 
1041 31 1 4  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swiss parent. 
1055 31 1 8  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 
 31 1 9  
1180 34 A 4  Destination company had existed since before the War,  





























































 Investor was owner of other pre-war investor, appearing,  
 for example, in meeting 11, case No. 2. 
 
 See also BArch B102.6749, 35. Sitzung (20.12.1951),  
 Liste C, Nr. 30, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
1270 35 D 3  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swiss shareholders. 
1275 35 D 8   Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Dutch-British parent. 
1367 37 B 6  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Italian parent. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Reason for identification as pre-war investor 
1393 37 D 16  Destination company had existed since before the War,  










 Son of pre-war investor with majority ownership of  
 destination company.  
 BArch B102.6800, 111. Sitzung (14.1.1955), Liste D,  
 Nr. 49, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
1605 42 C 
 
2  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 



















 One destination company had existed since before the  
 War, investor was sister company, common British parent. 
1677 44 A 7  Destination company had existed since before the War,  







 Destination company had existed since before the War, 






















 One destination company had existed since before the  
 War, investor was sister company in an international  
 holding structure. 
 See also: NARA, Record Group 260, Records of the German 
External Assets Branch of the U.S. Allied Commission for 
Austria (USACA) Section, 1945-1950, Publication Number 
M1928, Roll 0105-0106. 







 Investor already held share in destination company  
 before the War. 
1899 48 D 41  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common US owners. 
2066 52 C 1  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 







 Investor was effective parent company without legal  
 ownership share in destination company at time of  
 investment. However, it had initially held a share before  
 the War. 
2210 55 D 18  Destination company had existed since before the War, 
 German owners act as trustees for French (Saarland) 
 parent company.   
2238 56 D 13  Investor already held share in destination company  
 before the War. 
2251 57 B 13  Destination company had existed since before the War,  







 Destination company had existed since before the War,  














 Jones (1986), p. 24. 
2313 58 D 20  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swiss shareholder. 
2363 60 C 8  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company. 
2385 60 D 29  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common owners. 
2526 65 B 10  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Dutch parent. 
2545 65 D 18  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common British parent. 
2615 67 B 2  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swedish parent. 
2639 67 D 6  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 
2646 67 D 16  Investor had no legal ownership share in destination   
 company of the same name that had existed since before  
 the War, but had already granted extensive post-war  
 reconstruction loans that were subsequently converted  
 into equity capital. 
2651 67 D 20  Investor had identical firm in Germany before the War. 
2839 72 D 51  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Austrian owners. 
3153 81 B 7  Destination company had existed since before the War,  










 Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 German owners had always acted as trustees for Swiss  
 parent company. 
3458 89 B 4  Destination company has worked exclusively under a  
 licence of the investor since the 1930s. A formal  
 ownership share had been intended since that time but   
 was only realized in 1953.  
 BArch B102.6782, 89. Sitzung (19.2.1954), Liste B,  
 Nr. 4, Stellungnahme des LWM. 
3535 90 D 24  Investor had been the owner of a German company 
 before the War., see PA AA R117.263, Band 1, Schreiben 
Handelsabteilung der Kgl. Britischen Botschaft an 
Auswärtiges Amt, 14.3.1932. 
3579 91 D 42  Destination company had existed since before the War,  







 Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swiss parent. 
3956 103 D 21  Investor had already been owner of destination company 
     before the War. 




Inv.-ID Meeting List Case Reason for identification as pre-war investor 
4099 109 D 1  Owners of investor companies had already been owners  
 of destination company before the War. 
4201 111 D 47  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 German owners had always acted as trustees for Swiss  
 parent company. 
 
4232 112 D 3  Destination company had existed since before the War,  
 investor was sister company, common Swiss owners. 
 
 
Appendix F – Economic Sectors 
The distribution of FDI across economic sectors represents one interesting dimension of the 
investment commission data. In particular, it is a precondition for estimating the influence of 
sectoral agglomeration on the location choice of non-resident investors across West German 
districts during the period under consideration. Sectoral agglomeration itself can be measured by 
using sectoral employment shares derived from the West German occupation census of September 
1950, which is conveniently timed to virtually coincide with the beginning of the period covered 
by the commission data.  
The use of the census data is significantly complicated by the fact that the results were published 
separately for each German Land. Eight out of nine Länder (excluding West Berlin and later 
Saarland) use exactly the same classification to present district-level results, in the form of the 
number of people working in a particular economic sector (Wirtschaftsgruppe). Thus, the results 
are already given in the ideal form for calculating sectoral employment shares. For unknown 
reasons, however, North Rhine-Westphalia chose to publish district-level results only in the form 
of the number of people working in a particular occupational group (Berufsgruppe). Even though 
economic sectors and occupational groups are related as measured by Wirtschaftsgruppe and 
Berufsgruppe respectively, they are distinct from each other in two important dimensions: On the 
one hand, Berufsgruppen are defined more broadly than Wirtschaftsgruppen. Thus, the single 
Berufsgruppe “Nahrungs- und Genußmittelhersteller” can be attributed to five different 
Wirtschaftsgruppen, which are “Mühlen- und Bäckereigewerbe“; „Fleisch-, Milch-, 
Zuckerindustrie”; “Obstverwertung, Gewürzverarbeitung”; “Getränkeherstellung”; and 
“Tabakwarenherstellung”. On the other hand, occupational groups have an additional dimension 




Thus, the Berufsgruppe “Nahrungs- und Genußmittelhersteller” does not include all individuals 
working in the food, beverages and tobacco industries. There are the additional occupational 
groups of  “Gewerbliche Hilfsberufe”, “Ingenieure und Techniker”, “Technische Sonderfach-
kräfte”, and “Maschinisten und zugehörige Berufe”. Some individuals falling in each of these 
groups likely worked in the food, beverages and tobacco industries. 
Being by far the most important Land at the time in terms of population and economic turnover, 
North Rhine-Westphalia cannot simply be excluded from the sample. As a consequence, the much 
more suitable classification employed by the other Länder needs to be abandoned to conform with 
the important outlier. I do so by creating sixteen comprehensive economic sectors which 
accommodate the two different classifications as well as possible and which are presented in Table 
F.1 below. Specifically, I calculate sectoral employment shares per district by summing the total 
workforce for each sector (Erwerbspersonen insgesamt) and dividing by the overall total 
workforce in the particular district. For all Länder, this overall workforce excludes assisting 
relatives (mithelfende Familienangehörige) in agriculture (sector 1), as well as all types of 
pensioners and recipients of transfer payments (Selbstständige Berufslose)157. Specifically for 
North Rhine Westphalia, I also exclude the four additional occupational groups mentioned above 
from the overall workforce. To nevertheless ensure comparability with districts located in the other 
eight Länder, I thus implicitly assume that these four groups were distributed uniformly across the 
sixteen sectors. In other words, each industry employed an identical proportion of regular workers 
to technicians, etc. Across all districts in North-Rhine Westphalia, the share of the four excluded 
groups in the overall workforce amounted to between 2.5 and 10.3 percent, with an average value 
of 6.4 percent. 
The original district-level results of the 1950 occupation census are published in the following 
volumes, as referenced in the list of published sources above: Bayerisches Statistisches Landesamt 
(1953), Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (1952), Niedersächsisches Amt für Landesplanung 
und Statistik (1953), Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (1954), Statistisches 
Landesamt Bremen (1953), Statistisches Landesamt der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg (1953), 
Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen (1952), Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz 
(1952), Statistisches Landesamt Schleswig-Holstein (1953). 
                                                 
157 For a concise definition of the term Erwerbspersonen, see the technical documentation provided by any of the 
Land Statistical Authorities in the respective publications of the census results. For the Bavarian example, see 




Table F.1 Matching of Berufsgruppen and Wirtschaftsgruppen. 
Sector 
North Rhine-Westphalia Other Länder 
No. 
Berufsabteilung (single digit) or 




1 1 Berufe des Pflanzenbaus und der 
Tierwirtschaft 
03 Landwirtschaft und Tierzucht 
  ier irtsc aft 04 Forst- und Jagdwirtschaft 
   05 Gärtnerei 
   08 See- und Küstenfischerei 
   09 Binnenfischerei 
2 21 Bergmännische Berufe 11 Steinkohlenbergbau 
   12 Braunkohlenbergbau 
   13 Erzbergbau (auch Aufbereitung) 
   14 Salzbergbau und Salinen 
   15 Sonstiger Bergbau 
3 22 Steingewinner und –verarbeiter, 17 Industrie der Steine und Erden 
  Keramiker   
4 25/ Metallerzeuger und –verarbeiter  21 Eisenschaffende Industrie 
 /26  22 NE-Metallerzeugung 
   23 Stahl- und Waggonbau 
   24 Maschinen- und Apparatebau 
   25 Schiffbau 
   26 Fahrzeugbau 
   28 Feinmechanik und Optik 
   29 Metallwarenfertigung 
   44 Musikinstrumente, Spielwaren,  
    Schmuckwaren 
5 27 Elektriker 27 Elektrotechnik 
6 28 Chemiewerker 31 Mineralölindustrie 
   32 Chemische Grundindustrie 
   35 Gummi- und Asbestverarbeitung 
7 29 Kunststoffverarbeiter 34 Kunststoffverarbeitung 
8 23 Glasmacher 36 Feinkeramische und Glasindustrie 
9 30/ Holzverarbeiter und zugehörige 37 Sägerei und Holzverarbeitung 
 /31 Berufe 38 Holzverarbeitung 
 32 Papierhersteller und –verarbeiter  39 Papiererzeugung, 
 33 Graphische Berufe  Druckereigewerbe 
10 34/ Textilhersteller und –verarbeiter 41 Ledererzeugung und –verarbeitung  
 /35 Lederhersteller, Leder- und  42 Textilgewerbe 
 36 Fellverarbeiter 43 Bekleidungsgewerbe 
11 37 Nahrungs- und Genußmittel- 45 Mühlen- und Bäckereigewerbe 
  hersteller 46 Fleisch-, Milch-, Zuckerindustrie 
   47 Obstverwertung, Gewürzverarb. 
   48 Getränkeherstellung 





North Rhine-Westphalia Other Länder 
No. 
Berufsabteilung (single digit) or 




12 24 Bauberufe 53 Architektur-, Vermessungsbüros 
   54 Hoch- und Tiefbau 
   55 Zimmerei und Dachdeckerei 
   56 Bau- und Elektroinstallation 
   57 Ausbaugewerbe 
   59 Bauhilfsgewerbe 
13 51 Kaufmännische Berufe 65/ Warenhandel und Verlags- 
   /66 gewerbe 
   67 Vermittlung und Werbung 
    (Wirtschaftswerbung und Hilfs- 
    gewerbe des Handels) 
   68 Geld-, Bank- und Börsenwesen 
   69 Versicherungswesen 
   75 Nachrichten- und Schreibbüros 
14 53 Gaststättenberufe 71 Grundstücksverwaltung 
   72 Gaststättenwesen 
   73 Theaterwesen, private Forschung 
15 52 Verkehrsberufe 82 Deutsche Bundesbahn 
   83 Schienenbahnen 
   84 Straßenverkehr 
   85 Schiff.- und Wasserstraßenwesen 
   86 Luftverkehr 
   87 Verkehrsneben- und hilfsgewerbe 
16 6 Berufe der Haushalts-, 19 Energiewirtschaft 
  Gesundheits- und Volkspflege 74 Sportpflege 
 7 Berufe des Verwaltungs- und 76 Photographisches Gewerbe 
  Rechtswesens 77 Friseurgewerbe 
 8 Berufe des Geistes- und 78 Reinigungs- und Bewachungsgew. 
  Kunstlebens 79 Häusliche Dienste 
 91 Berufstätige ohne nähere 81 Deutsche Bundespost  
  Berufsangabe 91 Öffentliche Verwaltung 
   92 Besatzungsmächte 
   93 Politische und wirtschaftliche 
    Organisationen 
   94 Rechts- und Wirtschaftsberatung 
   95 Kirchen, weltanschaul. Verein. 
   96 Erziehung, Wissenschaft, Kultur 
   97 Fürsorge und Wohlfahrtspflege 
   98 Sozialversicherung 
   99 Gesundheitswesen und Hygiene 




Appendix G – Currency conversion of commission data 
In the records of the investment commission, amounts of money are denominated in Deutschmark. 
For estimation purposes, I convert these Deutschmark (DM) amounts into Swiss Francs (CHF), 
using quarterly averages of the exchange rates quoted in the evening edition of the Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung.  
-  For investment occurring with foreign exchange (Deviseneinbringung) or through the 
importation of some kind of tangible capital (Sacheinbringung), I use the official DM-CHF 
exchange rate for conversion. From the beginning of the period under observation to May 11, 
1953, this rate is equal to the clearing parity of 103.90 CHF (bid) and 104.30 CHF (ask) for 100 
DM. From May 12, 1953, to the end of the period under observation, the rate fluctuates slightly 
around the clearing parity, because pegged trading in Deutschmark foreign exchange had resumed 
in Zurich on that day. 
Quarterly averages of the official DM-CHF exchange rate, based on the average of bid and ask 
prices, are therefore given as:  
Table G.1 – Quarterly averages of the official DM-CHF exchange rate 
Quarter Average exchange rate Quarter Average exchange rate 
3rd q 1950 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 1st q 1953 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 
4th q 1950 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 2nd q 1953 1.042225 CHF for 1 DM 
1st q 1951 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 3rd q 1953 1.041565 CHF for 1 DM 
2nd q 1951 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 4th q 1953 1.043653 CHF for 1 DM 
3rd q 1951 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 1st q 1954 1.044203 CHF for 1 DM 
4th q 1951 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 2nd q 1954 1.041903 CHF for 1 DM 
1st q 1952 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 3rd q 1954 1.041506 CHF for 1 DM 
2nd q 1952 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 4th q 1954 1.041141 CHF for 1 DM 
3rd q 1952 1.041 CHF for 1 DM 1st q 1955 1.041737 CHF for 1 DM 
4th q 1952 1.041 CHF for 1 DM   
 
-  For investment occurring with acquired Sperrmark or Libka-Mark, I use the corresponding 
exchange rate for conversion. This is the acquired Sperrmark rate from June 4, 1951, until 
September 16, 1954, and the Libka-Mark rate from September 17, 1954 until the end of the period 




On March 15, 1951, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung notes that the average rate for 100 DM 
in Sperrmark was 56.60 CHF two days earlier158. This is in broadly in line with early average 
prices for June 1951 as published in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. (48.50 on June 4, 54.75 on June 
30). Due to the absence of any additional information, I use the single quote for March 13 as the 
average rate for the first quarter of 1951. Quarterly averages of the Sperrmark/Libka-Mark 
exchange rate, again based on the average of bid and ask prices, are therefore given as:  
 
Table G.2 – Quarterly averages of the Sperrmark/Libka-Mark exchange rate. 
Quarter Average exchange rate Quarter Average exchange rate 
3rd q 1950 --- 1st q 1953 0.6104054 CHF for 1 DM 
4th q 1950 --- 2nd q 1953 0.6094366 CHF for 1 DM 
1st q 1951 0.565 CHF for 1 DM 3rd q 1953 0.6537987 CHF for 1 DM 
2nd q 1951 0.5032 CHF for 1 DM 4th q 1953 0.7287666 CHF for 1 DM 
3rd q 1951 0.6192308 CHF for 1 DM 1st q 1954 0.8676013 CHF for 1 DM 
4th q 1951 0.5872297 CHF for 1 DM 2nd q 1954 0.9827778 CHF for 1 DM 
1st q 1952 0.5643421 CHF for 1 DM 3rd q 1954 0.9704747 CHF for 1 DM 
2nd q 1952 0.5822535 CHF for 1 DM 4th q 1954 0.9936635 CHF for 1 DM 
3rd q 1952 0.6356962 CHF for 1 DM 1st q 1955 0.9957368 CHF for 1 DM 
4th q 1952 0.6412666 CHF for 1 DM   
 
As quarterly averages are already quoted in CHF for 1 DM, I simply multiply the respective 
Deutschmark amount invested with the corresponding quarterly average exchange rate, in order to 







                                                 




Appendix H – Archival data on corporate pre-war US investors 
I retrieve information on corporations from the United States of America having invested in 
Germany before the Second World War from the US National Archives in College Park/Maryland. 
The corresponding records can be found in Record Group Number 265, Entry Number NC 8-2, 
“Foreign Funds Control, TFR-500: Original Reports Series A-II (by Organization), 1943 – 1945”.  
Overall, the records containing the original TFR-500 reports are divided into three parts: Reports 
filed by individuals (A-I), by organizations (A-II) and by trustees (A-III). Foreign investment by 
US corporations is contained in reports by organizations (A-II). The term “organization” is meant 
broadly: Beyond business corporations, it also includes endowments, trust companies, universities 
and church organizations, as well as banks. One individual organization is identified by having 
filed a “Series A-II: Summary Report by Organizations” (red form). 
For the purpose of identifying the universe of corporate, pre-war US investors in Germany, I only 
retain organizations that reported owning a subsidiary in Germany. This definition corresponds to 
the Classes A1 (Corporations, associations, and similar organizations), A2 (Branches) or A3 
(Partnerships) on the “Series B: Detailed Property Report by jurisdiction” (white form), if the 
German subsidiary was in direct ownership of the US organization. In this case, organizations had 
to file an additional “Series C: Report of Interests in Primary Allied Organizations” (blue form). 
If the German subsidiary was in indirect ownership of the US organization, e.g. through its 
subsidiary in Great Britain, the German subsidiary would not appear on the white form for 
Germany, but rather on the white form for Great Britain. However, the US organization had to file 
a “Series C Supplement: Report of Interests in Secondary Allied Organizations” (yellow form) for 
its German subsidiary. In practice, therefore, I identify corporate, pre-war US investors in 
Germany as the organizations that filed a blue or yellow form for their ownership of a German 
company. Organizations had to submit a separate blue or yellow form for each German company 
they owned. 
This definition excludes any other type of German assets, including corporate shares (Class C-11). 
Ownership of Class C-11 assets is equivalent to mere portfolio investment, as blue or yellow forms 
had to be filed even in case of “ownership of less than 25 percent of voting securities”. Typical C-
11 assets are shares of Deutsche Bank, Rudolph Karstadt, or IG Farben. However, this restrictive 




For estimation purposes, I subsequently include those other assets in total assets owned in 
Germany by the corporate investors, rather than using only the German assets organized within 
the particular blue-form or yellow-form subsidiaries. 
Appendix H.1 – Excluded cases 
The purpose of collecting data on corporate, pre-war US investors is to determine which of these 
corporations invested in West Germany during the first half of the 1950s. This purpose necessitates 
excluding a number of corporations from the sample. Firstly, corporations need to have been able 
to invest during the post-war period in the first place. Therefore, I exclude all corporations which 
had become defunct or inactive by 1950, as well as all for which it is not verifiable whether they 
were still active in 1955, the end of my post-war period under consideration. Secondly, 
corporations should have been US corporations already at the time they made their pre-war 
investments in Germany. For this reason, I exclude the following cases: 
-  Organizations designated on the TFR-500 forms as „Alien property“. Such organizations 
were ultimately owned by enemy nationals, i.e. Germans, and were put under sequester by an 
Alien Property Custodian. 
- Corporations belonging to the Stinnes group. The owners of the German industrial 
conglomerate had transferred their worldwide assets into US holding structures and had managed 
to avoid sequester as of 1943159. Therefore, they do not fall under the “Alien property” designation 
in the TFR-500 forms.  
-  Corporations belonging to the Jakob-Michael group or the Petschek group. Jakob Michael 
was a German merchant who had assembled a conglomerate of German companies during the 
1920s. He emigrated to the Netherlands in 1931 and the United States in 1939. He managed to 
escape “aryanization” of his German assets, notably the “Deutsche Familien-Kaufhaus (DeFaKa)”, 
and was active in Germany during the post-war period160. The Petschek family were Czech 
industrialists who expanded into German industry during the 1920s, notably into soft coal mining. 
Even though they sold most of their German assets during the 1930s, they had retained residual 
ownership shares until 1943 (Gall 2006, 65) 161.  
                                                 
159 They were sequestered later on, cf. Der Spiegel, Nr. 24, June 12, 1957, p. 22 “Die Aktien vom Delaware”. 
160 Jaeger, Hans, "Michael, Jakob" in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 17 (1994), S. 425 f. [Online-Version]; URL: 
https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd138377413.html#ndbcontent, last accessed on Feb. 2, 2019, 4.44pm. 
161 Geršlová, Jana, "Petschek, Julius" in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 20 (2001), S. 268-269 [Online-Version]; URL: 




-  Miscellaneous cases. The Church of Latter-day Saints owned a church in Selbongen, East 
Prussia, which did not constitute a business enterprise. The Witroth corporation was a shell 
company representing Rothschild ownership claims to the Vítkovice Iron Works in Czecho-
slovakia, which they had been forced to sell to the Reichswerke Hermann Göring in 1939 
(Ferguson 1998, 1001). The Westhold corporation and the North River Securities Corporation 
were holding structures for the Czechoslovakian Bata shoemaking corporation162. Both the 
Rothschild and the Bata group historically owned German companies through their 
Czechoslovakian companies, which therefore did not represent pre-war US investments. 
Table H.1.1 – List of excluded US corporations with pre-war subsidiaries in Germany. 
US corporation Reason for exclusion 
Atlantic Assets Corporation, c/o Corporation 
Trust Co., Wilmington  
Alien property 
Joh. Barth & Sohn, Inc., New York 
 
Alien property 
Casco Bay Timber Company, Portland Alien property 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
Salt Lake City 
Church organization 
Continental "Borvisk" Company, Wilmington 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Davis & Company, Inc., Houston 
 
Inactive by 1950 
The Deimel Linen-Mesh system company, 
San Francisco 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Eitingon-Schild Co. Inc., New York 
 
Inactive by 1950 
G. Hirsch Sons, Inc., New York 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Independent Casing Company, Chicago 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
International Mortgage & Investment 
Corporation, New York 
Alien property 
Koenig Medicine Company, Chicago 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Kupfer Bros. Co. Inc., New York 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Magdalena Syndicate, New York  
 
Inactive by 1950 
New England Industries Inc. (formerly New 
England Securities Corporation), New York 
 
Jakob Michael holding 
New Jersey Industries Inc. (formerly: Phelan 
Beale Investment and Securities Corporation), 
New York 
 
Jakob Michael holding 
North River Securities Corporation, New York Czech holding company (Bata) 
Northeastern Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Hartford 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
R. Schiffmann Co., Los Angeles 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Hugo Stinnes Corporation, Baltimore Stinnes holding 
Hugo Stinnes Industries, Inc., New York Stinnes holding 
                                                 




US corporation Reason for exclusion 
Swiss "Borvisk" Company, Wilmington Unverifiable activity by 1955 
Trubenizing Process Corporation, New York 
 
Unverifiable activity by 1955 
United Continental Corporation, New York Petschek holding 
Westhold Corporation, New York Czech holding company (Bata) 
Witroth Corporation, Wilmington 
 
Holding company for claims on 
Vítkovice Iron Works, Czechoslovakia 
 
Appendix H.2 – Merged cases 
Corporations frequently used legally separate, US-based holding companies for their overseas 
assets, while at the same time retaining a fraction of these assets on their own books. Not 
accounting for this fact would result in counting the same investor multiple times. It would also 
not be clear to which of the related US corporations to attribute potential post-war investment 
activity. Therefore, I merge holding (daughter) companies with their respective parent company. 
The ultimate parent corporation is identifiable through item Six on the “Series A-II: Summary 
Reports by Organization“ (red form), which reads “Name and address of particular person or 
persons, if any, having ultimate control of organization […]”.  
To properly consolidate balance sheets of parent and daughter companies would require detailed 
financial information to a degree which is not systematically available from the TFR-500 records. 
Retrieving such information for each individual corporation is beyond the scope of the present 
project. Therefore, I simply add the value of the assets reported by daughter (holding) companies 
to their respective parent. Note that this likely results in overestimating total assets for corporations 
using separate holding companies, which is worse the more of these companies are used. 
Table H.2.1 – List of merged parent and daughter corporations among US pre-war investors.  
Merged daughter/holding company Parent company 
Aris Gloves Co. Inc., Gloversville 
 
 
Aris Gloves Inc., Gloversville 
 
 
Bavarian Oil and Gas Corporation,  
New York 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company Incorporated, 
New York. 
Bedford Construction Company,  
New York 
Corn Products Refining Company, New York 
Charmil Inc., Wilmington 
 
Northeastern Insurance Company of Hartford, 
Hartford  
The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, 
Wilmington 
The Coca-Cola Company, Wilmington 





Merged daughter/holding company Parent company 
Electrical Products Investors 
Corporation, New York 
International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation, New York 
 The Forak Company, New York Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), New 
York (64%) 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company Incorporated, 
New York (18%) 
The Texas Company, New York (13%) 
Foreign Investments Inc., New Haven The Stanley Works, New Britain 
Foreign Securities Company, Chicago Swift and Company (Illinois), Chicago 
Richard Hudnut, Inc., New York William R. Warner & Co. Inc. (Delaware), 
New York 
International Affiliated Corporation,  
New York 
William R. Warner & Co. Inc. (Delaware), 
New York 
International General Electric Company 
Inc., New York  
General Electric Company, Schenectady 
International Harvester Export Company, 
Chicago 
International Harvester Company, Chicago 
International Securities Company,  
New York 
The Singer Manufacturing Company,  
New York 
International Standard Electric 
Corporation, New York 
International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation, New York  
Jadev Corporation, New York Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
 Markt & Company Inc., New York Markt & Hammacher Company, New York 
The Melltone Corporation, Niagara Falls The Carborundum Company, Niagara Falls 
North River Securities Corporation,  
New York 
Westhold Corporation, New York 
Otis Elevator Company (Maine),  
New York  
 
Otis Elevator Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
Pan Foreign Corporation, New York  Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
Pown Corporation, Rochester Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester 
Schoonmaker-Scott Company, Chicago Butler Brothers, Chicago 
Signode International Limited, Chicago Signode Steel Strapping Company, Chicago 
Singer Sewing Machine Company,  
New York 
The Singer Manufacturing Company,  
New York 
Stanco, Inc., New York Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 
New York 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
Standard Oil Development Company, 
New York 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
Sterling Products International Inc., 
Newark 
Sterling Drug Inc., New York 
Texaco Development Corporation,  
Jersey City 




Merged daughter/holding company Parent company 
Tide Water Associated Oil Company, 
New York 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey),  
New York 
Titan Company Inc., New York National Lead Company, New York 
Union Special Machine Corporation of 
America, Chicago 
, Chicago 
Union Special Machine Company, Chicago 
United States Lines Operations Inc.,  
New York 




Appendix I – Data from Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951).  
The publication of Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951) represents an attempt by East German 
researchers to uncover the “malign influence” of  “international financial capital” on West German 
industry, in order to support the “fight against American plans to draw West Germany into a new 
World War” (ibidem, 7). It does so by compiling a list of West German companies under foreign 
influence, which the authors intended to be as comprehensive as possible. The list of sources 
provided on p. 53 includes a variety of business manuals, mostly from the late 1930s, such as the 
“Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften”, the British “The Bankers Almanac and Year 
Book”, or the American “Moody’s Industrials”. Despite the clear political intention behind the 
publication, its empirical methodology is well documented and attempts to account as precisely as 
possible for intricate corporate group structures. Thus, it gives the direct equity share of the foreign 
parent in the German company (Kapitalbeteiligung des ausländischen Kapitalbesitzers), as well 
as its effective equity share through third corporations (Tatsächlicher Einfluss des ausländischen 
Kapitalbesitzers). It also documents the companies for which the precise foreign equity share was 
not retrievable (represented by a question mark in the respective column), or for which foreign 
influence is only presumptive, for example, through the existence of a licensing agreement 
(represented by a hyphen, a dot, or a blank space in the column giving the equity share). 
Using the data for estimation purposes requires acknowledging both their ideological background 
and the real need to account for ramified corporate structures that make it difficult to determine 
the effective degree of control exercised by corporate headquarters over their subsidiaries. 
Therefore, I use Tatsächlicher Einfluss to measure equity share, but only as benchmark values in 




Moreover, the list of non-German sources provided on p. 53 and 54 has a clear Anglo-American 
focus and likely overestimates the weight of large US and British corporations relative to smaller 
investors from other countries. In fact, the authors acknowledge their inability to capture the 
“multitude of small participations” for the case of the Netherlands on p. 45. As a consequence, I 
use the data as a simple geographical control variable indicating the number of foreign-owned 
companies in a particular district. In this way, I interpret them only as a lower benchmark of the 
overall presence of foreign corporations on the local level across Germany, thereby assuming that 
they at least capture all foreign-owned companies above a certain quantitative threshold. I do not, 
however, employ them as higher-dimensional control variables by differentiating the data 
according to countries of origin of the foreign parent company, even though the structure of the 
data would technically allow for that. 
Starting on p. 83, the publication presents a list of companies under foreign influence, according 
to economic sector and within sectors according to country of origin of the foreign influence. In 
compiling the variable indicating the number of foreign-owned companies for each West German 
district, I exclude companies from my sample for the following reasons: 
-  Companies with an indeterminate foreign ownership share, indicated by a question mark, 
a hyphen, a dot, or a blank space in the column specifying Tatsächlicher Einfluss in %. In this 
way, I attempt to control for possibly biased sampling by the authors, who had a clear ideological 
incentive to inflate the number of foreign-owned companies in West Germany. 
-  Companies located in West Berlin. The records of the post-war Investment Commission 
do not include investments into West Berlin that would necessitate collecting corresponding data 
for the local incidence of foreign-owned companies since the pre-war period. Importantly, 
Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951) distinguishes the location of subsidiaries within Germany of 
the main German subsidiary of the foreign parent company, such as for the case of Unilever on p. 
360. Thus, there is a low risk of missing observations across West Germany (excluding Berlin), 
even though geographical information is in principle based on the legal location of company 
headquarters. 
-  Companies which had come under their current ownership at a time during which that 
owner was still German. This is analogous to the discussion in Appendix H.1. The corresponding 
foreign owners are as listed in the column Ausländischer Kapitalbesitzer:  




New Jersey Industries Inc., New York; Jakob-Michael holding, see Appendix H.1. 
Thyssen-Bornemisza-Konzern (Rotterdamsch Trustee’s Kantoor NV, Rotterdam; Bank voor 
Handel en Scheepvaart NV, Rotterdam); The Thyssen family was a prominent dynasty in German 
heavy industry. During the interwar period, they transferred their shares in German companies to 
shell corporations outside of Germany (Rasch 2010, 63). 
The British Metal Corp., London, deren Mutter: Amalgamated Metal Corp. Ltd., London; 
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte, Basel.; These three companies represent borderline 
cases. Historically, they had been part of the German Metallgesellschaft universe of companies 
(Ball 2004). The Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte in fact was a shell company founded 
by Metallgesellschaft in 1910 for tax evasion purposes (Ball 2004, 456). However, their 
Germanness, so to speak, during the interwar period is opaque and it is therefore not entirely clear 
whether they ought to be removed from the pertinent sample of foreign investors according to 
Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951). This is a non-negligible problem, as the three foreign 
companies together are typically reported to own about 25% each of a multitude of German 
companies engaged principally in the (non-ferrous) metal industry. I remove them nevertheless in 
order to achieve a conservative measure of the number and geographical distribution of foreign-
owned companies. 
Theodor Sachs, Santiago de Chile; See Appendix D.2, Table D.2.1, Id-Inv. Number 3691. 
- Companies indicated as having been restituted to their original owners; Corresponding to 
Appendix D.1, I assume the original owners to be ethnic German refugees from National Socialist 
persecution. In this sense, they were not foreign investors during the pre-war period. 
-  Companies established between the lifting of the Allied investment embargo in 1950 and 
the publication of Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951); The following companies are identifiable 
as such through the records of the post-war Investment Commission: 
Information in Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut (1951) Reference in investment 
commission records 
German company Foreign owner Meeting List Number 
Groninger Farbenfabrik, 
Bremen 
Holländisches Kapital 15 --- 42 
Voreux-Wolle-Handels 
GmbH, Frankfurt 
Maurice Voreux, Roubaix; 
Pierre Grisay, Tourcoing. 





Appendix J – Districts (Stadt- und Landkreise) within West Germany 
Using local districts of the Federal Republic of Germany as geographical units for estimation 
purposes requires making two types of adjustment. Firstly, including district-level, pre-war control 
variables requires adjusting these pre-war data for changes to district boundaries occurring 
between the pre-war period and 1950 (Appendix J.2.). 
Secondly, the historical distinction among German districts between Stadtkreise and Landkreise 
needs to be accounted for (Appendix J.1.). Towns above a certain population size typically formed 
their own districts, called Stadtkreis, independently of the surrounding area. Even though this area 
thus formed a separate district, its administrative seat, as well as clearly its economic centre was 
nevertheless identical to the Stadtkreis. As a consequence, such Landkreise can hardly be 
interpreted as economically distinct units of observation. This problem is made worse by the fact 
that the population threshold for towns to be their own Stadtkreis varied for historical reasons 
across West German Länder. Thus, Bavaria accounted for approximately 19% of the West German 
population, but for 34% of its districts, while the smallest Bavarian Stadtkreis had 8,802 
inhabitants in 1950. At the same time, neighbouring Baden-Württemberg accounted for 
approximately 13% of both population and districts, and its smallest Stadtkreis had 36,582 
inhabitants. As a consequence, relatively large districts containing local centres of industry in 
Baden-Württemberg might, for example, exhibit a lower industry employment share than rural 
market towns in Bavaria that happened to be their own Stadtkreis. The true influence of the 
location of industry on Foreign Direct Investment could therefore be underestimated in case the 
latter was attracted to the industrial centre within the large district, rather than the rural market 
town. 
J.1. Merged Stadtkreise and Landkreise  
I merge towns that were their own administrative district (Stadtkreise) with surrounding rural 
districts (Landkreise) if the Stadtkreis town was the administrative seat of the Landkreis.  
I violate this rule in two specific cases: Firstly, I treat the Land of Bremen as one district, even 
though the cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven were two separate administrative districts within 
the Land at the time. The Land of Bremen had issued foreign currency bonds during the 1920 that 
had not been amortized completely by 1950. By merging Bremen and Bremerhaven I add one 
additional district-level observation of outstanding bonded debt to the otherwise low number of 




This can be justified by the fact that the Land of Hamburg was just one district from an 
administrative point of view, yet had almost three times the population of Bremen and 
Bremerhaven combined in 1950. Both city states had outstanding bonded pre-war debt, but one of 
the two observations would have to be deleted due to the fact that it was composed of two districts 
instead of one.  
Secondly, I do not merge the district of Wesermünde with Bremerhaven, even though its 
administration was located in the latter city. I thus avoid merging districts from two different 
Länder, as Wesermünde was part of Lower Saxony. 





 Baden – Württemberg  Number of districts reduced from 73 to 65. 
 Heilbronn  Heilbronn  
 Ulm  Ulm 
 
 
 Karlsruhe  Karlsruhe  
 Heidelberg  Heidelberg  
 Mannheim  Mannheim  
 Pforzheim  Pforzheim  
 Freiburg  Freiburg  
 Konstanz  Konstanz  Actually merged in 1953. 
 Bavaria  Number of districts reduced from 191 to 149. 
 Freising  Freising  
 Ingolstadt  Ingolstadt  
 Landsberg am Lech  Landsberg am Lech  
 München  München  
 Rosenheim  Rosenheim  
 Traunstein  Traunstein  
 Deggendorf  Deggendorf  
 Landshut  Landshut  
 Passau  Passau  
 Straubing  Straubing  
 Amberg  Amberg  
 Neumarkt in der Oberpfalz  Neumarkt in der Oberpfalz  
 Regensburg  Regensburg  
 Bamberg  Bamberg   
 Bayreuth  Bayreuth  
 Coburg  Coburg  
 Forchheim  Forchheim  








 Kulmbach  Kulmbach  
 Ansbach  Ansbach  
 Eichstätt  Eichstätt  
 Erlangen  Erlangen  
 Fürth  Fürth  
 Nürnberg  Nürnberg  
 Rothenburg ob der Tauber  Rothenburg ob der Tauber  
 Schwabach  Schwabach  
 Weißenburg in Bayern  Weißenburg in Bayern  
 Aschaffenburg  Aschaffenburg  
 Bad Kissingen  Bad Kissingen  
 Kitzingen  Kitzingen  
 Schweinfurt  Schweinfurt  
 Würzburg  Würzburg  
 Augsburg  Augsburg  
 Dillingen an der Donau  Dillingen an der Donau  
 Günzburg  Günzburg  
 Kaufbeuren  Kaufbeuren  
 Kempten im Allgäu  Kempten im Allgäu  
 Memmingen  Memmingen  
 Neuburg an der Donau  Neuburg an der Donau  
 Neu-Ulm  Neu-Ulm  
 Nördlingen  Nördlingen  
 Lindau  Lindau  
 Rhineland – Palatinate  Number of districts reduced from 51 to 39. 
 Koblenz  Koblenz  
 Trier  Trier  
 Mainz  Mainz  
 Worms  Worms  
 Frankenthal in der Pfalz  Frankenthal in der Pfalz  
 Kaiserslautern  Kaiserslautern  
 Landau in der Pfalz  Landau in der Pfalz  
 Ludwigshafen am Rhein  Ludwigshafen am Rhein  
 Neustadt an der Weinstraße  Neustadt an der Weinstraße  Alternatively Neustadt/Haardt 
 Pirmasens  Pirmasens  
 Speyer  Speyer  
 Zweibrücken  Zweibrücken  
 Hesse  Number of districts reduced from 48 to 41. 
 Darmstadt  Darmstadt  
 Gießen  Gießen  








 Fulda  Fulda  
 Kassel  Kassel  
 Marburg an der Lahn  Marburg an der Lahn  
 Hanau am Main  Hanau am Main  
 North Rhine – Westphalia  Number of districts reduced from 94 to 85. 
 Leverkusen  Rhein-Wupper-Kreis  Separate after April 1, 1955. 
 Bonn  Bonn  
 Köln  Köln  
 Aachen  Aachen  
 Münster in Westfalen  Münster in Westfalen  
 Recklinghausen  Recklinghausen  
 Bielefeld  Bielefeld  
 Herford  Herford  
 Iserlohn  Iserlohn  
 Siegen  Siegen  
 Lower Saxony  Number of districts reduced from 76 to 65. 
 Hameln  Hameln-Pyrmont  
 Hannover  Hannover  
 Göttingen  Göttingen  
 Hildesheim  Hildesheim-Marienburg  
 Celle  Celle  
 Lüneburg  Lüneburg  
 Wolfsburg  Gifhorn  Separate after October 1, 1951. 
 Osnabrück  Osnabrück  
 Braunschweig  Braunschweig  
 Goslar  Goslar  
 Oldenburg  Oldenburg  
 Bremen  Number of districts reduced from 2 to 1. 
 Bremen  Bremerhaven  
   
 Schleswig – Holstein  Number of districts reduced from 21 to 20. 
 Flensburg  Flensburg  
 Total West Germany  Number of districts reduced from 557 to 466. 
 
J.2. Adjusting 1935 data for 1950 district borders 
District-level control variables based on 1935 turnover tax data need to be adjusted for district 
border changes that occurred between 1935 and 1950. I do this for the districts concerned by 




In practice, I collect the population of municipalities located in the respective districts from the 
official register of German municipalities (Amtliches Gemeindeverzeichnis), which provides 
population figures from the 1933 population census163. I then redistribute municipalities according 
to the district they belonged to in 1950, and sum up the population of all municipalities transferred 
from one particular 1933 district to the 1950 district under consideration. The share of these 
municipalities in the total 1933 population of the original district equals the population weight 
used for redistributing the 1935 tax data. For example, municipalities making up 5.09% of the 
1933 population of the Oberamt Ludwigsburg had become part of the city of Stuttgart in 1950. I 
therefore take 5.09% of the 1935 tax figure of Oberamt Ludwigsburg and add it to the original 
1935 tax figure of Stuttgart, in order to construct the adjusted 1935 data for Stuttgart. 
This adjustment method rests on three assumptions: Firstly, total population did not shift to any 
significant degree among municipalities during the two years in between 1933 and 1935. Secondly, 
turnover tax revenue was distributed uniformly across municipalities within a district. Thirdly, 
individual municipalities were not split up in the process of redrawing district borders. The first 
assumption is justified by the absence of large-scale, intra-German population upheavals during 
the early 1930s. The second assumption is strong, but improves upon the alternative adjustment 
method of using territory rather than population weights. Given the preponderance of low 
mountain ranges across West Germany, I expect economic turnover to be more highly correlated 
with population than with territory. The third assumption is mild, as the administrative partitioning 
of Germany was very fine prior to the 1970s. The vast majority of municipalities in 1933 had a 
population ranging between 100 and 1,000 inhabitants. 
 
The population shares given in the following table add up to one for each 1933 district, except for 
the case that the Federal Republic as a whole lost or gained population compared to the entirety of 
its constituent districts in 1933. The district of Saarburg, for example, lost approximately 30% of 
its 1933 population to the Saarland – effectively a part of France until 1956 – which had been 
enlarged relative to the interwar Saargebiet. In contrast, 2.76% of the 1933 population of the 
Schönberg district of Mecklenburg lived in enclaves in later West Germany which the Soviet 
occupation authorities exchanged for Western enclaves in the Soviet Zone in 1945. 
 
                                                 
163 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a). Amtliches Gemeindeverzeichnis für das Deutsche Reich auf Grund der 




Table J.2.1 – Population shares of 1933 districts in 1950 districts. 
1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Stuttgart Stadt Stuttgart 1 
 Oberamt Eßlingen 0,0217 
 Oberamt Ludwigsburg 0,0509 
 Oberamt Stuttgart-Amt  0,5248 
Backnang Oberamt Backnang 1 
 Oberamt Marbach 0,2537 
 Oberamt Gaildorf 0,6106 
 Oberamt Welzheim 0,0351 
Böblingen Oberamt Böblingen 0,9826 
 Oberamt Herrenberg 0,7780 
 Oberamt Stuttgart-Amt  0,1235 
Esslingen Oberamt Eßlingen 0,9370 
 Oberamt Schorndorf 0,0807 
 Oberamt Stuttgart-Amt  0,3517 
 Oberamt Kirchheim 0,0360 
 Oberamt Göppingen 0,0385 
Heilbronn Oberamt Heilbronn 1 
 Oberamt Neckarsulm 1 
 Oberamt Marbach 0,1384 
 Oberamt Brackenheim 0,9543 
 Oberamt Besigheim 0,2572 
 Amtsbezirk Sinsheim 0,0233 
Leonberg Oberamt Leonberg 1 
 Oberamt Böblingen 0,0174 
 Oberamt Vaihingen 0,0646 
Ludwigsburg Oberamt Ludwigsburg 0,9491 
 Oberamt Besigheim 0,7428 
 Oberamt Marbach 0,6079 
 Oberamt Vaihingen 0,1815 
 Oberamt Waiblingen 0,0348 
Vaihingen Oberamt Vaihingen 0,7538 
 Oberamt Maulbronn 1 
 Oberamt Brackenheim 0,0457 
Waiblingen Oberamt Waiblingen 0,9652 
 Oberamt Schorndorf 0,8851 
 Oberamt Welzheim 0,4628 
Balingen Oberamt Balingen 1 
 Oberamt Sulz 0,1860 
 Oberamt Rottweil 0,0870 




1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Calw Oberamt Calw 1 
 Oberamt Nagold 0,9028 
 Oberamt Neuenbürg 1 
Freudenstadt Oberamt Freudenstadt 1 
 Oberamt Nagold 0,0346 
 Oberamt Horb 0,0508 
 Oberamt Oberndorf 0,0951 
 Oberamt Sulz 0,0427 
Horb Oberamt Horb 0,9492 
 Oberamt Sulz 0,6591 
 Oberamt Rottenburg 0,0452 
 Oberamt Nagold 0,0626 
Nürtingen Oberamt Nürtingen 1 
 Oberamt Kirchheim 0,9107 
 Oberamt Urach 0,0265 
 Oberamt Tübingen 0,0118 
 Oberamt Eßlingen 0,0413 
Reutlingen Oberamt Reutlingen 1 
 Oberamt Tübingen 0,0982 
 Oberamt Urach 0,7693 
Rottweil Oberamt Rottweil 0,9130 
 Oberamt Spaichingen 0,0404 
 Oberamt Oberndorf 0,9049 
 Oberamt Sulz 0,1123 
 Oberamt Tuttlingen 0,0219 
Tübingen Oberamt Tübingen 0,8900 
 Oberamt Herrenberg 0,2220 
 Oberamt Rottenburg 0,9548 
Tuttlingen Oberamt Spaichingen 0,7867 
 Oberamt Tuttlingen 0,9781 
Aalen Oberamt Aalen 0,9592 
 Oberamt Neresheim 0,7844 
 Oberamt Ellwangen (Jagst) 0,9203 
Crailsheim Oberamt Crailsheim 1 
 Oberamt Gerabronn 0,8739 
 Oberamt Künzelsau 0,0285 
Schwäbisch Gmünd Oberamt Gmünd  0,9784 
 Oberamt Welzheim 0,4273 
 Oberamt Gaildorf 0,1835 
 Oberamt Aalen 0,0408 
 Oberamt Göppingen 0,0031 




1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Schwäbisch Hall Oberamt Hall  1 
 Oberamt Künzelsau 0,0634 
 Oberamt Ellwangen 0,0797 
 Oberamt Öhringen 0,0537 
 Oberamt Gaildorf 0,2059 
 Oberamt Gerabronn 0,0211 
Heidenheim Oberamt Heidenheim 1 
 Oberamt Neresheim 0,2156 
 Oberamt Ulm 0,0296 
Künzelsau Oberamt Künzelsau 0,9081 
Mergentheim Oberamt Mergentheim 1 
 Oberamt Gerabronn 0,1051 
Öhringen Oberamt Öhringen 1 
Biberach Oberamt Biberach 0,9940 
 Oberamt Laupheim 0,6730 
 Oberamt Leutkirch 0,2479 
 Oberamt Waldsee 0,3623 
Ehingen Oberamt Ehingen 0,9368 
 Oberamt Biberach 0,0060 
 Oberamt Riedlingen 0,0945 
 Oberamt Münsingen 0,0202 
 Oberamt Blaubeuren 0,1459 
Göppingen Oberamt Göppingen 0,9584 
 Oberamt Kirchheim 0,0533 
 Oberamt Geislingen 0,9111 
 Oberamt Schorndorf 0,0342  
Oberamt Gmünd  0,0216 
 Oberamt Welzheim 0,0748 
Münsingen Oberamt Münsingen 0,9798 
 Oberamt Urach 0,2042 
 Oberamt Geislingen 0,0322 
 Oberamt Ehingen 0,0055 
Ravensburg Oberamt Ravensburg 1 
 Oberamt Waldsee 0,5703 
 Oberamt Saulgau 0,0338 
Saulgau Oberamt Riedlingen 0,9055 
 Oberamt Saulgau 0,9662 
Tettnang  Oberamt Tettnang 0,9755 
Ulm Oberamt Ulm 0,9704 
 Oberamt Laupheim 0,3270 
 Oberamt Geislingen 0,0567 




1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Ulm (continued) Oberamt Ehingen 0,0577 
Wangen Oberamt Wangen 1 
 Oberamt Leutkirch 0,7521 
 Oberamt Waldsee 0,0674 
 Oberamt Tettnang 0,0245 
Konstanz Amtsbezirk Konstanz 1 
 Amtsbezirk Engen 0,5971 
Donaueschingen Amtsbezirk Donaueschingen 1 
 Amtsbezirk Engen 0,3265 
Stockach Amtsbezirk Stockach 1 
 Amtsbezirk Engen 0,0765 
 Amtsbezirk Meßkirch 1 
Überlingen Amtsbezirk Überlingen 1 
 Amtsbezirk Pfullendorf 1 
Müllheim Amtsbezirk Müllheim 1 
 Amtsbezirk Staufen 0,6677 
Freiburg Amtsbezirk Freiburg 1 
 Amtsbezirk Staufen 0,3323 
 Amtsbezirk Waldkirch 0,0933 
Emmendingen Amtsbezirk Emmendingen 1 
 Amtsbezirk Waldkirch 0,9067 
Lörrach Amtsbezirk Lörrach 1 
 Amtsbezirk Schopfheim 0,8066 
Neustadt/Schwarzwald Amtsbezirk Neustadt/Schwarzwald 1 
 Amtsbezirk Schopfheim 0,0296 
   
Säckingen Amtsbezirk Säckingen 1 
 Amtsbezirk Schopfheim 0,1638 
Offenburg Amtsbezirk Offenburg 1 
 Amtsbezirk Oberkirch 1 
Karlsruhe Amtsbezirk Karlsruhe 1 
 Amtsbezirk Bretten 0,5544 
 Amtsbezirk Ettlingen 1 
Bruchsal Amtsbezirk Bruchsal 1 
 Amtsbezirk Bretten 0,2072 
Sinsheim Amtsbezirk Sinsheim 0,9767 
 Amtsbezirk Bretten 0,2158 
 Kreis Heppenheim 0,0560 
Pforzheim Amtsbezirk Pforzheim 1 
 Amtsbezirk Bretten 0,0226 
Mannheim Amtsbezirk Mannheim 1 




1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Heidelberg Amtsbezirk Heidelberg 1 
 Amtsbezirk Wiesloch 1 
Buchen Amtsbezirk Buchen 1 
 Amtsbezirk Adelsheim 1 
Tauberbischofsheim Amtsbezirk Tauberbischofsheim 1 
 Amtsbezirk Wertheim 1 
Marktredwitz Stadt Marktredwitz 1 
 Bezirksamt Wunsiedel 0,0353 
Wunsiedel Bezirksamt Wunsiedel 0,9647 
Coburg Bezirksamt Coburg 1 
 Stadt Rodach bei Coburg 1 
Mellrichstadt Bezirksamt Mellrichstadt 1 
 Kreis Meiningen (Land Thüringen) 0,0415 
Grafenau Bezirksamt Grafenau 1 
 Bezirksamt Deggendorf 0,0041 
Neustadt/Waldnaab Bezirksamt Neustadt an der Waldnaab 1 
 Bezirksamt Kemnath 0,0058 
Oberviechtach Bezirksamt Oberviechtach 1 
 Bezirksamt Vohenstrauß 0,0092 
Regensburg Bezirksamt Regensburg 0,9889 
 Bezirksamt Roding 0,0144 
Straubing Bezirksamt Straubing 1 
 Bezirksamt Regensburg 0,0111 
Waldmünchen Bezirksamt Waldmünchen 1 
 Bezirksamt Cham 0,0059 
Deggendorf Bezirksamt Deggendorf 0,9959 
Kemnath Bezirksamt Kemnath 0,9942 
Vohenstrauß Bezirksamt Vohenstrauß 0,9908 
Roding Bezirksamt Roding 0,9856 
Cham Bezirksamt Cham 0,9941 
Gießen Kreis Gießen 1 
 Kreis Schotten 0,1716 
Büdingen Kreis Büdingen 1 
 Kreis Schotten 0,5519 
Lauterbach Kreis Lauterbach 1 
 Kreis Schotten 0,1058 
Alsfeld Kreis Alsfeld 1 
 Kreis Schotten 0,1706 
Bergstraße Kreis Heppenheim 0,9440 
 Kreis Bensheim 0,8756 
Darmstadt Kreis Darmstadt 1 




1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Darmstadt (continued) Kreis Dieburg 0,0666 
Dieburg Kreis Dieburg 0,9334 
Witzenhausen Kreis Witzenhausen 0,9854 
Alzey Kreis Alzey 0,7812 
 Kreis Oppenheim 0,3705 
 Kreis Worms 0,0277 
Bingen Kreis Bingen 1 
 Kreis Oppenheim 0,0157 
 Kreis Alzey 0,2188 
Mainz Kreis Mainz 1 
 Kreis Oppenheim 0,6138 
Worms Kreis Worms 0,9723 
Birkenfeld Land Oldenburg - Landesteil Birkenfeld 0,8062 
 Kreis Sankt Wendel-Baumholder (Rest) 0,9266 
Saarburg Kreis Saarburg 0,7077 
 Kreis Trier 0,1329 
Trier Kreis Trier 0,7847 
Kusel Bezirksamt Kusel 0,9580 
Zweibrücken Bezirksamt Zweibrücken 0,9116 
Ludwigshafen Bezirksamt Ludwigshafen 1 
 Bezirksamt Frankenthal (Pfalz) 0,2181 
Frankenthal (Pfalz) Bezirksamt Frankenthal (Pfalz) 0,7819 
Jülich Kreis Jülich 1 
 Kreis Erkelenz 0,0460 
Erkelenz Kreis Erkelenz 0,9540 
Lippstadt Kreis Lippstadt 1 
 Kreis Detmold 0,0178 
Detmold Kreis Detmold 0,9822 
Osterholz Kreis Osterholz 0,7890 
Verden Kreis Verden 0,7887 
Blankenburg (Nieders.) Kreis Blankenburg 0,2437 
Osterode am Harz Kreis Osterode am Harz 1 
 Kreis Grafschaft Hohenstein (Provinz Sachsen) 0,0622 
Hildesheim-Marienburg Kreis Hildesheim 1 
 Kreis Marienburg 0,8851 
 Kreis Gandersheim 0,0241 
Wolfenbüttel Kreis Wolfenbüttel 0,8278 
 Kreis Marienburg 0,1149 
 Kreis Wernigerode (Provinz Sachsen) 0,0424 
Gandersheim Kreis Gandersheim 0,9706 
Peine Kreis Peine 1 




1950 districts 1933 districts Share 
Braunschweig Kreis Braunschweig 0,9876 
Helmstedt Kreis Helmstedt 0,9729 
 Landkreis Haldensleben (Provinz Sachsen) 0,0036 
Land Hadeln Kreis Land Hadeln 1 
 Hamburgisches Landgebiet 0,0156 
Cuxhaven Hamburgisches Landgebiet 0,2937 
Harburg Kreis Harburg 0,7840 
Stade Kreis Stade 0,9922 
Goslar Kreis Goslar 0,8000 
 Kreis Gandersheim 0,0053 
Salzgitter Kreis Goslar 0,2000 
 Kreis Wolfenbüttel 0,1375 
Bremen Land Bremen 1 
 Stadtkreis Wesermünde 1 
 Landkreis Osterholz 0,2110 
 Landkreis Verden 0,2113 
Hamburg Stadt Hamburg 1 
 Stadt Altona 1 
 Stadt Harburg-Wilhelmsburg 1 
 Stadt Wandsbek 1 
 Hamburgisches Landgebiet 0,6129 
 Kreis Stormarn 0,4976 
 Kreis Pinneberg 0,1534 
 Kreis Harburg 0,2160 
 Kreis Stade 0,0078 
Herzogtum Lauenburg Kreis Herzogtum Lauenburg 0,9819 
 Hamburgisches Landgebiet 0,0595 
 Kreis Schönberg (Mecklenburg) 0,0276 
 Landgebiet Lübeck 0,7305 
Stormarn Kreis Stormarn 0,5024 
 Hamburgisches Landgebiet 0,0183 
Pinneberg Kreis Pinneberg 0,8466 
Eutin Land Oldenburg - Landesteil Lübeck 1 












Hiermit erkläre ich, die vorliegende Dissertation selbstständig angefertigt und mich keiner anderen 
als der in ihr angegebenen Hilfsmittel bedient zu haben. Insbesondere sind sämtliche Zitate aus 
anderen Quellen als solche gekennzeichnet und mit Quellenangaben versehen. 
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